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PREFACE
The papers collected here are the product of a workshop on “The United States and Asian
Security” held on 9-11 March, 2001 at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. The workshop
brought together specialists in Asian security issues from the United States and England to dis-
cuss regional security issues from a variety of perspectives.
The rich discussion and debate during the workshop are reflected in the arguments pre-
sented in the following chapters, which we have grouped into two parts: The Role of the United
States in Asia, and Asian Security in a Regional Perspective. This collection is one of the first to
study 21st century Asian security policy both in its regional context and with regard to the major
role played by the United States. It is the first to highlight the findings of the weapons data proj-
ect of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies and to examine their implications for
Asian security. Finally, the collection features mainly younger scholars—graduate students and
professors—at early stages of their careers, but with impressive regional expertise and analytic
skills. The Peace Studies Program is grateful for their participation in the project.  We would
also like to thank the other participants in the workshop who wrote papers, served as discussants,
and contributed comments that have improved the quality of this collection: Greg Brazinsky,
Allen Carlson, Tom Christensen, Wade Huntley, Peter Katzenstein, Barry Strauss, Eric
Tagliacozzo, Takao Takahara, and Joel Wit.
The workshop was sponsored by Cornell’s Peace Studies Program, with funding from an
institutional grant to the Program from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Matthew Evangelista and Judith Reppy organized the workshop, with help from Jae-Jung Suh
and Allen Carlson. Elaine Scott and Sandra Kisner provided essential administrative support for
the workshop, and Sandra Kisner contributed significantly to the editorial task of producing this
publication.
1INTRODUCTION:
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIAN SECURITY
Matthew Evangelista
George W. Bush came into office in January 2001 with a team of foreign-policy advisers
largely inherited from his father. Their experience ranged from negotiating the Soviet Union’s
military withdrawal from Eastern Europe to forging a multinational coalition to wage war
against Iraq and end its occupation of Kuwait. Expertise in Asian affairs was conspicuously
absent from the collective résumé of the Bush team.
Not surprisingly, the administration’s first initiatives towards Asia reflected both the
experiences of its main foreign policymakers and a certain ambivalence about how to deal with
issues that had not loomed large on their radar screens—at least not outside of the Cold-War
context. Indeed, to refer to the early policy moves of the Bush administration as initiatives is per-
haps inaccurate. Many were, rather, reactions to prior policies of the Clinton administration or to
events that caught the Bush team by surprise.
In the first category was Korea. Clinton’s State Department had attempted to deal with
North Korea’s pursuit of missile and nuclear-weapons technology essentially by bribery. In
return for constraints on its missile tests and inspections of its nuclear facilities, the United States
would provide food aid and technical assistance and give its blessing to efforts by the South Ko-
rean government at North-South rapprochement. Distracted by the controversy over who actually
won the U.S. presidential election of November 2000, and giving priority to trying to secure an
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the Clinton administration failed to nail down the final de-
tails of a deal with North Korea.
The new Bush administration was divided over how to proceed. Secretary of State Colin
Powell initially signaled that the administration would take up where its predecessor had left off.
Officials in the Defense Department and National Security Council quickly repudiated that posi-
tion. They preferred to put a freeze on relations with North Korea, even at the risk of undermin-
ing the “sunshine policy” of South Korea’s President Kim Dae-Jung. The arguments put forward
to justify a go-slow approach to the North held echoes of the Cold War and the Bush team’s un-
derstanding of how the East-West confrontation in Europe had ended. Limiting North Korea’s
21 Erik Eckholm, “China Agrees to Return Partly Dismantled Spy Plane as Cargo,” New York
Times, 29 May 2001, p. A8.
nuclear capabilities would be insufficient without substantial cuts in its conventional military
forces. Limiting military forces would be a reliable route to security only if accompanied by
moves towards greater openness in North Korea’s regime—otherwise, lack of trust would under-
mine further progress. Within months, however, the Bush administration had reconsidered its all-
or-nothing approach, which had in any case been rejected outright by the North Korean govern-
ment, and seemed willing to pursue the diplomacy that Clinton’s State Department had initiated.
Diplomacy carried the day in the next major issue of Asian security to confront the new
administration. On 1 April 2001, a fighter-interceptor jet of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) collided with a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft and forced it to land on PRC territory. The
Chinese jet evidently crashed, killing the pilot. The PRC government detained the 24-member
crew of the U.S. plane for 11 days while demanding an apology. The U.S. government won the
crew’s release by saying it was very sorry for the loss of the Chinese pilot’s life and for landing
without permission. It eventually managed to get the valuable EP-3 spy plane back, dismantled
in crates, and it paid the Chinese government nearly $35,000 for its expenses (China had de-
manded $1 million). As one administration official explained, “as far as Defense Department
accounting goes, this is pretty close to zero. It’s cheaper than sending delegations back and forth
to talk about it.”1
Thus the Bush administration was compelled to deal with the People’s Republic of China
in a diplomatic crisis, with military overtones, before it had successfully fashioned an overall
China policy. The Republican Party was already deeply divided over China: one faction was ex-
tremely critical of the regime’s record on human rights and still nostalgic for the days when the
United States acknowledged only Taiwan as the legitimate representative of China. Another was
willing to look the other way on human rights in order to pursue investment opportunities in
China’s vast potential market and to take advantage of its pool of low-wage labor. Some Repub-
licans expressed concern about the emergence of China as the next major military threat to the
United States, replacing the Soviet Union as a challenger to U.S. hegemony. Others were more
complacent and believed that China could be smoothly integrated into a U.S.-dominated interna-
tional system.
3Relations between Japan and the United States were also strained during the first months
of the Bush administration. On February 9, 2001, a Navy submarine, the USS Greenville, hit and
sank a Japanese fishing boat off the coast of Hawaii during a rapid ascent, resulting in the death
of nine Japanese, including high school students and teachers who were on a field trip. The sub-
sequent investigation revealed that the submarine was playing host to a party of civilian observ-
ers, some of whom were actually at the controls when the commander ordered the emergency as-
cent because they were running behind schedule in returning to port. The commander was forced
to resign from the Navy, but Japanese sentiment was outraged that he was not punished more
severely. This incident, along with an alleged rape involving U.S. military personnel on Guam,
stoked anti-American feeling in Japan, not least because they echoed earlier incidents in which
the United States military has appeared insensitive to Japanese public opinion.
The crises with China and Japan and the Bush administration’s contradictory approach to
Korea came as surprises to everyone. Yet, within the scholarly community of Asia specialists,
the broader questions about U.S. policy and Asian security have received considerable attention.
In March 2001 the Peace Studies Program at Cornell convened a workshop on “The United
States and Asian Security” to present some of the results of some of this academic research and
to discuss its implications for future U.S. policy. One impetus for the workshop was the comple-
tion of a major data project on trends in Chinese military forces by Dr. Randall Forsberg’s Insti-
tute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. Forsberg’s paper, revised and published here, kicked
off discussion at the conference with a controversial argument. She suggested that U.S. military
activities in Asia, including deployments and arms sales, were difficult to justify on the basis of
present or foreseeable Chinese military capabilities. She warned that U.S. actions threatened to
recreate a Cold-War situation in Asia, including a costly and potentially dangerous arms race.
Other participants suggested that U.S. policy was not driven so much by Chinese military
capabilities but rather by concerns that China not use force to reunite with Taiwan. Much of U.S.
policy in Asia, in this view, revolves around the Taiwan issue. The United States has played a
positive role in the dispute between Beijing and Taipei, especially compared to the alternative of
letting regional powers sort things out themselves. Similarly, with respect to Japan, American ef-
forts to encourage Japan to expand its military activities in the region risk alienating a number of
countries, including the former Japanese colonies of Korea and Taiwan. From this perspective, a
continuing U.S. presence is reassuring to most states in the region (including possibly China),
4whose historical memories of Japanese expansionism in the 1930s would make them reluctant to
countenance an increase in Japan s military role.
Debates about the proper role of the United States in Asian security lay at the heart of the
March workshop. Indeed, the very title of the workshop—“The United States and Asian Secu-
rity”—is deliberately ambiguous, as Peter Katzenstein pointed out in his opening remarks. Do
we consider the United States to be part of Asia, and, thus, naturally concerned about the secu-
rity of its own region? Such an interpretation might have been clearer if we had chosen the term
“Asia-Pacific,” for example. Or is Asia some other place, independent of the United States, with
its own security concerns? In that case, the United States might expect to influence Asian secu-
rity, for good or ill, but many of the key issues that concern Asian governments and people
would be driven more by regional dynamics than by the behavior of the United States. Finally,
aside from questions about the relevance of the United States, what do we mean by Asia? Which
countries are within the purview of our discussion?
The last question was the easiest to answer. The papers presented at the workshop dealt
primarily with the major countries of East Asia—China, Taiwan, Japan, and the Koreas—and
with Russia, a country geographically situated in Asia, and, in the post-Soviet era, increasingly
involved in matters affecting Asian security. No papers focused explicitly on southwest Asian
states, such as Pakistan and India, but they and other countries were brought up when relevant to
particular issues under discussion.
The question of the place of the United States in the region remained a difficult and con-
troversial one, but we have sought to turn it to our advantage in presenting the findings of the
workshop. We have divided this Occasional Paper into two parts. The first looks at the role of
the United States in Asian security, and, in particular, how U.S. military deployments, strategy,
and alliance relations have affected developments there. The second examines the dynamics of
Asian regional security without according the United States a privileged role. The countries of
the region share a long history of interaction, predating the rise of the United States as a naval
and air power with worldwide reach. Moreover, the demise of the bipolar system that character-
ized the Cold War has given rise to many security issues that were not salient in the context of
superpower conflict. They are better studied within their specific regional context.
The volume begins with Randall Forsberg’s analysis of military developments in China
and her warning about an emerging new Cold War in Asia -- the result, she argues, primarily of
5U.S. military policies there. Jae-Jung Suh of Cornell’s Department of Government follows with a
study of U.S. military policy towards North and South Korea. His careful political and military
analysis is congenial to Forsberg’s in that he finds much of the U.S. policy of “containgagement”
(a neologism combining containment and engagement) contradictory and counterproductive. It
seems more likely to exacerbate security problems on the Korean peninsula than alleviate them.
Professor Suh expresses particular concern that U.S. actions not inadvertently derail the process
of North-South reconciliation, so unthinkable just a decade ago.
A more positive assessment of the role of the United States is found in the paper by John
Swenson-Wright of Cambridge University. He traces the post-World War II history of the alli-
ance between the United States and Japan and finds much to admire. He documents a number of
incidents in which new scholarship suggests that the U.S. government was more sensitive to
Japanese culture and political exigencies than is commonly thought and argues that public opin-
ion in Japan is evolving to support a more realistic security policy for Japan. Finally, Alan Segal,
now at the Council on Foreign Relations, discusses an issue that very much involves the United
States: the plans for deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) systems in Asia. The U.S.
government, since the Clinton administration, has described the threat that ostensibly drives the
development of TMD in the region as stemming from North Korea’s pursuit of the capability to
launch long-range ballistic missiles. But the interpretation of that threat, as well as alternative
means to deal with it (such as arms control), are determined to a large extent by the United States
itself. Segal’s chapter provides an assessment of the technical capabilities of the North Korean
missile program, details on the proposed U.S. systems, and a country-by-country consideration
of the military, political, and diplomatic consequences of TMD deployment.
The second part of the volume begins with an analysis of China’s regional security policy
by Suisheng Zhao of the University of Denver. The People’s Republic of China, according to
Professor Zhao, has in the post-Cold War era considered good relations with its neighbors a cru-
cial component of its security policy. This orientation marks a change from the early years fol-
lowing the communist revolution, when the PRC, in striving for great-power status, was some-
times described as “a regional power without a regional policy.” Professor Zhao’s analysis
covers relations between China and neighbors such as Vietnam, Mongolia, and Russia; questions
of border disputes; China’s longstanding rivalry with Japan; the extent to which the PRC poses a
6threat to weaker countries in the region; and, finally, how relations with the United States affect
China’s regional policy.
In devising its regional security policy, Japan faces a choice, as Lisa Sansoucy, a PhD
candidate in Cornell’s Department of Government, discusses. It can emphasize its relationship
with the United States and deal on a bilateral basis with its neighbors, or it can work towards the
establishment of multilateral institutions for regional security. Since 1991, argues Sansoucy, Ja-
pan has pursued multilateralism, with U.S. blessing, through the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. How Japan came to embrace regional multilateralism is best
explained by an analysis of the domestic politics of Japanese security policy. In particular, San-
soucy show how liberals in the Foreign Ministry promoted an understanding of Japan’s national
identity that made the “self-binding” restraints of multilateral cooperation seem compatible with
Japan’s security interests.
Although the end of the Cold War eliminated the factor of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in East
Asia, it did not render Russia’s influence insignificant. On the contrary, as Cristina Chuen of the
Monterey Institute of International Studies argues, the provinces of the Russian Federation that
make up what Russians call the “Far East” have become key elements in the overall Asian secu-
rity environment. Conflicts between the Far Eastern regions and Moscow have international
repercussions, not least because they concern such issues as control over former Soviet military
bases, including nuclear facilities, and military industry. Questions of immigration, organized
crime, and trade, especially for the regions that border China, are of particular concern. So are
border disputes—particularly the long unresolved status of the southern Kuril Islands and Sakha-
lin, claimed by Japan as its “northern territories,” but occupied by the Soviet Union in the wake
of World War II, and still populated and controlled by Russians. Chuen’s paper examines how
domestic center-periphery relations between Moscow and its Far Eastern regions affect Russian
policy towards its Asian neighbors, including the United States.
America’s security interests have been reconstituted following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The place of the United States in
Asian regional security and of Asia in U.S. security calculations, however, remain as enduring
issues. The papers in this volume serve as an introduction to the context and issues at stake, and
are, we hope, a contribution to more informed public discussion and policy making.
PART  I
The Role of the United States in Asia
1 SIPRI data. Available at http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mex_database1.html.
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THE COMING ARMS RACE IN ASIA:
CAN WE AVOID REPEATING THE COLD WAR WITH NEW PLAYERS?
Randall Forsberg
The United States and the other major Western industrial nations have had a decade to
adjust to the fact that none of them faces an imminent threat of major conventional war. The dis-
solution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany, along with
the subsequent decline of the Russian economy and Russian armed forces, have created a situa-
tion in which, for the first time in over a century, no major industrial country faces another large,
hostile industrial country with the capability to launch a military invasion.
Despite this revolution in international affairs, the military policies of the United States
and its allies have remained stunningly unchanged. U.S. military spending has declined, but only
back to the pre-Reagan Cold War norm: it remains as high today in real terms as it was during
the Cold War (the peacetime years between 1950 and 1980). At over $300 billion, the U.S. mil-
itary budget is seven times larger than those of the next biggest spenders, Japan and Russia,
whose annual military spending is about $40 billion each. The next highest spenders—France,
Germany, Britain, and Italy—are all major U.S. NATO allies. Military expenditures in these
nations remain close to their Cold War peaks. The military spending of China is estimated to be
about the same as that of Italy, around $25 billion.1
The continued high level of military spending is just one of several unchanging features
of military policies in the West. Other features are:
C On-going quantity production and vigorous competition for export of high-tech weapon
systems previously justified as needed, either globally or regionally, to counter military
threats from or originating in the Soviet Union or Russia;
C The expansion of facilities for U.S. forward military basing in the Asia-Pacific region,
with the support of Japan and despite the improving relations between the two Koreas
and the admission of China to the World Trade Organization.
92 Over the period from 2002 to 2012, total U.S. nuclear warheads are expected to go down from
10,600 to 10,000. That total includes about 2,000 tactical warheads, of which 800 are active. Of
the 8,000 strategic warheads, over 6,000 are active today, which just 2,200 are expected to be
active by 2012. However, the other 5,800 will be held in reserve in a condition in which they can
be pulled out relatively quickly (some very quickly; others would take weeks or months to get
back into service). In the meantime, the U.S. nuclear weapon production complex is budgeted to
be complete refurbished, so that all of the 10,000 weapons to be kept can be given their tritium
replacements and kept in good working order. See “Faking Nuclear Restraint: The Bush Admin-
istration’s Secret Plan for Strengthening U.S. Nuclear Forces,” Natural Resources Defense
Council, Washington, DC, 13 February 2002.
C The refusal of the United States to respond to Russian pleas to move rapidly toward deep
cuts in nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and other steps to reduce the
risk of nuclear war and foster nonproliferation;2 and
C New efforts in the United States to build national and theater missile defenses and other
weapons and equipment with which the U.S. military seek “full-spectrum dominance”
across the range of potential forms of warfare in all parts of the world, from minor to full
scale.
The West’s failure to explore a new approach to military policy and military aspects of
foreign policy is increasingly dangerous. The world is standing on the threshold of a new con-
ventional and nuclear arms race in Asia, which is likely to be extremely dangerous in itself and
to lead to a new Cold War-like armed confrontation between parts of Asia and the United States.
This would divert financial resources, human energy, and channels of communication away from
constructive projects, openness, and democratization in these nations and into self-perpetuating
cycles of fear, secrecy, concealment, and hostility.
In this paper I begin by giving an overview of the likely lines of alliance and confronta-
tion in a new Cold War in Asia—that is, an intensified, hostile stand-off chiefly between China
(or China and Russia), on the one hand, and the United States, Japan, and South Korea on the
other, with most other nations in East and Southeast Asia lining up on the U.S. side. I then sur-
vey trends in the development of China’s armed forces. Today China and other Asian nations
stand at a fork in the road: Since 1980 “modernization” and growth in military spending and
forces have been modest. Although the end of the Cold War did not lead to any major military
cuts, the Asian economic crisis reduced planned rates of modernization in several countries. The
question now is whether forces will remain roughly constant or, if relations between the two
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Koreas continue to improve, decline in size; or whether, as economic conditions permit, there
will be substantial new increases in the quantity and quality of conventional armed forces in
several countries and, in China, a significant expansion of the nuclear arsenal.
Next I look at the evidence that U.S. policy is, in fact, moving toward a strategy of mili-
tary containment toward China, which is likely to evolve into a Cold War-like confrontation.
Finally, I look at the likely impact on China of the unchanging aspects of U.S. and other
Western military policies, and the new U.S. policy of containment. I conclude that taken togeth-
er, Western competition for exports of high-tech weapons and equipment, increased U.S. mili-
tary presence in Asia, the U.S. refusal to make deep cuts in nuclear weapons, U.S. national and
theater missile defense programs, and other systems for “full-spectrum dominance” are likely to
foster the emergence of a new Cold War in Asia. This will involve new build-ups of conven-
tional and nuclear forces and, as a direct consequence of these build-ups, deteriorating relations
among China, Japan, the United States, and other nations.
The Concept and Meaning of a New Cold War in Asia
We can already identify not only the key players in a New Cold War in Asia, but also
their roles—roles remarkably parallel to those of various nations at the outset of the Cold War in
Europe. Despite having neither comparable armed forces nor a comparable strategic location rel-
ative to U.S. political and economic interests, China is being put in the position of playing the
role of Russia, that is, “the bad guy.” Japan and South Korea have roles in Northeast Asia resem-
bling those of Britain, France, and Germany in Europe: previously warring countries themselves,
now trying to live at peace with each other while fending off the bad guy, but not fully trusting
each other. Clearly Japan in Asia plays the role of Germany in Europe: this is the country most
feared because of its tremendous economic base, the related potential for a major build-up of
armed forces, and its history of military aggression and imperialism in the region. Meanwhile,
Taiwan plays a role comparable to that of East Germany, where the issue of continued separation
or unification was a persistent obstacle to the development of a stable long-term peace in the
region.
As became increasingly clear over the course of the 50-year Cold War, the role of the
United States in Europe was not only and perhaps even not mainly to help defend U.S. allies
against the designated enemy—even though that was the purpose stressed for public consump-
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tion. Given the low risk of a deliberate Soviet attack on NATO countries, the more basic role, in
the view of decision makers, was to help preserve the peace against any form of unraveling—for
example, Germany once again unifying and become a military threat to the rest of Europe, or any
pair of countries among Britain, France, Germany, and Russia combining to threaten the others.
Now, even more than over the past half century, the United States is settling in to play
the role of “power balancer” for the next 50-100 years in the Asia-Pacific region. This is clear
from several recent steps to expand and entrench a dominant U.S. military presence in East Asia.
These include the new U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, plans to maintain U.S.
bases in Korea after unification, increased U.S. naval deployments in the Pacific, and on-going
development of naval-based theater missile defenses for joint use with Japan and possibly Tai-
wan and Korea. The new U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines permit the United States to
use Japanese naval and air ports and other infrastructure to support U.S. military deployments for
any purpose, anywhere in the world, without prior consultation or agreement with Japan. This
means that Japanese territory could be used as a base for U.S. military operations against China
in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. The great bulk of U.S. military forces in Japan are already
stationed in Okinawa, where the main airport is three hours distance by plane from Tokyo, but
just one hour from Taiwan. At the same time, Japan’s participation in a joint project with the
United States to develop and deploy a naval-based theater missile defense system poses a poten-
tial future threat to the viability of China’s strategic nuclear forces. These two new programs
unite the United States and Japan in ways that cut right to the heart of China’s chief security
concerns and must be perceived as threatening by China.
Regarding U.S. relations with South Korea, the private statement by North Korean leader
Kim Jong Il in the June 2002 summit with South Korean President Kim Dae Jun that a continued
U.S. military presence in Korea after unification would be acceptable may be an expression of
the continued Korean fear of Japan as a potentially aggressive nation, which will be kept at bay
by U.S. military presence. There is evidence that China supported this position in advance of the
Korean summit meetings. Like Korea, China remains worried about the potential future evolu-
tion of Japan’s military and political ambitions.
This combination of interests and actions puts the United States in a classic power-bal-
ancing position, protecting Taiwan with the aid of Japan; protecting Japan from China directly;
while protecting the Korea peninsula and China from Japan both by maintaining a large military
12
3 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress
(Annual Report) Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2001, p. 14, published
at: http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr2001/.
presence in Japan (mainly in Okinawa) and by retaining military bases in Korea. This role is
explicitly recognized in the Annual Report for 2001 of outgoing Secretary of Defense William S.
Cohen. In the section on U.S. Defense Strategy as it pertains to East Asia and the Pacific rim, the
Annual Report states: “maintaining significant and highly capable forces in East Asia and the
Pacific Rim . . . allows the United States to play a key role as regional balancer and security
guarantor to Allies.”3
Similarly, a new Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,
issued for the first time by the Pentagon in November 2000 (in compliance with Congressional
legislation), recognizes explicitly the likely impact on China of current U.S. policies. The first
part of the report, on “Goals of Chinese Grand Strategy, Security Strategy, and Military Strate-
gy,” accurately portrays the priority China has long given to economic development over mili-
tary development, and describes China as having been relatively sanguine about continuing this
emphasis until recently. Now, it says, U.S. policies and actions have begun to create a good deal
of concern:
[Recent] developments . . . have prompted some Chinese elites to question seri-
ously China’s longstanding benign security assessments that “peace and develop-
ment” are the primary international trends, that world war can be avoided, and
that [the] balance of global power is shifting from a bipolar to a multipolar
structure.
. . . [Among other things] Beijing suspects that new US-Japan Defense
Guidelines Review measures authorize Japanese military action beyond Japan’s
previous defense posture and prompt Tokyo to improve its regional force projec-
tion capabilities. Beijing also calculates that US efforts to develop national and
theater missile defenses will challenge the credibility of China’s nuclear deter-
rence and eventually be extended to protect Taiwan, a move that China would
consider a gross intervention in Chinese affairs. . . .
In the aftermath of Operation ALLIED FORCE’s success in Kosovo, Bei-
jing thinks it will have increasing difficulty managing potential U.S. meddling in
internal Chinese affairs or military interventions in potential conflict scenarios
involving China . . . China believes that [recent] trends indicate that it will be dif-
ficult for Beijing to develop a special relationship with Washington that would
fundamentally moderate any US intent to “contain” China or that would encour-
13
4 Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act: Annual Re-
port on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter referred to as Military
Power of China), Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2000, section I.A, pub-
lished at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm.
5 Ibid.
age the United States to cooperate with China in offsetting Japan’s growing
power.4
The report goes on to discuss likely Chinese responses to U.S. efforts to “contain” China,
concluding that for the near future, there are few practical options that China would see as being
to its advantage:
Since the 7 May 1999 bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade, China’s leaders
reportedly have been discussing ways to offset US power, to include accelerating
military modernization, pursing strategic cooperation with Russia, and increasing
China’s proliferation activities abroad. However, none of these options is likely to
improve fundamentally Beijing’s position.
China does not appear to have concluded that any of these options would
necessarily improve its security environment. Senior leaders resisted domestic
pressures in the early- and mid-1990s to raise the importance of defense develop-
ment in China’s national development strategy because of concern that doing so
would complicate efforts to ensure the growth and modernization of China’s
economy. Beijing believes that the economic growth is an important element in its
strategy for maintaining the stability of its domestic social environment; more-
over, foreign trade and investment links are central to China’s development of the
economic element of material (hard) component of national power. China’s lead-
ers also suspect that increasing the role of defense in national priorities would
only reinforce Washington’s efforts to contain China and justify Japan’s intent to
improve its force projection capability. Over the last decade, senior PLA strate-
gists periodically have cautioned China’s leaders to avoid being goaded by the
United States into a lopsided arms race that could derail China’s economic
modernization.5
As discussed in more detail below, the limited options open to China derive not only
from the self-imposed limits on China’s military spending, but also from the lack of a technolog-
ical infrastructure that would let China develop current-generation weapons and equipment or
military capabilities needed for “power projection.” Thus, it is not surprising that the Pentagon
Report attributes relatively limited and peaceful goals to China’s military policy:
China seeks to become the preeminent power among regional states in East Asia.
Beijing is pursuing a regional security strategy aimed at preserving what it per-
14
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ceives as its sovereign interests in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and elsewhere on
its periphery and protecting its economic interests, while at the same time pro-
moting regional stability.6
In contrast to the political pundits and journalists who casually exaggerate China’s military capa-
bilities and ambitions, the Pentagon has offered a relatively realistic assessment. Thus, U.S.
goals and policies in the region are not a product of deliberate or mistaken “worst-case analysis.”
Instead, the Clinton administration and now the Bush administration seem to be pursuing—with
open eyes—a strategy of containment, confrontation, and arms deployment which could lead to
an avoidable New Cold War.
Current and Likely Future Military Forces in China
The reason that U.S. and other Western military policies are likely to have a harmful im-
pact on security in Asia lies in large part in the character of Asia’s armed forces as they are
today.
Unlike the countries of Europe, those in Asia have not yet built up large inventories of
major weapon systems, diverse, technologically advanced military capabilities, or “power pro-
jection” forces. Instead of striving to prevent a repetition of the Cold War arms race in Asia,
however, the current policies of the United States and other Western countries toward China and
Russia are likely to foster conventional arms build-ups and arms races, a nuclear build-up on the
part of China, continued reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence of conventional war on the
part of Russia, and even further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The likelihood of fostering these developments is clearest in China, and the bare possibil-
ity of such developments in China in the not too distant future has already provoked concern and
some increased arming in Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and several nations in Southeast Asia. For
this reason, I will focus on China, describing the current state of Chinese armed forces in some
detail, as a basis for then discussing the likely interaction between Western military policies and
future Chinese arming.
There are three key weaknesses in China’s armed forces as they are today: First, in al-
most every area, China’s inventory of major weapon systems remains at the level of technology
15
that was reached in the United States in the early to mid-1950s and in Russia and Europe soon
after. As shown in Tables 1-5, which delineate the key features and trends of Chinese air,
ground, and naval forces, the overwhelming majority of China’s conventional weapon systems in
service today were either designed before 1958 or are Chinese variants of U.S. and Russian
systems designed by that time. China’s introduction of combat aircraft with technology from the
1970s is just beginning today, with imports and licensed production of Sukhoi Su-27 aircraft,
first flown in 1977. At the rate of procurement that has prevailed in China since the late 1980s
—about 60 combat aircraft per year—it will be 2020 at best before China’s air force is made up
primarily of these relatively modern aircraft.
Table 1
China’s Tank Force
Design
Country Design Era 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Russia WWII/1950s (built '50s-'60s) 4,550 4,650 4,750 4,850 4,850 4,650 3,950 3,950 3,400
Russia WWII/1950s (built '70s) 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750 2,750
China 1950s Era (built '80s) 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,600 1,600 800 800 700
Subtotal: 1950s Russian
Technology 9,300 9,400 9,500 9,600 9,200 9,000 7,500 7,500 6,850
China Chinese-designed Newer 250 325 400 500 600 700 800 850 910
Source: IDDS World Arms Database 2001, File 5A. Tank Holdings, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies,
Cambridge MA, 2001.
The “at best” caveat relates to China’s on-going effort to develop military-grade turbofan
engines for advanced combat aircraft, which will permit the production of a new generation of
Chinese-designed aircraft. So far, China’s inability to build the powerful engines that drive mod-
ern aircraft, tanks, and ships has proven a prohibitive obstacle to domestic development and pro-
duction of new systems. While China continues to pursue this goal, full conversion to even
1970s level technology—in combat aircraft, attack and ballistic missile submarines, tanks—will
remain beyond reach, except through imports. And hitherto, China has refused to commit the
exorbitant funds—probably doubling its defense spending—that would be required to import the
bulk of its ground, air, and naval systems from Russia. This means that 2020 is the earliest date
by which China is likely to be able to field a relatively modern air force. In the case of tanks and
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naval forces, and if there are continued problems with China’s engine design and manufacturing,
the actual date could be 2030.
A second key feature of China’s current and likely future military forces is the extent to
which, contrary to common speculation, they do not contain “power projection” capabilities,
and show no prospect of doing so for the foreseeable future. There are many aspects of military
forces which can provide, supplement, or support a power-projection capability. Aircraft carrier
and amphibious landing battle groups, surrounded by naval means of defense against opposing
aircraft, ships, and submarines, can bring ground attack aircraft and ground troops to distant
lands. Large-scale, long-range air transport can land with tanks and heavily equipped ground
forces; or they can drop in paratroopers and lighter equipment—assuming that they are operating
in an environment with “air superiority,” where they will not be shot down by ground- or air-
based anti-aircraft systems. Aerial refueling, global networks of reconnaissance, command, con-
trol, and communications, the ability to keep sea lanes free of surface ships and submarines that
could attack transport shipping—all are among the many features of an advanced military force
that permits projection of military power far from home territory.
China has none of these things, nor any prospect of getting them sooner than, at best, 30
years out. China may acquire a large cruiser (20,000 tons) which can carry a few STOL (short
take-off and landing) aircraft at some point between 2010 and 2020: no firm acquisition plan is
in place yet. Such a ship bears no comparison to the12 90,000-ton aircraft carriers in the current
U.S. fleet. In fact, China is unlikely to acquire even one surface ship comparable to the dozens of
Aegis cruisers which defend U.S. carriers, or a nuclear-powered attack submarine comparable to
scores available to defend U.S. carriers against other submarines before 2010, and the date for
acquisition of such sophisticated systems might well be 2020 or later. Similarly, huge air trans-
ports, air superiority, system-wide aerial refueling—none of these are in prospect for China.
In fact, those who raise the specter of China’s acquiring a “power-projection” capability
use the term in a very special sense, unlike its traditional sense in the United States. In the Uni-
ted States, the term means the ability to field armed forces in strength on a distant continent. In
the context of China, it means being able to pose a serious threat of successfully attacking and
occupying Taiwan, a part of China which lies not far offshore, with no intervening obstacle. Fur-
ther in the background are intimations of Chinese military threats to Japan and Chinese naval
forces guarding mineral resources in the South China Sea, but in political discussion, the exact
21
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nature of these potential operations, and the kinds of forces China would have to acquire to pull
them off are never described.
Today, China’s armed forces are restricted almost entirely to operations over land and
along the coast. China has large number of very small diesel-powered submarines, frigates, and
destroyers, with limited supplies of fuel and munitions, capable of engagements only at very
limited range. In the area of amphibious landing capability, which would be central to an attack
on Taiwan, China has actually reduced its overall capacity in recent years. Starting with several
dozen U.S.-made World War II era landing ships of about 4,000 tons each in the late 1940s,
China began to build replacements of the same size in the early 1980s; but the rate of building
has been so slow that today the landing capacity is just half the size it was in 1972. At the same
time, China has built a number of much smaller (1,500 ton) landing ships, which gave some
alternate capacity, but mainly for small scale operations around the coasts of China itself. It is
helpful to consider again the most recent Pentagon assessment of China’s military goals as “pre-
serving what it perceives as its sovereign interests in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and else-
where on its periphery and protecting its economic interests, while at the same time promoting
regional stability.”7
So far, China has not taken any overt steps to strengthen its capability to launch an inva-
sion and forced take-over of Taiwan, much less to “project power” against Japan or any other,
more distant nation.
Third, China’s nuclear forces have been remarkably stable and modest, compared with
those of the other four openly acknowledged nuclear-weapon powers. China developed its first
force of around 20 nuclear missiles that could reach the United States 30 years ago. Since that
time, China has developed two new generations of intercontinental nuclear missiles, missiles that
were increasingly invulnerable to pre-emptive attack by the United States. Unlike the other
nuclear-weapon states, however, it did not build ever-growing numbers of missiles, with an ever-
expanding target list. Each generation was limited to a true “minimum deterrent” capability. To
quote the Pentagon’s Military Power of China report:
[China’s] relatively small nuclear forces are intended for retaliation rather than a
first strike. Beijing’s objective is nuclear deterrence: to convince potential ene-
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9 Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25:2 (Fall
2000): 51-86.
mies that enough of China’s strategic weapons would survive an attack to inflict
unacceptable damage on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike. The only Chinese
missile system capable of targeting the continental United States is the CSS-4
ICBM. China reportedly has built 18 CSS-4 silos.8
Given these limitations, what military threats does China pose today, or might it pose in
future, that are a source of concern to the United States, Japan, Australia, and other countries? It
is widely recognized that following territorial defense, the main purpose of China’s armed forces
is to pose a threat of attack on Taiwan sufficiently great and plausible to ensure that Taiwan does
not attempt to declare independence. In the Fall 2000 issue of International Security, Brookings
fellow Michael O’Hanlon gives a detailed analysis demonstrating the limits of China’s ability to
threaten Taiwan.9 Apart from being unable to mount a successful airborne and amphibious
assault on Taiwan, China has only modest resources with which to try intimidate Taiwan short of
a full-scale attack. The two most widely cited scenarios involve either some means of halting or
impeding commercial shipping to the island (a naval blockade, or the threat of attacks on com-
mercial shipping with land-based missiles), or else use of China’s growing arsenal of short-range
ballistic missiles to attack targets such as air fields or electric grids on Taiwan. O’Hanlon points
out that even though China has about 200 missiles that can reach Taiwan and is increasing the
force by about 50 missiles a year, these missiles “would generally miss their targets by several
football fields, and almost always by the length of at least a single field.” He concludes that even
if China used all its missiles, it would still be limited to “a few hits or near hits against key tar-
gets” on land or at sea, but would then have no missiles left to maintain the coercive posture.
Even against civilian populations, he points out, comparable missiles used against citizens in the
Iran-Iraq war results in the deaths of 0-12 civilian deaths per missile.
O’Hanlon rates the potential for a Chinese blockade of commercial shipping a good deal
higher, and comments that “Taiwan might not be able to break such a blockade by itself.” But he
argues that if the United States helped Taiwan “the tide of battle would be strongly against the
23
10 Ibid.
11 “Within the next several years, both the CSS-6 and the CSS-7 are expected to incorporate
satellite-assisted navigation technology to improve their accuracy.” Military Power of China,
section III.A.1.
PRC,” and the blockade could be broken in a reasonably brief time and with small losses of com-
mercial ships and naval vessels.10
U.S. Defense Department analyses stress that eventually—possibly as soon as 2010—
China’s short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) may have the accuracy to pose a significantly
greater threat to military targets on Taiwan.11 The contention of this paper, however, is not that
China will never develop military capabilities that are more threatening than those they have
today, but, on the contrary, that the United States and its allies are setting out on the road of what
is sure to become an intensively interactive arms race. China’s deployment of missiles that can
reach Taiwan has already closely followed Taiwan’s acquisition of advanced combat aircraft
over the past decade. In 1992, after Taiwan had developed an Indigenous Defense Fighter, the
United States decided to drop its embargo of sales of advanced weapon systems to Taiwan and to
provide 150 F-16s. France agreed to sell Taiwan 60 Mirage 2000-5s, supplementing Taiwan’s
130 IDFs. Taken together, these aircraft are superior in quantity as well as quality to the attack
aircraft and interceptors with which China might have threatened an attack on Taiwan or pro-
vided air cover to naval ships heading for Taiwan. China protested against the sale of advanced
aircraft to Taiwan, which in China’s view, might make Taiwan feel sufficiently invulnerable to
move toward independence. From this viewpoint, China’s acquisition of M-9 and M-11 SRBMs,
which cannot all be intercepted by existing Taiwanese air defenses, merely restored the relative
balance of power that existed in 1990. The view from Taiwan, meanwhile, was that China was
about to acquire Russian Su-27s and Su-30s, which would overmatch the older Taiwanese air
fleet. But Taiwan’s acquisition of its new Taiwanese, U.S., and French aircraft has proceeded
much more quickly than China’s acquisition of new Russian types.
Thus, it is not surprising that according to a recent Defense Department report, The Secu-
rity Situation in the Taiwan Strait:
[B]y 2005, Taipei will possess a qualitative edge over Beijing in terms of signifi-
cant weapons and equipment. The TAF will have over 300 fourth generation
fighters. Six French-built Lafayette-class frigates, eight U.S. Knox-class frigates,
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and eight Perry-class frigates will form the nucleus of Taiwan’s naval force. Tai-
wan will possess an advanced air defense network, comprising an AEW [airborne
early warning] capability, an automated C2 system, and several modern SAM
[surface-to-air missile] systems, which will provide Taiwan with an enhanced
defensive capability against both aircraft and missiles. The mobility and fire-
power of Taiwan’s ground forces will have been improved with the acquisition of
additional tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery and attack
helicopters.
Taiwan’s primary security goal beyond 2005 will be to maintain the status
quo. . . .12
As this brief overview suggests, an intensified arms race between Taiwan and China
began in the early 1990s, with the acquisition on both sides, for the first time, of significant
numbers of U.S., European, and Russian weapons developed after 1970. Supported by a Cold
War mentality in the United States, the China-Taiwan arms race is likely to spiral upwards, with
the deployment of increasingly expensive and deadly forces on both sides, and to spread, little by
little, to Japan, the Korean peninsula, and Australia, as well as the United States.
Positioning China as the Key Enemy in a New Cold War
Given the slow pace of change, obsolete technology, and limited range of China’s current
armed forces, what are the grounds for treating China as a formidable military opponent? Equal-
ly important, what is the evidence that the United States has begun to turn in this direction?
It is widely recognized that the United States is pursuing a new kind of “double track”
approach in its policy toward China: On one side, U.S. non-military government agencies and
private corporations are rapidly increasing U.S.-China trade, as companies invest in cheap labor
in China and hope to win a big share of the huge market for consumer goods that is beginning to
emerge there. On the other side, U.S. military departments and agencies are gravitating more and
more to China as the key “bogeyman” needed to justify and focus U.S. military forces, policy,
and spending.
This bifurcated approach began under President Clinton with an emphasis on trade, but
has flowered fully under President Bush, whose administration has given much more attention to
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the military component of the policy. Increasingly, the U.S. government has depicted China as
the key player in an Asian group of actual or potential military opponents that includes Russia
(which is selling arms and military technology to China), North Korea (which has exported Rus-
sian Scud missiles and longer-range derivatives to many Third World nations), and, since May
2001, Pakistan (which is developing longer-range ballistic missiles with help from China and
North Korea, and new nuclear reactors with help from China). Increasingly, the U.S. government
is attempting to persuade other nations in East and South Asia to support the United States in
cases where U.S. policy may conflict with that of China (or any of the other three nations).
Well before the November 2000 election Condoleezza Rice (later appointed Bush’s
National Security Adviser) and others in the Bush camp indicated that, if elected, Bush would
take a harder line toward China and toward Russia and North Korea. In January 2000, for
example, while acting as Bush’s adviser on security matters, Rice argued in Foreign Affairs that
the United States should confront China militarily: “Even if there is an argument for economic
interaction with Beijing, China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its
military power is currently no match for that of the United States. But that condition is not neces-
sarily permanent. What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital interests,
particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea.”13
Rice defines future relations with China in terms of a zero-sum competition for power
and influence in the Asia-Pacific region, saying that the United States should focus its energies
“on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can
and will mold the character of the international political system extending even into South
Asia.”14
Later she continues:
China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This
means that China is not a “status quo” power but one that would like to alter
Asia’s balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic com-
petitor, not the “strategic partner” the Clinton administration once called it. . .
China’s success in controlling the balance of power depends in large part
on America’s reaction to the challenge. The United States must deepen its cooper-
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ation with Japan and South Korea . . . maintain its commitment to a robust mili-
tary presence in the region . . . [and] pay closer attention to India’s role in the
regional balance. . . . India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to
emerge as one.15
Rice concludes that if the United States faces a conflict in dealing with China, contain-
ment should take precedence over cooperation: “It is important to promote China’s internal
transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions.
Cooperation should be pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our
interests collide.”16
The power-balancing approach that Rice advocated was elaborated in greater detail in a
major study on the future of security in Asia published by the RAND Corporation early in
2001.17 (In May 2001, the lead author, Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed to Bush’s National
Security Council as special assistant for Gulf and Southwest Asia issues.) In a Research Brief
summarizing the study, the RAND authors assert that “Central to [U.S. objectives in Asia] is the
need to prevent the rise of a dominant power that might seek to undermine the U.S. role in
Asia. . . .”18 To achieve this objective, they say, the United States should, among other things:
C Complement its bilateral security alliances to create a broader security framework. This
multilateralization could ultimately include Japan, South Korea, Australia, and perhaps
Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand.
C Pursue a balance-of-power strategy among key Asian states that are not part of the U.S.
alliance structure, including China, India, and Russia.
They argue that with secure U.S. military bases in Northeast Asia, the United States
should put greater emphasis on Southeast Asia, “where a permanent U.S. combat presence is
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currently lacking . . . [T]he United States should seek to solidify existing access arrangements
and cement new ones with the Philippines, Indonesia, and possibly Vietnam.”19
They also suggest that it would be useful for the United States to establish military bases
in South Asia, where, they say, “U.S. military forces currently lack reliable access.” Finally, they
argue that the overall U.S. military posture in the Pacific should be strengthened through three
additional steps: “First, Guam should be built up as a major hub for power projection throughout
Asia . . . Second, the U.S. Air Force and Navy should work at developing new concepts of opera-
tions that would maximize the leverage of their combined forces in a future Pacific crisis . . .
Third, the Air Force should continue to review its future force structure to see if it might benefit
from a greater emphasis on longer-range combat platforms.”20
In sum, the approach to China recommended by key advisers included four main compo-
nents:
1. Preserving and strengthening existing U.S. military alliances in East and Southeast
Asia and the Pacific;
2. Developing new alliances or military relationships in that region and in South Asia;
3. Adding new military bases and building up existing military facilities and access out-
side of Japan and South Korea; and
4. Developing and producing a combination of offensive and defensive high-tech weap-
ons and related C3I systems that would give the United States an ever greater military edge over
China than it has today, regardless of the expected future Chinese military modernization.
Combined, the effect of these steps would be to encircle China in a well-developed web
of U.S. military alliances and forward military bases, “containing” the country both geographi-
cally and technologically in virtually the same manner that the United States attempted to “con-
tain” the former Soviet Union throughout the Cold War—but due to China’s relative military
weakness, with the prospect of even greater success.
By the spring of 2001, there was evidence that the United States was, in fact, pursuing a
new policy of containment toward China and putting into effect all of the recommendations
made in the recent RAND report. I will not review here the Bush administration’s heavy lobby-
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ing of Congress, the public, and foreign governments to build support for a crash National Mis-
sile Defense (NMD) program, which appears to be aimed more at China than at so-called “rogue
states.”21 This aspect of the administration’s Cold War approach to China has been extensively
covered in the media.
Apart from its NMD drive, the first step in the Bush administration’s new China policy
was to shift the emphasis of U.S. military operations from Europe and the Atlantic to Asia and
the Pacific, as had been proposed for several years in the long-term joint services planning study
JointVision 2020. In May, in the most detailed public comment to date on the administration’s
still unpublished military strategy review, review director Andrew Marshall, long-time head of
the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, declared that in the future, the emphasis of U.S. policy
will be on Asia. As a result, he said, the United States should rely increasingly on high-tech
weapon systems to maintain U.S. military pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific region in the face of
growing threats to U.S. military bases and naval forces in the area posed by the growing Chinese
force of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMS) capable of reaching Taiwan and Japan.22 Greater
reliance on long-range, high-tech weapons, favored by Marshall and by Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld but opposed by many senior military commanders, could help bring about several fun-
damental changes in the Pentagon: (1) a cutback in force size and operating costs appropriate to
reduced post-Cold War threats of major war; (2) increased spending on R&D and production of
high-tech weapon systems (including National Missile Defense) that might otherwise languish
for lack of funds; (3) increased emphasis on China as a potential military opponent of the United
States and its allies in Asia; and, finally, (4) a commitment to (and realistic method of) maintain-
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ing a strong U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region even if popular protests eventually
lead to cuts in U.S. forces and military bases in Okinawa and South Korea.
The New York Times report about the review was further amplified by discussion in the
military journal Stars and Stripes by Okinawa bureau chief David Allen and an interview with
Marshall. The Stars and Stripes exchange begins with a comment by Allen that the (still unpub-
lished) review appears to call for “the development of a missile defense system to shield U.S.
bases in the Pacific while focusing on stealth bombers, unmanned aircraft and a larger Navy
presence. It also calls for less reliance on U.S. bases in the West Pacific, vulnerable to missile
attacks.”23 In response, Marshall said that he does not favor reducing existing bases. “That char-
acterization of the review is wrong,” he said. “What we called attention to is how great the dis-
tances are in this theater, and how we need to develop strategies to overcome this. We were cer-
tainly not saying the bases should be given up. We just ought to pay more attention to Asia and
take into account its characteristics,” he said. “Actually, there’s nothing very novel about this.
It’s the same thing various studies have been saying for the last decade or so.”24
Also in May 2001, in an early signal of U.S. efforts to develop an improved relationship
with India—a relationship that could eventually entail military cooperation—Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage went to New Delhi to “consult Indian leaders about American’s
nuclear policies.” On the third anniversary of India’s nuclear tests, Armitage told Indian officials
“that the United States was worried about Pakistan’s development of a nuclear arsenal, but he
did not mention a paired worry about India’s own nuclear capacity,” suggesting that instead of
continuing to condemn the nuclear weapon programs of India and Pakistan equally the United
States may have accepted India’s claim to have a special right to its own minimum nuclear deter-
rent (given its self-defined role as the major power in South Asia).25 In a press conference after
the meeting, describing Libya, Iraq, and North Korea as countries against which U.S. missile
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defenses will be aimed, Armitage added that “American concerns about Pakistan were well
known,” as though Pakistan might be considered as close to the “rogue” group. And Indian offi-
cials announced that President Bush had accepted an invitation to visit India, at a time yet to be
determined.26 A change in U.S. policy toward India was confirmed in August, when unnamed
Bush administration representatives announced that the United States is preparing to drop the
economic and military sanctions imposed on India after its 1998 nuclear test explosions and
“moving on a broad front to strengthen relations with India, a nation it views as a neglected and
potentially important strategic ally and trading partner in Asia.”27
Initial U.S. efforts to strengthen U.S. bilateral military alliances with South Korea, Japan,
and Australia through a new multilateral, over-arching association were revealed in late July
2001, when Secretary of State Colin Powell capped a trip to Vietnam, China, Japan, and South
Korea with a visit to Australia on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS (Australia-
New Zealand-U.S.) Treaty. Caught off guard by a press conference question concerning whether
(as proposed in the Rand Report cited above) Australia, Japan, and South Korea would be coop-
erating with each other and with the United States more closely in the future, and if so why,
Powell responded:
Interesting, we were talking about this subject earlier in the day, as to whether or
not we might find ways of talking more in that kind of a forum. I don’t think it
would lead to any formal arrangement of the kind you suggest. But there might be
a need for us to seek opportunities to come together and talk more often. So yes,
we’ve talked about that, but not in the form of some formal kind of new organiza-
tion. We just began speaking about that today.28
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer then hastened to reassure the press that
the idea of multilateral consultation among the United States’ most powerful military allies in the
region was not a prelude a major military change in the region that China would undoubtedly
perceive as a threatening form of containment:
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As Colin says, this is something that we have discussed, we’ve also informally
discussed with the Japanese as well. So as not to allow a hare to rush away here,
we obviously—I think it must be obvious—wouldn’t want the sort of new archi-
tecture in East Asia which would be an attempt to kind of replicate NATO or
something like that. We are talking here just about an informal dialogue and the
question of whether we could do it at a more numerous level than two, that is, we
obviously have a dialogue with the Japanese, the Japanese with the United States,
the United States with us. Would there be a formulation where the United States
and the Japanese, for example, might be able to sit down together—not necessari-
ly, by the way at ministerial level, but perhaps at a lower level—to engage in
some sort of dialogue. That is something that we’ve been talking about. I’ve
spoken to the Japanese foreign minister, Mrs. Tanaka, about it as well, when I met
with her recently in Hanoi. So it’s really, at this stage, just an idea. I don’t think
too much should be interpreted.29
Note that despite the questioner’s original formulation including South Korea in the po-
tential consultative group—and despite the recent RAND proposal that South Korea be included
in such a group—Downer made no mention of South Korea. One reason for this might be that
such consultations would be much more problematic for South Korea than for Japan, Australia,
and the United States. Though more immediately vulnerable to a military attack by China, South
Korea has little if any fear of such an attack, and tends to look on China as a friend and on Japan
—which has invaded Korea many times and occupied Korea for the first half of this century—as
a potential military opponent.
Many China experts in the United States have argued that China’s military strength and
the prospective for its actual use of armed force in the region should not be over-estimated—and
that new Taiwanese political challenges or U.S. military challenges to China could be counter-
productive, generating greater than expected military buildups, or actual use of force against Tai-
wan, or both.30 Secretary of State Powell and other members of the Bush administration worked
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to improve U.S. relations with China in the wake of tension over the P-3 aircraft downing, the
spying trials of U.S. citizens and residents in China, and China’s strong objections to the Nation-
al Missile Defense program. But the effort to keep diplomatic and trade relations on an even keel
seems largely unrelated to the U.S. military strategy of containing China militarily by creating a
ring of U.S. military alliances around it, and by keeping it at a permanent disadvantage with
respect to the military technology incorporated in U.S. and allied military forces. To the extent
that this strategy has rational underpinnings and is not just a rationale for high military spending,
it is the product of a 19th century view of the world, in which China’s loss of power and influ-
ence is the United States’ gain, and vice versa. In this view, the specific military threats that
China might be able to pose outside its own territory, and the stakes at issue in potential military
confrontations between China, the United States, and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region
have little bearing on U.S. military deployments and policy. What is important in shaping U.S.
policy is the geographic range and political depth of intangible, unmeasurable Chinese and U.S.
spheres of influence.
The Likely Impact of U.S. and Western Policies on Conventional and Nuclear Arming in
China
The features of U.S. and other Western military policies that have failed to show an
appropriate change in the post-Cold War period, along with the new U.S. strategy of containing
China militarily, are likely to spur more rapid and threatening new arming in China than would
otherwise occur. In combination, China’s reactions could be very serious indeed.
The policy area which most directly involves Europe as well as the United States is on-
going quantity production and vigorous competition for export of high-tech weapon systems. It
is likely to contribute directly to speeding up technological advances in China’s conventional
forces, and possibly in its nuclear delivery systems. On-going and likely future arms exports to
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea will put pressure on China to match their ever-improving tech-
nology. China has long tried to import Western engines for its military aircraft and other plat-
forms: currently, Britain is providing Rolls Royce engines for China’s latest tank—its first really
modern tank—and China hopes to obtain Rolls Royce engines for its JH-7 light bomber.
Of course, the principal supplier of weapons and military technology to China is Russia;
but to some extent, this, too, is a product of Western policies. When NATO added former Soviet
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allies as new members while refusing to consider Russia as a potential near-future member, and
when, at the same time, the West offered no political, military, or financial incentive to stop
exports as a source of income for maintaining the Russian arms industry, pressure for Russian
arms exports to China was bound to be high. Generally speaking, Western markets do not want
Russian arms, former Soviet allies in Europe prefer Western arms (if they can afford them); and
Iraq and Syria are out of the picture as export clients—the former because of the UN sanctions,
the latter because it cannot afford to pay for new arms. This leaves just India and China as major
clients for Russian exports.
By failing to develop a global approach to security that would include Russia and damp-
en down the industrial pressure for arms exports during a period of declining domestic demand,
the West both insured that potentially threatening Russian military technologies would be
released to China, and, in more direct ways, has participated in advancing China’s military-
related technology.
Given the actual state of China’s armed forces and the inability of China (shared with all
other developing nations) to develop an independent defense-industrial base without a great deal
more help from the industrial countries, it is safe to say that decades would be added to the peri-
ods suggested above for China’s acquisition of modern military forces—let along limited “power
projection” forces—were it not for the international arms trade.
The new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, which give the United States free rein to use
Japanese bases for any foreign intervention and commit Japan to provide maintenance and
refueling infrastructure to support such missions, have made Japan a virtual partner in the quasi-
explicit U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan against an attack by China. China must perceive the
greater involvement of Japan in putting a potential barrier between China and Taiwan not only as
threatening in itself, but also as encouraging Japan to re-assert a broader, more dominating
approach to security relations in East Asia. This remilitarization of Japanese foreign policy is
one of the greatest fears of China and of other countries in the region, particularly North and
South Korea. Given this likely reaction on the part of China and the lack of new security threats
in East Asia, it is hard to understand why the new Guidelines were adopted.
The refusal of the United States to respond to Russian pleas to move rapidly toward deep
cuts in nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and other steps to reduce the risk of
nuclear war and foster nonproliferation have, for the time being, eliminated any prospect that
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medium-range missiles, with poor accuracy. North Korea has conducted only one test of a mis-
sile at a range over 1000 miles—a 1998 test in which the missile passed over Japan—and that
test failed when the missile’s third stage exploded. Siegel also shows why, even with the most
favorable assumptions, North Korea is unlikely to be able to develop an ICBM sooner than a
decade after it resumes missile tests. North Korea suspended all missile tests in 1999, to facilitate
talks with the United States on a permanent missile development ban; and it has promised to sus-
tain the test moratorium until 2003 even though talks with the United States have not resumed
since President Bush was elected.
China would seriously consider moving toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, in a joint effort
with India, Pakistan, and the other nations of East and South Asia.
The U.S. plan to proceed with national and theater missile defenses, which could nullify
China’s minimum deterrent and thereby pose a prohibitive obstacle to China’s ability to deter the
United States from potential military involvement in Taiwan is likely to provoke an expansion of
China’s intercontinental nuclear forces. China is currently attempting to acquire improved strate-
gic weapon technology from Russia; and it is putting greater emphasis on imports of Russian
naval technology, which will help put TMD ships deployed by Japan and other countries at
greater risk.
Given the non-existent ICBM from North Korea,31 the decision by the United States to
deploy a light national missile defense in the region most convenient for intercepting missiles
from China—and from nowhere else—seems almost determined to provoke a substantial in-
crease in China’s intercontinental nuclear missile force. In addition, the decision by the United
States and Japan to proceed with a naval-based TMD system that would be more useful against
missiles from China than against missiles from North Korea could be problematic for China if
TMD systems become part of a larger, integrated NMD-TMD network. (For example, the TMD
radars could feed information into the NMD detection and localization system.)
In the next few years, it seems likely that China will feel caught between a rock and a
hard place. On the one hand, if it does nothing much to respond to arms sales to Taiwan and
Japan, the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, and the on-going TMD and NMD programs, then by
Chinese standards—that is, its ability to protect its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and its ac-
cess to mineral resources in the South China Sea—its security will be considerably diminished.
On the other hand, if China substantially increases military spending and uses hard currency to
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increase the rate of weapon and technology imports from Russia and other countries, and to build
a considerably larger long-range nuclear force, then it will divert funds from economic develop-
ments, it will be attacked by the United States and countries in Asia as developing a threatening,
power-projection oriented military policy, and it will may provoke further military build-ups
threatening to China in Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.
In the midst of this thicket of uncertainty and wasted opportunity, one question stands
out: Given that outside the declining risk on the Korean peninsula, there is no threat of major war
in the Pacific today, why aren’t the United States and Japan taking a pro-active approach to
regional security and peace-building? Why not invite China to join them in taking a different
path from the one followed by Europe for a half-century, and build a regional security system in
which “modernization” and “power projection,” along with TMD and NMD are set aside in
favor of regime of transparency, arms limitation, and confidence-building measures. Such a
regime, similar to the one associated with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, would hold the promise of eventual demilitarization and disarmament throughout the
region.
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on Alternative Security Systems
in the Asia-Pacific, Bangkok, March 27-30, 1997 and at the workshop on The United States and
Asian Security, Peace Studies Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, March 9-11,
2001. A substantially revised version will appear in the Fall 2002 issue of Critical Asian Studies.
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THE TWO-WAR DOCTRINE AND REGIONAL ARMS RACE:
CONTRADICTIONS IN U.S. POST-COLD WAR SECURITY POLICY ON KOREA*
Jae-Jung Suh
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been pursuing a foreign policy
whose ends and means are marked by a lack of consistency, as many analysts have noted.1 No-
where is this more striking and dangerous than in Northeast Asia, where the United States is en-
gaged in inconsistent, even contradictory, projects to adapt to the post-Cold War Asia with Cold
War means and within a Cold War mindset. Washington is talking peace with North Korea, one
of a few Cold War leftover enemies, while at the same time strengthening its own and allies’
military capabilities in the region. These contradictory projects, if implemented uncritically, can
undermine not only Seoul’s “sunshine policy,” but also the fragile regional peace.
U.S. policy toward Korea and Northeast Asia stands on two legs. On what we may call
the engagement leg, the United States, after many years of isolating the DPRK, began a series of
negotiations in the early 1990s. American diplomats sat down with their North Korean counter-
parts to negotiate a peaceful end to Pyongyang’s nuclear program and succeeded in reaching an
agreement, the Agreed Framework, which laid out a comprehensive road map to a peaceful de-
velopment of the two countries’ relationship. In the past several years since the Geneva agree-
ment of 1994, the State Department has spearheaded the efforts to implement the agreement on
schedule, at times twisting the arms of its recalcitrant allies.2 On what we may call the contain-
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Bush administration remains half-hearted about the agreement, while the Kim Dae-Jung govern-
ment has insisted on dialogue and exchanges. Despite its initial dismissal of negotiations with
the DPRK, however, the Bush administration recently announced a willingness to resume talks
with the North. Main issues on the negotiation table will be the implementation part of the
Agreed Framework, the verification of North Korean ballistic missile development as well as
conventional arms reduction. See “U.S. Welcomes N. Korea Overture,” Washington Post, April
8, 2002.
ment leg, however, the United States continued to pursue confrontational policies. Washington
has been strengthening its own and its allies’ military capabilities in the region in an effort to
militarily intimidate North Korea. The Pentagon, moreover, in 1993 adopted as its post-Cold
War global strategy the two Major Theaters Contingency (MTC) doctrine that required the
American military to be prepared to fight two simultaneous wars, in Korea and the Middle East.
During the same period that American diplomats were laboring to implement the Framework,
Pentagon officers were leading the drive to translate the MTC doctrine into a reality, reconfig-
uring and building up its and its allies’ capabilities to militarily confront North Korea. In short,
the American government has simultaneously sought to contain and engage North Korea: we
may dub these contradictory elements of U.S.-North Korea policy “containgagement.”
A peace regime in a real world may well grow out of a compromise between a realist
power strategy and liberal institution-building. In that sense, the American policy of “contain-
gagement” may represent an effort to integrate the two contradictory policy measures in a com-
plex Asian security environment. Although containment and engagement may not be mutually
exclusive, they can, if indiscriminately mixed, create confusion and result in counterproductive
outcomes, for they may entail fundamental disagreements about strategic goals, priorities, and
means. In other words, the apparent contradiction between the two means of containment and en-
gagement may embody irreconcilable social understandings of regional actors and strategic envi-
ronment. If the disagreements apparent in “containgagement” reflect fundamental irreconcilabil-
ity, both cannot be sustained for long. I argue that the policy of “containgagement” is constituted
by irreconcilable understandings of the identities of self and other, and thus has the potential of
imploding America’s strategic goal of “building a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula.”
On a more immediate policy level, the containment side of U.S. policy imposes a struc-
tural constraint on the extent to which engagement can progress. Not only does it hamstring
Seoul’s “sunshine policy” and Washington’s engagement, but it has also led to a regional arms
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build-up. America’s two-war strategy has taken, in East Asia in particular, the form of new U.S.-
led efforts to integrate and modernize U.S., South Korean, and Japanese forces in preparation for
a potential conflict with North Korea. The strategy, predicated on designating the North as “the
major threat” and “the country most likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war,” lays
down the force requirement that American and its allies’ militaries must meet. Given that the
North’s military capabilities have been in decline throughout the 1990s, the regional arms build-
up is strategy-driven, not threat-driven. Although the “China threat” may lurk behind the arms
build-up and the “North Korean threat” may be a mere justification for the arms build-up
designed for the “China threat,” it is currently the “North Korean threat” that the strategy is
designed to confront and that American and its allies’ militaries are geared to fight.
Extensive press coverage has focused on Washington’s diplomacy over Pyongyang’s
nuclear program, Seoul’s engagement policy, and four-party peace talks, while much less atten-
tion has been paid to U.S. military measures. To redress this imbalance, I examine the military
strategy and place it in the context of overall American policy toward the region. Only when
seen from this comprehensive perspective, do the tension and danger inherent in the U.S.
approach become clear. In the next section, I delineate the overall structure and implementation
of the American strategy, demonstrating that its provocative nature is driving the arms build-up
in the region. In the concluding section, I propose ways to formulate and implement a peace
regime on the Korean peninsula.
U.S. Policies on Korea
As I have argued elsewhere, the North Korean nuclear crisis has produced in the United
States two mutually incompatible outcomes: the Agreed Framework and the Two Major Theaters
Contingency (MTC) strategy.3 The Framework represents a roadmap for building peace in the
region; the strategy entails a plan for waging war. These two are not just contradictory, but the
latter has the potential to undo everything the former envisions. American officials have been
busy implementing these fundamentally incompatible policies over the past several years as if
one group of them is oblivious to what the other is doing. The Clinton administration was tilted
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toward the engagement leg and came close to resolving most of the outstanding security issues
with the North, which, should it have been successful, could have undermined the containment
leg. The Bush administration, which inherited the self-contradictory policies is, however, show-
ing preference for the containment leg, the success of which would undo all the achievements
made by the engagement and the sunshine policies. In this section, I will lay out the duality of
U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, emphasizing the military strategy that has, despite its
enormous political implications, received much less attention than diplomacy.
Geneva Agreed Framework
The 1994 Agreed Framework, and the subsequent negotiations it engendered, have re-
ceived worldwide attention. At the global level of nuclear non-proliferation, they are viewed as
an important test case of the potential for positive inducements to obtain compliance from poten-
tial proliferators. At the regional level, they represent an important step toward creating a new
peace regime based on a carefully crafted series of tit-for-tat measures. They constitute a mile-
stone that specifies the mutually agreed goal to “move toward full normalization of political and
economic relations” between the United States and North Korea, the long-time adversaries who
fought a war five decades ago and have since maintained a state of war. The Framework and
negotiations represent a commitment by both sides to ending the war and replacing the enmity
with amity, a commitment that neither had been willing to make during the Cold War period.
A central factor that led to the groundbreaking Agreed Framework is crucial to forging a
new peace regime on the peninsula. Washington and Pyongyang were able to produce this his-
toric document mainly because each listened to the other side and accommodated its concerns.
North Korean leaders showed an understanding and sensitivity to American concerns about
nuclear proliferation at a time when Washington was leading an international effort to renew the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pyongyang made it clear that it would never yield to
what it regarded as an unfair power play, while at the same time showing a willingness to com-
promise. American negotiators also listened to their North Korean counterparts and displayed an
equal flexibility in accommodating their primary security concerns. Pyongyang agreed to return
to the NPT regime to allay America’s proliferation concerns; Washington pledged not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against the North to alleviate its security worries. Pyongyang
agreed to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and eventually dismantle them to further sub-
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military to fight the two wars at the same time with equal force.
5 Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Department of Defense, October 1993.
stantiate its commitment; Washington committed itself to working to compensate the North for
economic loss that would result from its freeze. The two also agreed to move toward normaliza-
tion of their relations as progress was made on issues of concern to each side.
In other words, there was in their negotiations an element of reciprocity that enabled both
to come to an agreement on an issue that seemed intractable. And it is this principle of reciproc-
ity that is required of all parties involved if a new regime is to be built that goes beyond the
Agreed Framework to guarantee peace on the Korean peninsula. The reciprocity entailed an
understanding of the core security concern that the other side held. As the following discussion
demonstrates, however, the United States has instead been engaged in unilateral moves that can
undermine the foundation of reciprocity on which the Agreed Framework stands.
Win-Win Strategy and Its Regional Implementation
It is ironic that the United States adopted the two MTC strategy and passed the first bud-
get for it approximately at the same time as the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. In the early
1990s, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Pentagon had introduced as a
post-Cold War strategy the “win-hold-win strategy,” but had shortly thereafter replaced it with
the “win-win strategy” in the midst of the crisis triggered by charges about North Korea’s nu-
clear weapons program.4 The much-publicized North Korean “nuclear threat” provided the last
push needed to reverse the strategy from the win-hold-win to the two-war doctrine (the two
MTC doctrine). The Pentagon articulated the new strategy in its Report on the Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) as follows:
U.S. forces will be structured to achieve decisive victory in two nearly simulta-
neous major regional conflicts and to conduct combat operations characterized by
rapid response and a high probability of success. . . . Our forces must be sized and
structured to preserve the flexibility and the capability to act unilaterally, should
we choose to do so.5
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The strategic vision, which remained unchanged throughout the Clinton administration and was
reconfirmed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997, began to take shape in 1994
when the U.S. Congress passed the FY 1995 military budget designed for the strategy. In the fol-
lowing years, the strategy guided the Pentagon—and also South Korean and Japanese forces—in
reconfiguring the military to get prepared for a Korean conflict. It is ominous for the region’s
peace that the American military has found eager partners in South Korea and Japan in its efforts
to put into effect the two-war doctrine in this part of the world, whereas American allies have
dragged their feet in implementing the Agreed Framework.6
In September 2001 the Bush administration released the Quadrennial Defense Review,
which continued the two-war strategy, along with the requirement to be able to conduct multiple
smaller-scale contingencies world-wide and provide homeland defense.7 The new strategy, how-
ever, is unlikely to bring about a major change in the Asia-Pacific theater that the Pentagon
views as posing a most serious near-term threat. In Bush administration’s “new” strategic vision,
North Korea remains the “enormous conventional threat” that the American military needs to be
prepared to fight, just like in the “old” two-war doctrine.8 The main difference is that the Penta-
gon now accepts that Iraq is little likely to pose the same kind of threat and much less likely to
initiate a war at the same time as North Korea. Instead of overstretching the American military to
get ready for unlikely two-war contingencies, therefore, the Pentagon is focusing on a strategy to
“‘win decisively’ in a single major conflict.”9 Given that North Korea is singled out as a main
near-term threat, that “single major conflict” seems to point to the Korean peninsula. Therefore,
few substantial changes can be expected in the force posture of the United States and its allies in
the region, even if the United States reduces its forward military presence as a way to lessen its
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burden and to channel the savings to missile defense and other programs in the revolution in mil-
itary affairs. If the Pentagon decides to reduce its force size in the theater without modifying its
threat assessment, American allies—Japan and South Korea—will face increasing pressures to
shoulder more of the defense burden.
U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific. The first Bush administration had planned to reduce its
military presence in Korea in three stages and had completed first stage withdrawal by 1991.
Citing the North’s suspected nuclear weapons development, however, the Pentagon put a stop to
the plan. Furthermore, its review at the end of 1993 of the preparedness of its forces in Korea re-
vealed that the current state of its military was not adequate to defend against the North’s threat.
Based on the review General Gary Luck, commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK), requested
reinforcements. The Pentagon immediately took a number of rearmament measures. It placed un-
der the USFK’s command the Seventh Fleet, which included an aircraft carrier, and it deployed
the following to Korea: 130 M1A1 Abrams tanks, Patriot missiles, one heavy artillery division,
mine sweepers, amphibious landing ships, AH-64 Apache helicopters, Bradley armored person-
nel carriers, and a mobile ground satellite station.10 A few days after the Clinton administration
agreed to hold a meeting with Pyongyang in Geneva in 1994, the U.S. House of Representatives
approved $250 million in new military spending to strengthen the USFK. In 1996, in order to
enhance surveillance capability, the United States replaced the existing fleet of OV-10 Mohawk
surveillance aircraft with Airborne Reconnaissance Low aircraft, equipped with advanced sur-
veillance payloads that would allow them to see at night and in bad weather.11 In 1997 the U.S.
Army also installed satellite communications equipment that would speed the delivery of signals
intelligence data to the USFK and South Korean war-fighters.12 As if an iota of the USFK’s
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The “Ulchi-Focus Lens” (UFL), a command post exercise that resulted from combining two sep-
arate exercises, Ulchi and Focus Lens in 1994, has been staged every year since its inception. On
the South Korean side the 12-day-long UFL is attended by administrative officers of the county
and district and above, as well as military units of army corps, naval fleet and air force of the
wing-class and above. From the U.S. side, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and subordinate units
of the Eighth U.S. army command participate in the exercise. On the other hand, “Hoguk,”
staged from March to April annually, involves South Korea’s army, navy and air force only.
Involving two corps deployed near the DMZ, “Hoguk 96” was the largest military drill since the
strength could not be compromised even after these rearmament measures, President Clinton
went so far as to exempt South Korea from his order to clear all active U.S. mines when he
announced support for a world-wide mine ban in 1996.13
While the USFK was being strengthened, the mobility requirement study that assessed
the requirements of the two-war doctrine in light of the Gulf War experience pointed out the
need to “pre-position” military hardware in-country. The Gulf War demonstrated to American
military planners the enormity of the logistical tasks involved in dispatching to a regional theater
personnel and hardware sizable enough to ensure a quick victory that minimized U.S. casualties.
They devised a plan to preposition military hardware, both afloat in the sea and in-country, so
that American soldiers could be rapidly transported to a theater without the logistical burden of
simultaneously moving the hardware needed to equip them. The brigade afloat, two armored
battalions, and two mechanized infantry battalions that the Army has as the core of its AWR5
pre-position capability gives the American military both in the Gulf and in Northeast Asia the
capability to put ashore a potent brigade combat capability. As part of this “pre-po,” the United
States in the fall of 1996 brought into South Korea sufficient military hardware, including tanks,
armored vehicles, and communication equipment, to supply a brigade. This makes possible rapid
arming of reinforcements to be sent to the South in the event of a contingency.
The USFK and South Korean militaries have held an RSOI (reception, staging, onward
movement, and integration into the combat force) exercise annually since 1994 to rehearse the
actions that they have to take to receive reinforcement forces, to equip them with prepositioned
material, and then to integrate them into combined forces. It is interesting to note that the exer-
cise was first staged in 1994 just when the Team Spirit exercise was canceled,14 a change that
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reflects more a doctrinal shift than a transformation in American policy toward Korea. The im-
plementation of the two-war doctrine in Korea culminated in March 1996 when the U.S. Third
Corps and South Korean forces staged a war game called “a joint mock combat training” in
Texas. Noting that the United States had decided after the Security Consultative Meeting in
November 1995 to airlift U.S. First and Third Corps to Korea in case of an emergency to double
the size of the Flexible Deployment Force (FDF), a Korean-American analyst argued that this
was an exercise to enhance the coordination between the South Korean military and the Ameri-
can Third Corps that would be added to the FDF.15
South Korean Force Modernization and U.S. Strategy. If the United States has moved
somewhat cautiously to strengthen its forces in Korea because of its fiscal and domestic political
considerations, South Korea forged ahead with its ambitious military modernization projects.
Although engaged in military modernization since the 1970s, Seoul agreed in a 1994 meeting
with Defense Secretary William Perry to accelerate the process. At the meeting, it also agreed to
buy an array of sophisticated American military equipment, including Apache attack helicopters
and Maverick antitank missiles. A strong synergy was clear between the dictates of the Penta-
gon’s two-war doctrine and the desires of South Korea’s military to strengthen itself. The Ameri-
can strategy requires a heavy reinforcement of its allies’ military in order to hold the front line
until American reinforcements arrive with sufficient firepower to assure a decisive victory. The
force requirement that American strategy dictates bodes well for the South’s force modernization
plan, as both require high-tech, mobile forces.
Over the past three decades South Korea has built a formidable military industry that now
produces a variety of ground weapons under licensed production agreements. In addition to
licensed production, Korean weapons contractors are also producing indigenous armaments such
as K3 machine guns, K-900 and K-2000 armored personnel carriers, and K-1 tanks, KDX
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destroyers, and Chang Bogo submarines.16 In the 1990s, Seoul’s force modernization placed
increasing importance on achieving air supremacy and acquiring surveillance capability, both of
which are also required by the two-war doctrine. Seoul is projected to spend $24 billion by 2010
on fighter jets, surveillance planes, and air defense equipment. In addition to the 120 F-16 fight-
ers that the South’s air force acquired from the United States under its Korea Fighter Program, it
plans to purchase another 120 planes under a next generation fighter program, known as the FX
program.17 To strengthen its intelligence capability, South Korea is purchasing approximately 10
Hawk 800XP state-of-the-art reconnaissance planes worth $450 million from the United States.
Flying 40 to 50 km south of the Military Demarcation Line, the aircraft can acquire video images
of objects as small as 30 cm by 30 cm in North Korea.18 With the new military intelligence-
gathering systems, the South Korean military will be capable of processing real-time information
on North Korea’s military movements.19
The South Korean government has spent 2.2 trillion won since 1992 under the force mod-
ernization project dubbed the “Yulgok” project, and continues to spend massive funds to buy
state-of-the-art weapons. In 1995, South Korea’s military purchases from the United States
totaled $957.4 million. In the same year, it became the world’s second largest importer, behind
China, of conventional weapons, spending $1.7 billion on arms procurement. For fiscal year
1996, Seoul purchased military equipment and services worth $1.8 billion from the United States
alone, becoming the biggest client for American weapons. Furthermore, $26.5 billion is bud-
geted for new weapons purchases in 2002, the year that marks the first part of a five-year force
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improvement program.20 According to SIPRI estimates, South Korea ranked fourth among the
recipients of conventional weapons during the 1996-2000 period, importing weapons worth $5.6
billion, while North Korea was dropped from the list of the 15 leading arms purchasers and
ranked 63rd during the same period.21 On the Korean peninsula, the South maintained a high vol-
ume of imports of major conventional weapons across the period 1986-95, whereas weapons
deliveries to the North fell by 98 percent during the same period.22
Not satisfied with the sum of money spent on arms procurement, in July 1995 the South
Korean Defense Ministry released a report, “ROK’s Defense Towards the 21st Century,” arguing
that an investment of a minimum of 110 trillion won in the defense budget was “inevitable” to
guarantee the South’s security for the next six years.23 Although the South cut its defense budget
by 3.5 percent in 1998 following the financial crisis of the previous year, it will raise the “pro-
portion of allocations for ‘force improvement programmes’—primarily for import of high-cost
weapons’— . . . at the expense of allocations for O&M” over the 2000-2004 period.24 Moreover,
on June 28, 2001, the South’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced a record-high
$12.72 billion defense budget for year 2002, a 6.2 percent increase from the previous year, reaf-
firming the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s commitment to increasing government spending on
national defense.25 In an ironic turn of events, in 2000 while Washington was negotiating with
the North to curtail its long-range missile development, the South succeeded in having Washing-
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ton reverse its long-held policy of capping the South’s missile capability at 180 km to allow the
development of a missile with a range up to 300 km.
After the global bifurcation of the Cold War era became blurred, Seoul—which had
relied exclusively on the United States for weapons imports—found an unexpected supplier of
weapons systems: Russia. Moscow’s importance rose quickly, especially after it reached an
agreement with Seoul to settle Russia’s debt of $1.89 billion with transfers of weapons systems.
Following the agreement, in 1996 Russia provided South Korea with weapons valued at $150
million, including the first transfer of 30 upgraded T-80U tanks, 30 BMP-3 armored combat ve-
hicles, hundreds of IGLA portable antiaircraft missiles, and METIS-M portable antitank equip-
ment.26 Russia agreed to deliver by the end of 2001 weapons worth $500 million, including air-
refueling planes, transport helicopters/aircraft, and other military equipment.27 Formalizing the
military cooperation between Moscow and Seoul, South Korean Defense minister Kim Dong-Jin
and his Russian counterpart Igor Rodionov signed a military cooperation memorandum in No-
vember 1996, citing exports of weapons and military technologies as the two most beneficial
areas of cooperation. The military cooperation was further reconfirmed by Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s visit to Seoul in 2001. The South’s imports of Russian weapons systems can
undermine the tight integration between the U.S. and Korean militaries, if the Russian systems
constitute a large share of the South’s military hardware, but so far they make up such a small
portion that they complement the U.S.-ROK alliance and pose complications for the North more
than for the U.S.-ROK alliance.
After taking the Blue House in 1998, President Kim Dae-Jung initiated the policy of en-
gagement, commonly dubbed the “sunshine policy,” which led to the historic North-South sum-
mit in June 2000. The meeting was followed by a series of exchanges: reunion of separated
families, exchanges of cultural groups, increases in cross-border economic activities, and even a
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project to reconnect a railroad/highway that involves clearing mines in part of the DMZ. Also,
South Korea’s defense budget, which had increased at about 10 percent annually since the early
1970s, decreased for the first time in 1999, although the decrease reflected the South’s economic
difficulties and overall reduction of its government budget rather than a change in its military
policy. Despite the political rapprochement and the economic hardship of recent years, however,
the South has taken few meaningful measures to restrain its force modernization. Rather, it is
continuing most of its force enhancement projects. In 2000, for example, the South’s Ministry of
National Defense allocated $4.7 billion for R&D and acquisition to develop unmanned spy
planes and to buy a military satellite, attack helicopters, naval destroyers, AWAC aircraft, and
fighter jets. The “Medium-Term National Defense Plan,” approved by President Kim in 1999,
budgets $35 billion for weapons purchases for the next five years to develop the capability to
operate within 500 km from Korea.28 On balance, military containment far outweighs political
engagement even in South Korea. In 2000, for example, South Korea spent $12.8 billion to pre-
pare to fight the North—about 100 times as much as the $114 million it allocated for humanitari-
an aid for the North Koreas who were suffering and continue to suffer a severe food shortage.29
Japanese Integration in U.S. War Plan. If the Pentagon’s win-win strategy promotes, if
not drives, South Korea’s force modernization, the war doctrine further accelerates the process
of integrating American and Japanese forces with the USFK and South Korean military, com-
pleting the circle of tripartite militarization. A smooth operation of the American doctrine
requires a seamless integration of American and its allies’ forces and bases in the region. That is
being achieved by a number of measures: the Tokyo security declaration of 1996, the 1997 revi-
sion of the “Guideline,” the agreement on military goods provision, joint development of such
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weapons system as theater missile defense (TMD) and support fighters (F-2), and tripartite mili-
tary exercises.30
If the Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) formalized the win-win strategy in 1993, its application
to the Asian theater was established two years later by the East Asia Strategy Review (EASR,
commonly known as the Nye Initiative), which effectively reversed the first Bush administra-
tion’s East Asia Strategy Initiative of 1990 to reduce the American military presence in Korea
and Japan. The EASR set the number of American soldiers in the Asia-Pacific at 100,000, and
emphasized the importance of its nuclear umbrella and existing alliances, setting the stage for
further implementation of the two-war doctrine. It was followed by Japan’s new National De-
fense Program Outline, adopted in November 1995, which underscored the fact that Japanese
military capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold
War. Five months later, Washington and Tokyo signed an agreement on the provision of logis-
tics support and military goods and services between the two. These measures culminated in the
Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (New Security Declaration) that President Clinton and
Prime Minister Hashimoto issued in April 1996 after a summit meeting, emphasizing the central-
ity of their alliance to maintaining “a stable . . . environment for the Asia-Pacific region.” After
confirming the status quo vision contained in the EASR, the two leaders agreed in the declara-
tion to review the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation for the purpose of pro-
moting bilateral coordination in “dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surround-
ing Japan.”31 The purpose was well served in 1997 when the Guideline itself was revised to
authorize U.S.-Japan military cooperation outside Japan.
The new security arrangement created by these measures represents an effort to bring
U.S. forces in Japan and the Japanese contribution in line with the dictates of the U.S. strategy.
Most significantly, the arrangement allows American forces to use Japanese bases for operations
outside Japan, including the Korean peninsula—a radical departure from the previous arrange-
ment, which prohibited precisely such an operation. It also provides the gaiatsu (“outside pres-
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sure”) that the Japanese government needs to change its laws banning military operations outside
Japan. Citing American pressure, for example, Japan’s Defense White Paper stated in 2000 that
it was “necessary to legislate a contingency law,” which was drawn up in an effort to specify the
steps Japan will take in the wake of armed attack in the vicinity of Japan s territory.32 This step
represented a departure from the 1999 version that saw it only as “desirable.” The cooperative
measures between the United States and Japan reflect the degree to which the triangular military
alliance justifies Japan’s expanded military role on the Korean peninsula.
These measures are buttressed by the steps that Tokyo has taken to improve its military
capabilities. The Japanese Self-Defense Force received the Aegis air defense system for four
Kongo Class destroyers in 1998,33 and decided two years later to purchase four more Aegis ships
with PAC-3 capability.34 The Japanese Defense Agency, which has already been operating four
Boeing E-767 AWACS aircraft, also plans to improve missile defense by upgrading its radar and
introducing airplane infrared detectors.35 Most significantly, Japan decided in 2000 to acquire
air-refueling planes, an important step in expanding its long distance “force projection capabil-
ity.”36
The trilateral military cooperation, whose foundation is laid down through shared doc-
trines and common hardware, is being perfected through a set of bilateral exercises that are held
concurrently among the three countries. The “Team Spirit” exercise, which North Korea had
long denounced as a test nuclear war exercise against it, had not been held since 1994, creating
an atmosphere conducive to dialogue with Pyongyang. The United States, South Korea, and
Japan, however, have staged a number of other military exercises. The one that best demon-
strates trilateral military cooperation is “Keen Sword” between the United States and Japan,
which is held nearly at the same time as “Foal Eagle” between the United States and South
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Korea. For Foal Eagle, troops from the U.S. 2nd Army Division were transported from the U.S.
mainland to Korea, while American soldiers stationed in Japan took part in Keen Sword with
Japan’s Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces. The Japanese Self-Defense Force de-
ployed 130 aircraft and eleven warships, while the U.S. Forces in Japan mobilized 170 aircraft
and six warships, including the aircraft carrier USS Independence. The 1997 exercise marked the
first time a U.S. aircraft carrier was used in a joint drill with Japan in the Sea of Japan, demon-
strating the extent to which American and Japanese forces were integrated to implement the two-
war strategy in Northeast Asia. It should also be noted that during the 1997 exercises, the United
States and Japan carried out their first practice in providing each other with military goods and
services, a procedure provided by the logistics support agreement reached in April 1996. In
November 2000, the United States also conducted a joint military exercise with Japan to enhance
its cooperation with Japan s Self Defense Forces in the event of a military contingency in areas
surrounding Japan.37
Duality of U.S. Approach to Peace
In sum, the United States is containing the North with its classical Cold War methods
while also being engaged in negotiations to ease tensions and to terminate Pyongyang’s nuclear
development program. As part of its worldwide effort to limit weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems, Washington is spearheading the international consortium to implement
the Agreed Framework and has engaged in various dialogues with Pyongyang. Even the current
Bush administration, which avowedly harbors no trust in the North Korean leadership, also reaf-
firmed its willingness to negotiate with the North.38 At the same time, however, the United States
remains the driving force in implementing its two-war doctrine. It is building up its own as well
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as its allies’ military in the region. It is also the United States that is producing and propagating
the mantra that North Korea is a threat to be fought, not a partner to have a dialogue with. The
contradictory nature of American policies is brought into stark relief when the regional arms
build-up is juxtaposed with the North’s declining economic and military capabilities. Even South
Korean government statistics show that the South’s military spending surpassed the North’s by
20 percent in 1985, an advantage the South subsequently increased to a 10 to 1 ratio by the year
2000.39 As early as in 1988, Yi Young-hui, a leading South Korean intellectual, argued in Ko-
rea’s parliamentary testimony that the South’s military was stronger than the North’s, a view that
South Korea’s own military acknowledged in 1990.40 Hangyore Sinmun reiterated the view in a
1995 editorial that “given the capability of South Korea’s state-of-the-art weapons, the South’s
military strength is a match for the North’s or, as some people estimate, is superior to it.”41
Nevertheless, the United States is allocating nearly a third of its defense spending to the Asia-
Pacific region, where North Korea is designated the chief threat, and enlisting Japanese support
for its endeavor as well.
To better understand why the United States is pursuing the two-war doctrine and regional
militarization despite its apparent overwhelming military superiority, it may be necessary to situ-
ate the doctrine in a wider regional context that takes into account the tenuous Sino-U.S. rela-
tionship. To better understand why the Pentagon has so easily succeeded in selling its Asian
strategy under the “North Korean threat,” however, it is necessary to situate the material capabil-
ity in the context of a social reality that is constituted by discursive politics. As the United States
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implements its doctrine, it has produced a stream of analyses and reports that single out the
Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf as the most dangerous and strategically important places.
According to George Tenet, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “[a] Korean war
scenario remains our primary near-term military concern,”42 a view that the National Defense
University reinforced with its annual report on the national security threat. The security concern
is justified in a number of ways. In 1999, when the North was still struggling with the wide-
spread famine, Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
argued that “North Korea remains the country most likely to involve the United States in a large-
scale regional war scenario over the near term.”43 By 2000, when its economic crisis seemed to
bottom out, however, Tenet suggested that “the North Korean military appears, for now, to have
halted its near decade-long slide in military capabilities” and that “we have not yet seen a signifi-
cant diminution of the threat from the North to American and South Korean interests.”44 In other
words, these two short snippets show that North Korea remains a constant threat no matter what
its material condition is like.
The concerns about the North’s conventional military capabilities are furthered by wor-
ries about its missiles. One of President Bush’s three overarching military goals is “to develop
the capabilities to defend against missiles,” which in turn is based on the Rumsfeld Commis-
sion’s report on missile threat. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the Uni-
ted States, headed by now Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, concluded in its report to Congress in
1998 that “They [North Korea, Iran and Iraq] would be able to inflict major destruction on the
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[United States] within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability.”45 No sooner
was the report released than the North fired a rocket over Japan, fanning a fear. Such a fear about
the North’s long-range missiles is further buttressed by concerns about its shorter-range missiles,
as reflected in George Tenet’s testimony in February 2001 before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee on Worldwide Threats to National Security.
The way in which the United States understands the situation is well captured in the
Defense Secretary’s recent report on the Korean situation:
North Korea remains the major threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia
and is the country most likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war.
While the historic summit between the North and South leaders holds the promise
of reconciliation and change, no evidence exists of the fundamental precursors for
change. There is little or no evidence of economic reform or reform-minded lead-
ers; reduction in military forces; or a lessening of anti-US rhetoric. A decade of
steep economic decline has not deterred the North’s leaders from allocating pre-
cious resources to improving their military forces. The DPRK maintains a dogged
adherence to a “military first” policy even against the backdrop of a nation facing
severe economic and social challenges.46
Thus the North’s missiles and conventional forces are framed in terms of an offensive
capability that can inflict major damage on the United States. Excluded from the framing is an
alternative, and more plausible, possibility: the North is providing for its security in the face of
the overwhelming power of its adversary. The logic of the security dilemma suggests that just as
the North’s military represents a security threat to the United States and its allies, the forces of
the latter are a threat to the North. Just as the United States, South Korea, and Japan are building
up their capabilities to defend against their adversary, so is the North. Such a simple understand-
ing, however, is out of the question for all of them because the vicious cycle of insecurity is em-
bedded in fifty years of confrontational interaction, making the enmity seem part of the natural
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order of things. To either side of the confrontation, the enmity seems to derive directly and im-
mediately from the “anarchic” nature of the international system, and the threat from the “essen-
tially” hostile nature of the other party. Neither is capable of rising above the enmity; neither is
able to see itself and its adversary caught in the security dilemma that they themselves have pro-
duced.
On the other hand, a critical analysis of American attempts to restrain the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction reveals an element of power politics, as the American efforts reflect
a new focus in Pentagon’s weapons development strategy. First, these efforts are directed at
freezing the capacity of other countries to develop weapons of mass destruction. Although non-
proliferation is a praiseworthy goal, American moral leadership is being undermined by its own
nuclearism. For while Washington is preaching to the world about the dangers of nuclear weap-
ons, it is at the same time leading in maintaining the myth that nuclear weapons are the guarantor
of peace. For while Washington argues that a new nuclear weapon acquired by non-nuclear
states would pose an immense threat to humanity, it is protecting its own overkill capacity of an
unrivaled nuclear arsenal. For while keeping its own nuclear materials beyond international in-
spections and control, it is demanding intrusive inspections on others’. Nowhere is America’s
contradictory position more apparent than in Korea. On the Korean peninsula, Washington’s
duality has led to the self-contradictory position that it guarantees, under the Agreed Framework,
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, while at the same time main-
taining, under its Defense Treaty with South Korea, a nuclear umbrella over the South, threaten-
ing a nuclear retaliation against the North.
Second, America’s leading role in nonproliferation reflects a change in the Pentagon’s
weapons development strategy. While maintaining the overwhelming superiority of its mass-
destruction power, the U.S. military is determined to forge ahead with its efforts to develop
“smart weapons” technology as well as missile defense systems, which most countries are sim-
ply incapable of catching up with. The United States is simultaneously the leading advocate of
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the leader in the development of precision-guided weap-
ons. The new focus in American weapons development strategy, coupled with the efforts to curb
worldwide proliferation, smacks of the duplicity of SALT I in the early 1970s. Although SALT I
was ostensibly intended to limit the increase in the number of missiles, it was criticized by some
for providing a cover under which to justify the new generation of nuclear armaments, particu-
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larly the multiple-independently targetable-reentry-vehicles (MIRVs). U.S. weapons production
is moving toward next generation weapons systems, e.g., smart bombs and missile defense sys-
tems, while other countries, including China and North Korea, are still grappling with such
World War II technologies as ballistic missiles. The United States is trying to freeze the weapons
development in the rest of the world at the current primitive level of precision while continuing
to develop more precise and effective weapons systems. Again, nowhere is America’s contra-
dictory position more apparent than in Korea. The United States remains the unrivaled number
one supplier of missiles and other state-of-the-art weapons systems to Seoul; at the same time it
is leading the international efforts to have Pyongyang terminate its missile exports. Washington
is vigorously pursuing its missile defense programs while accelerating its “revolution in military
affairs”; at the same time it is leading the international charge against Pyongyang’s programs of
outdated weapons.
This is not to suggest that it is meaningless for Washington to try to control worldwide
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; my purpose is rather to point out that the U.S.
effort for non-proliferation will remain ineffective as long as Washington is engaged in contra-
dictory policies. For others will view American non-proliferation initiatives with skepticism, and
greet its weapons programs with their own weapons programs. If the United States wants to
eradicate the temptation of smaller, poorer countries to develop weapons of mass destruction, it
must lead an international effort to redress the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and nuclear threat.
For many countries—such as North Korea—are tempted to develop weapons of mass destruction
for fear of the U.S. nuclear weapons. If Washington wishes to prevent proliferation of high-tech
weapons and their technology, it must lead an international effort to curb arms exports, including
its own. Many nations—such as North Korea—import or develop weapons systems precisely to
defend against American exports. The United States must squarely face the dilemma that arises
from its reluctance to envision a fundamentally different concept of peace and security; it must
come to terms with the imperative that its nonproliferation efforts must be coupled with
restraints on itself.47
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Designing a Peace Regime
 The Korean peninsula might prove an excellent ground for testing a policy genuinely
geared toward peace, resting on curbing rather than stoking the arms race. Nuclear proliferation
concerns drove the Clinton administration to the negotiating table on which the Agreed Frame-
work was signed. But the potential for nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula will linger
as long as Korea remains a dangerous tinderbox with a short fuse. In order for a non-prolifera-
tion regime on the peninsula to be effective and robust, therefore, it needs to be complemented
by a mechanism that would reduce the conventional military threat felt by either side of the
DMZ. At a minimum this requires ending the Korean War, which was only suspended by the
Armistice Agreement. To ensure non-proliferation and to allay security concerns, radical disarm-
ament taken by the two Koreas with the support of the four surrounding powers is also needed.
To ultimately defuse the Korean powder keg, Korea has to be peacefully reunified, and it has to
be reunified in a form that would not upset the power balance among the four powers. In this
section, I turn to some of specific issues that stand in the way toward these goals.
Missiles, Soldiers, and Armistice
If Clinton made it clear that he would link progress in the missile negotiations to lifting
the economic sanctions and improving U.S.-North Korean relations, Bush has made it one of the
cornerstones of his policies toward the North. Any substantial progress in the peace talks and the
normalization of the North Korean diplomatic and economic relations with the West, therefore,
depends on whether the two parties can achieve a constructive compromise on the missile issue.
Clinton began a series of negotiations on the missile issue and Kim Jong-Il agreed in September
1999 on a moratorium on missile testing while the negotiations were under way. Kim has since
repeatedly confirmed his willingness to maintain it until 2003. Clinton was apparently on the
verge of making a breakthrough in his final days: he and Kim Jong-Il exchanged highest level
envoys to arrange a summit where they would seal an agreement to shut down the North Korean
missile program.48 But currently Bush and Kim are at a stalemate. Bush wants to prevent the
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development and export of missiles by the North, while Kim insists that the development and
deployment of missiles inside North Korea is a matter of its sovereign right to self-defense.
The fundamental difference between Clinton’s near success and Bush’s stalemate lies not
in Bush’s unwillingness to talk or his proposal to expand the agenda, but in his refusal to end the
enmity between the two nations. The last U.S.-North Korea joint statement shows that it was pre-
cisely because the two governments made a commitment to end hostile policies toward each
other that the North was ready to scrap its missile program:
Recognizing that improving ties is a natural goal in relations among states and
that better relations would benefit both nations in the 21st century while helping
ensure peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region,
the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. sides stated that they are prepared to undertake a new
direction in their relations. As a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither
government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the com-
mitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new
relationship free from past enmity.
Building on the principles laid out in the June 11, 1993 U.S.-D.P.R.K.
Joint Statement and reaffirmed in the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework, the
two sides agreed to work to remove mistrust, build mutual confidence, and main-
tain an atmosphere in which they can deal constructively with issues of central
concern. In this regard, the two sides reaffirmed that their relations should be
based on the principles of respect for each other’s sovereignty and non-interfer-
ence in each other’s internal affairs49
It is precisely this commitment “to build a new relationship free from past enmity” that is re-
quired to peacefully defuse the missile issue. Pyongyang is not likely to give up the production
and deployment of missiles unless Washington shows a willingness to address its security con-
cerns. Hence a possible solution seems to lie in a set of reciprocal concessions whereby Bush
provides a security guarantee in exchange for Pyongyang’s termination of its missile program.
Only when Bush comes to a realization that his non-proliferation policy is riddled with contra-
dictions and that the United States-North Korea relationship is entrenched in the security dilem-
ma would such a solution become possible. Given the North’s deep economic problems, one
might be tempted to think that it will give in to the American pressure if the United States offers
economic incentives such as removing sanctions. But this may well prove wishful thinking be-
cause Pyongyang is likely to maintain that its military and missiles are the only guarantor of its
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survival. To treat what it considers the “life-or-death” issue as an economic bargaining chip is to
put the cart before the horse. Such an approach turns a blind eye to the stubborn reality that the
North’s missiles are a byproduct of the enmity between the two nations and that a solution to the
missile issue therefore can begin only with a reciprocal recognition that both sides of the DMZ
share the common responsibility for the persistent military tension and arms build-up. Without
this sense of reciprocity, the hawks in the United States and South Korea as well as in North
Korea may find many a chance to halt and reverse a peace process and to maintain the status quo
of armament.
In addition to the growing ballistic missile capabilities, North Korea’s forward deploy-
ment of its massive infantry units near the DMZ represents a major source of concern for the
United States and South Korea. South Korean and American militaries estimate that two thirds of
North’s 1.1 million military personnel is deployed within 100 kilometers of the DMZ. In 1996
North Korea also redeployed its combat aircraft to locations near the DMZ that are only 6 min-
utes’ flying time from the heart of Seoul. The 2000 ROK Defense White Paper shows that 55
percent of North Korean military force is deployed near the DMZ.50 The North’s conventional
forces are buttressed by greatly improved special forces that number 100,000 and are trained to
filter rapidly into key political, industrial, and other sectors within the South. Most statistics on
the military balance show that the North maintains a quantitative advantage in the number of sol-
diers and various weapons systems, whereas the South has a qualitative edge in its weapons and
training, making it extremely difficult to compare their military capabilities.
Force comparison may be difficult to make, but the logic of the security dilemma is easy
to see. Just as the United States and South Korea are concerned about the North’s force deploy-
ment near the DMZ, so is the North equally concerned about the South’s and America’s posture
that deploys 90 percent of their military within 50 km of the DMZ. Each side claims its own
forces to be defensive while viewing the other’s to be offensive; each justifies its own force pos-
ture on the basis of its perceived threat from the other’s force posture. It is time for both sides to
acknowledge that they are entrapped in a vicious cycle of security dilemma. That acknowledg-
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ment would constitute the first step out of the dilemma. For just as the security dilemma is a by-
product of practices of enmity that the United States and North Korea have been engaged in, so
does its resolution begin with practices that would replace the enmity with amity. If Pyongyang
or Washington argues that its forces are purely defensive, it should also be prepared to accept the
other side’s claim that its forces are also defensive. Given Seoul’s growing military superiority
over Pyongyang, by the same token, the South should be prepared to scrap its weapons purchase
and modernization plans in exchange for Pyongyang’s halting its missile programs and a com-
mitment to limiting its arms purchases. Washington, the major weapons supplier to the South,
should also be prepared to support Seoul’s decision to stop arms imports and to stop reinforce-
ment of the USFK in exchange for Pyongyang’s pledge not to export or import weapons. Once
arms limitation is agreed upon and implemented, the two Koreas can start the process of
building-down their arms stockpiles.
Some of these steps had been taken or were at least in the works under the Clinton ad-
ministration. The Agreed Framework of 1994 laid down the political framework that would
allay, in a step-by-step, reciprocal manner, America’s concerns about the North’s nuclear pro-
gram and the North’s concerns about U.S. military posture. The Clinton administration was
apparently on the verge of negotiating away the missile problem in its final days precisely
because it acknowledged the security dilemma dynamic on the Korean peninsula, as clearly
reflected in Perry’s admission that North’s missiles might be a weapon of deterrence: “[North
Korean missiles’] primary reason . . . is deterrence . . . They would be deterring the United
States.”51 On the basis of this acknowledgment, the Clinton administration moved to give North
Korea a guarantee of no nuclear threat and a political normalization; the Kim Jong-Il regime
reciprocated by freezing its nuclear and missile programs. The Bush administration halted these
processes, allegedly for a review. But it has thus far stubbornly refused to acknowledge that the
United States and North Korea are entrapped in the vicious cycle of a security dilemma, prefer-
ring instead to demonize the North; it has thus far resisted the need to adopt reciprocal measures,
preferring instead to take unilateral steps. This refusal and resistance contradict the premises
underlying the Agreed Framework and other joint statements, and thus have the potential to undo
the achievements made through negotiations.
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Pyongyang has long demanded the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace
treaty with the United States and normalized relations between the two countries. Washington,
however, regards the Korean armistice as the cornerstone of the U.S. alliance system in North-
east Asia and therefore untouchable. It is “virtually heresy even to raise the issue, let alone dis-
cuss a detailed road plan toward ending the armistice,” as insightful observers have noted.52 The
North Korean leadership seems to understand now that the United States will not end the Korean
armistice and sign a peace treaty for some time. It has dropped its long-standing objections to
U.S. troops in the South, and begun to seek what it terms “an interim peace mechanism” to re-
place the armistice. One possible way to resolve the differences seems to lie in a set of simulta-
neous non-aggression pacts between the parties to the Korean War that would establish a new,
truly peacekeeping function for UN forces.
Who is party to the war is a tricky question, and there are various answers to it.53 There
seems little disagreement that Washington and Pyongyang are parties, while there is little agree-
ment on Seoul’s and Beijing’s status. Despite the four-party talk proposal made by Presidents
Clinton and Kim, I argue that China is not a de facto or de jure party because the state of war
that had existed between China and the United States and South Korea ended when Beijing
opened diplomatic relations with both. Also despite Pyongyang’s insistence that Seoul is not a
party, I argue that Seoul’s de facto, if not de jure, status has to be reckoned with. A peace regime
on the Korean peninsula could not be built if the South is not involved as a full party. Therefore,
Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang can perhaps adopt a document that would lay out a compre-
hensive set of measures, perhaps in a form similar to the Agreed Framework, which each com-
mits itself to taking to end the state of war. As Seoul and Pyongyang have made progress on this
front—they signed a non-aggression pact in 1991 and held a summit last year—the Bush admin-
istration remains the only party yet to take a meaningful measure to end the state of war with the
North.
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On a regional level, Washington needs to recognize that Beijing and Moscow would find
intolerable the idea of a reunified Korea in which the United States remains the sole foreign mili-
tary presence, just as it would be unfathomable for Washington or Tokyo to accept a reunified
Korea under Chinese or Russian influence. All four powers have a vital stake in peace on the
peninsula, and none would prefer a unified Korea under the lopsided influence of one of them to
a divided Korea that no single power controls. The international system in Northeast Asia, in
other words, has an interest in maintaining the status quo, even at the price of continued insta-
bility and risk of conflagration. Furthermore, the United States, Russia, China, and to a lesser
degree Japan, remain the major sources of weapons and their technology for the two Koreas,
giving them further incentive to perpetuate the fragile division. A peace regime on the peninsula,
therefore, needs an international component that would 1) constrain arms transfers from the four
and 2) alleviate the concerns that each might have over upsetting the power balance on the
Korean peninsula.
A regional factor that could adversely affect the peace process on the Korean peninsula is
the ever-increasing emphasis on military preparedness and joint arms build-up among the three
countries under the leadership of the United States. In itself, it promotes a vicious cycle of power
political rivalry, if not an arms race, between Japan and China, which may affect negatively the
relationship between China and the United States and the peace process on the Korean peninsula.
First, it increases a sense of military pressure and isolation on the part of the North Korean lead-
ership, hampering the process of military confidence building and arms control. The increasing
military cooperation between the United States and Japan means a codification of the triangular
military alliance that justifies Japan’s military role on the Korean peninsula. In the eyes of the
North Koreans, in particular, this development will exacerbate militarization of the Korean pen-
insula, as well as providing a powerful indication of the rising influence of a reemerging Japa-
nese militarism in the region. Hence a peace regime needs to be buttressed by a regional frame-
work that would neutralize any adverse international factors over which the Korean people have
no control.
Second, the increasing militarization of the American tripartite alliance can contribute
negatively to peace building on the Korean peninsula by arousing more power-political reactions
from China and Russia. When Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, was asked in April 1996 if he expected a positive reaction from Beijing to the
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joint security declaration in Tokyo, he replied that “the U.S. is confident that Beijing should
have every reason to welcome a reaffirmation of our alliance. It is not directed at any one coun-
try, and Beijing, I think, understands that close U.S.-Japan relations make for stability and pre-
dictability in the region.”54 But the actual reaction from Beijing and Moscow was to move to
develop a “strategic partnership” between the two in a summit meeting immediately after the
U.S. and Japan joint security declaration. The Chinese and Russians seem to define the new
development of the U.S.-led military alliance among the three as another a form of American
hegemony. On July 16, 2001, the two countries finally formalized their concerns about the U.S.
hegemony by signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation, which aims to oppose the U.S. mis-
sile defense and consolidate Russian support of China s sovereign right over Taiwan.55
The peace process among the three parties needs to be complemented by a regional re-
gime because arms control and disarmament requires a wider participation of the regional states,
including China, Russia, and Japan. The involvement of all three is essential for a Northeast
Asia-wide regime of restraints in arms transfers to the Korean peninsula and for a regional agree-
ment to make the peninsula a nuclear-weapons-free zone. An excellent way to work on this re-
gional regime is to build on the non-nuclear declaration that the North and South signed in 1991.
In the declaration, the two pledged not to develop nuclear weapons, but their pledges are not
accompanied by commitment by any of the four major powers to respect and support them. In
order to make the declaration more effective, North and South Korea can add a protocol, which
the four powers then sign and ratify. This could pave the way for a more ambitious demilitariza-
tion system where the four commit not to transfer weapons or weapons-related technology to, or
through, either of the Koreas.
The final stage of the peace process can result from successful progress of the above
mechanisms. If the peace process is intensified, the two Koreas may be able to enter a qualita-
tively higher level of inter-Korean dialogue. That may produce a political commonwealth, pos-
sibly a confederal form of political integration, between the two Koreas. At this juncture, the
multilateral peace talks, which began as a specific forum for peace on the Korean peninsula, can
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develop into a region-wide security forum for Northeast Asia in general. The formation of a
loose political commonwealth on the peninsula should be an indication that a mature and stable
peace regime has emerged in Korea. Therefore, in this stage, the focus of the multilateral forum
for Korea will be able to shift to a higher level of peace mission for East Asia.
Conclusion: Out of Security Dilemma to Reciprocity
E.H. Carr, the consummate realist, succinctly summarizes realism in his seminal work.56
As he articulates it, realism places an emphasis on facts and their analysis, and tends to down-
play the role of purpose. Realism emphasizes the irresistible strength of existing forces and the
inevitable character of existing tendencies, and insists that the highest wisdom lies in accepting
and adapting oneself to these forces and tendencies. Yet Carr warns that such an attitude, though
advocated in the name of objective thought, might be carried to a point where it results in the
sterilization of thought and the negation of action. He recognizes that there is a stage where real-
ism is the necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism, just as there is a period when
utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism. Immature thought is pre-
dominantly purposive and utopian; thought without purpose is “the thought of old age.” In a final
synthesis, therefore, he proposes that mature thought combines purpose with observation and
analysis: “Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science. Sound political thought
and sound political life will be found only where both have their place.”57
The question here is how to combine the two elements, reality and utopia, in designing a
course toward a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The challenge lies in envisioning a crea-
tive amalgam of brute power politics and liberal institution-building. In Northeast Asia, a simple
acceptance of power politics of major states provides no guarantee of peace, as I have shown.
The tripartite militarization would only precipitate negative reactions from North Korea, China,
and Russia, intensifying the already tense environment of the region, possibly triggering an arms
race and even a war. As long as the United States, South Korea, and Japan are complacent about
prolonging the power-political strategy of strengthening and integrating their military alliances,
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the international system in the region will continue to be fraught with the tensions they are bound
to create with other powers. At the same time, South Korea and Japan may become prisoners of
their own complacency, unable to develop their own vision of a new regional order that could
lessen the arms race and promote a peaceful interaction among the countries of Northeast Asia.
However, this vicious cycle was breached for the first time by the Agreed Framework, in which
each side to the confrontation not only recognized its adversary’s security concerns, but also
took measures to allay them. The breached hole was made wider as Kim Dae-Jung and Kim
Jong-Il held a summit in 2000, moving closer to amity between the two Koreas. The final break-
through was about to be made when Clinton prepared his own summit with the North Korean
leader. Clinton’s contradiction-rid “containgagement” policy was taking a decisive turn toward
engagement, only to be stopped and reversed by Bush. Thus far Bush has succeeded in pushing
back the achievements and closing the breached hole. Now the containment leg stands to gain
momentum and eclipse the engagement leg, which will only exacerbate the tension that the
United States’ two-war strategy has created.
To resolve the missile issue and to build peace in the region in general, we need a new
security framework that emphasizes less the centrality of power politics and more the importance
of multilateral interactions among countries of the region. We need to find the best balance
between alliance politics and a multilateral peace endeavor. The continued arms transfers from
the United States to South Korea, the accelerating arms build-up by South Korea, and the coop-
eration in arms production—particularly of the ballistic missile defense systems—among Wash-
ington, Seoul, and Tokyo would only make the peace proposal a barren gesture. An initiative for
peace talks must be coupled with a blueprint for reducing the centrality of military transactions
within the military alliances. To acknowledge the reality of the security dilemma and the neces-
sity of reciprocity may well constitute the first step toward the peace initiative.
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U.S.-JAPAN DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY RELATIONS POST-1945:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
John Swenson-Wright
Introduction
As former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson famously observed, “a week is a long
time in politics.” Wilson’s uncontentious observation, capturing succinctly the vagaries of parlia-
mentary politics, is rarely applied to the U.S.-Japan alliance, but recent events seems to have
confirmed its relevance even in the case of the long-standing post-war security and diplomatic
relationship between Washington and Tokyo. For example, in the protracted political stalemate
preceding the inauguration of President George W. Bush, media commentary on both sides of
the Pacific, optimistically highlighted new, positive trends in the bilateral relationship. In con-
trast to the sometimes tension-fraught and even acrimonious dialogue that surfaced periodically
throughout the 1990s during the stewardship of Bill Clinton, the new Republican administration
seemed intent on smoothing ruffled feathers in Tokyo and on encouraging a strong, co-operative
and genuinely reciprocal partnership with Tokyo. With the appointment of prominent experi-
enced Japan hands, such as Richard Armitage as Deputy Secretary of State and Robert Zoellick
as U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and in the wake of an important bipartisan report calling
for “renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance,”1
the prognosis for an improving relationship seemed unusually positive. Yet, within the space of a
few weeks, this favorable picture seemed entirely obscured by a plethora of press reports in
Tokyo critical of the U.S. government, reinforced by high-level Japanese official criticism and
widespread Japanese public discontent.2 The trigger for this sudden shift in attitudes was the
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collision on February 10, 2001 (less than a month after Bush’s inauguration as president) be-
tween a U.S. nuclear powered submarine, the USS Greenville, and a Japanese fishing boat, the
Ehime Maru, resulting in the sinking of the Japanese vessel and the disappearance, presumed
drowned, of nine of the ship’s 35 passengers and crew.
The sudden eruption of a diplomatic crisis highlights a point frequently observed by
historians, namely that contingencies and chance occurrences—as Harold Macmillan put it in
another apposite prime ministerial aphorism, “events dear boy, events”3—frequently intervene in
ways that all too often derail the best laid plans either of national policy makers or of social sci-
entists eager to use parsimonious, but supposedly rigorous, models to impose predictive order on
the chaotic world of international relations. A cursory glance back over the post-1945 history of
U.S.-Japan relations reveals a number of such unwelcome surprises, particularly in the early
years of the bilateral alliance. Notable, for example, during the 1950s were the irradiation of the
Fukuryu Maru (or “Lucky Dragon”) a Japanese fishing vessel, following U.S. hydrogen bomb
tests in the south-west Pacific in 1954; the Girard Incident of 1957 in which an American GI
shot and killed a Japanese civilian; and, in 1960, the attack on the motorcade of James Hagerty,
President Eisenhower’s press assistant in Tokyo by a crowd of Japanese protesters demonstrating
against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Events of more recent vintage, such as
George Bush senior’s unexpected collapse and vomiting fit at a state banquet in Tokyo in De-
cember 1992, or the deeply disturbing rape by U.S. marines of a 12 year old Okinawan school
girl in 1995, have similarly, albeit to a varying degree, threatened to spark a major rift in rela-
tions between the United States and Japanese governments.
Important as such crises undoubtedly are, focusing on temporary difficulties in the bilat-
eral relationship can sometimes obscure deeper undercurrents suggestive of a more stable and
healthy partnership. Moreover, there is a real danger that the immediacy of a particular crisis,
particularly its coverage in the national media (both Japanese and American), can distort our
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understanding of the reaction of individual government officials in both capitals. This becomes
increasingly clear as more of the diplomatic record detailing the post-war evolution of relations
between Washington and Tokyo has become accessible. Much of the historiography on post-war
U.S.-Japan relations has painted a picture of a U.S. leadership inclined either to take Japan for
granted,4 or in some cases to actively ride rough-shod over the sensibilities and political and
diplomatic priorities of its junior and, therefore, weaker alliance partner.5 In recent years, the
criticism of U.S. policy has become more sharply focused, and in some cases, particular strident
in tone. Chalmers Johnson—never one to shy away from controversy—has suggested that the
post-war American relationship with Japan was coercive and fundamentally anti-democratic,
equivalent to the Soviet domination of the satellite states of Eastern Europe, and intended
actively to limit Japan’s ability to chart its own political and diplomatic destiny.6 Less polem-
ically perhaps, John Dower and Michael Schaller have argued recently that the security relation-
ship with Japan can best be likened to a pattern of “double containment” in which Washington
supported Japanese rearmament in order to check Communist, primarily Soviet, expansionism,
but also located U.S. forces on Japanese territory in order to prevent the resurgence of an inde-
pendent and powerful Japan.7
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The strength of these claims is clearly dependent on the archival evidence. However, it is
also legitimate to consider to what extent contemporary developments may have colored and
influenced the perspective of those inclined to be critical of U.S. policy towards Japan, some-
times to a degree that seems unwarranted in terms of the actual historical record, or at least in a
manner that runs the risk of over-emphasizing particular short-comings on the United States side
of the relationship. Just as the experience of Vietnam may have encouraged “new left” historians
writing in the 1960s and 1970s to be particularly critical of early Cold War U.S. diplomacy, so
too writers analyzing the U.S.-Japan relationship from the vantage point of the 1990s—a decade
that witnessed, particularly in its early years, a marked increase in bilateral tension and an appar-
ently poorly co-ordinated and ad hoc approach by the American government towards Japan—
may have been overly quick to stress the weaknesses rather than the strengths of the U.S. gov-
ernment’s Japan policy.
Some suggestion that this may indeed be the case emerges from the diplomatic files, both
existing and recently released material, particularly that relating to the late 1940s and throughout
the 1950s. The following analysis highlights a number of instances in which a second look at the
record suggests we might want to reconsider our previous judgements. The approach here is nec-
essarily illustrative rather than exhaustive since the purpose is primarily to provoke discussion.
After documenting those events that are candidates for re-examination, the analysis continues
with a chronological overview of the security relationship in the remainder of the post-war peri-
od, highlighting some of the key turning points in relations, before focusing on contemporary
developments and speculating on the likely direction of alliance relations in the immediate
future.
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1945-1952: Laying The Foundations For Co-operation
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, American policy-making on Japan
was carried out at arms-length from Washington. State Department forward thinking on matters
Asian was largely the preserve of China specialists—men such as Owen Lattimore, Andrew
Ross and Stanley Hornbeck—inclined, either out of geopolitical calculation or a sympathy for
America’s longstanding missionary-inspired preoccupation with the “middle kingdom,” to iden-
tify America’s post-war role in the region with what seemed in 1945 to be an emerging continen-
tal power. A newly installed and relatively inexperienced (at least where foreign affairs was con-
cerned) President Truman was preoccupied with confronting possible Soviet expansion in the
Middle East or Europe,8 and eager, where feasible, to promote troop demobilisation and bring
America’s battle-weary troops back home. Against this backdrop, detailed management of
Japan’s affairs was the preserve of General Douglas MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), based in Tokyo.
SCAP headed a diverse Occupation administration of U.S. military officials and progres-
sive, “New Deal” reformers committed to a far-ranging set of social and political initiatives in-
tended to safeguard and advance new democratic institutions and principles while avoiding any
return to the disastrous and destructive militarism of the 1930s. Temperamentally, MacArthur
brooked no opposition to and little interference in his administration and faced at best only peri-
odic and ineffectual challenges from his nominal administrative overseer—the 11-member Far
Eastern Commission in Washington as well as the smaller, but equally ineffectual Allied Council
for Japan in Tokyo.
In February 1946 George Kennan (at that point, a Foreign Service Officer stationed in
Moscow) warned prophetically, in his “long telegram” of the dangers of Soviet expansion and
the need for a strategy of “containment.” It was only then that Washington began to move deci-
sively but gradually towards a policy of “patience and firmness” in confronting Soviet influ-
ence.9 In turn, this would create a context in which Japan would begin to intrude on the con-
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sciousness of Washington-based policy makers, although even at this stage the process was a
gradual, evolutionary one.
The catalyst for a more pronounced shift in U.S. government attitudes came in the spring
of 1947, when MacArthur surprised opinion within Japan and also his superiors back home by
calling publicly for an end to the Occupation and the rapid conclusion of a peace treaty. Wash-
ington was irritated by the Far Eastern general’s unilateralism, suspecting that he might have
been grandstanding on the peace treaty issues in order to boost his standing with U.S. public
opinion back home with a view to advancing his personal presidential ambitions, something
which he had apparently been promoting since as early as 1944.10 Despite these misgivings, the
Truman Administration explored the possibility of an early peace, via discussions within the four
power Council of Foreign Ministers (comprising Britain, France, the USSR and the United
States—the principal wartime allies). However, the Soviet Union’s objection to a general peace
conference, and disagreements on the role of Nationalist China as well as over the location of the
conference, conspired to conspired to block any rapid progress on the issue. Nonetheless,
MacArthur’s initiative had clearly raised the profile of Japan-related issues among senior Wash-
ington officials. These issues were quickly addressed from the summer of 1947 as a matter of
some urgency by a newly established Policy Planning Staff (PPS), charged by Secretary of State
George Marshall with responsibility for ensuring more coherence and focus in policy-making
and headed by a recently reassigned George Kennan.
Kennan and his colleagues broke new ground by seeking for the first time in the post-war
period to examine Japan in a wider geopolitical context, while also downplaying the long-
standing emphasis on the importance of China. Surprised, if not dismayed, by the past reluctance
seriously to examine Japan’s strategic importance to the United States, the PPS planners chal-
lenged MacArthur’s peace initiative as premature and were sharply critical of the way in which
the occupation had been administered in its early years. Kennan, in particular (especially follow-
ing his visit to Japan in early 1948), was appalled by MacArthur’s management style and his ap-
parent inability to appreciate the extent to which the wholesale imposition of U.S.-authored
political and social norms (particularly via the new 1947 Constitution), as well as the consider-
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able privileges enjoyed by Occupation personnel, might be generating resentment among broad
swathes of Japanese political and public opinion—both on the left and right of the political
spectrum.
At a practical level, Japan lacked a coherent, centralized police force, was economically
weak and, therefore, remained vulnerable to “Communist political pressures . . . and a Commu-
nist take-over.” Equally important, the early Occupation purge of Japanese officials had been
carried out “with a dogmatic, impersonal vindictiveness for which there were few examples
outside the totalitarian countries themselves” and had disproportionately affected individuals
predisposed to be sympathetic to the United States, and as a consequence had potentially
jeopardized long-term U.S.-Japan relations.11
Confronted by these problems, Kennan recommended a halt to the reform process of the
Occupation, to be replaced by a focus instead on promoting the rapid recovery of the Japanese
economy, and in the long-term steps to ensure a “brief, general and non-punitive” peace treaty
with Japan.12 Perhaps the most significant aspect of Kennan’s recommendations was his empha-
sis on the psychological dimension of the relationship between Japan and the United States.
While recognizing that the immediate peace treaty was inappropriate, Kennan was quick to stress
the need to encourage Japanese independent responsibility, to return decision-making authority
to the Japanese government, and to minimize the Occupation presence. This was clear from his
proposals for the stationing of American troops in Japan, in which he emphasized the need to be
sensitive to potential slights to Japan’s national pride and independence. Locating U.S. forces
away from major population centers and restricting interaction between American troops and
ordinary Japanese would, “reduce to a minimum the psychological impact of the presence of
occupational forces on the Japanese population.”13 Similarly, promoting cultural exchange be-
tween Japan and America and ending press censorship could also be seen as measures intended
to correct the earlier impression that Western political and social customs were being foisted on
Japan at the expense of Japanese traditions.
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Kennan’s recommendations for Japan eventually formed the basis for NSC 13/2,
approved by President Truman on October 9, 1948. It represented a significant shift in thinking
and can be seen as the first major redefinition of America’s Japan policy since 1945. Kennan
himself regarded his role in shaping this new policy (with the exception of his involvement with
the Marshall Plan), as his most significant achievement during his time in government. By con-
trast, in later years some Japanese writers were critical of this change of direction (often referred
to as the “Reverse Course”), arguing that it represented a subordination of popular left-wing
majority sentiment in Japan to a narrowly defined American goal of co-opting Japan into the
Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Such criticisms, while perhaps understandable from
the vantage point of the 1990s and frustration over tension in contemporary U.S.-Japan relations,
can be challenged on a number of grounds. First, they ignore Japanese government and bureau-
cratic support for the new approach as well as mischaracterizing Japanese sentiment at the time,
overlooking the eagerness with which a people that had endured three years of Occupation
would have actively welcomed Kennan’s initiative. Second, they exaggerate the scope of
change. NSC 13/2 envisaged a gradual restoration of authority to the Japanese government,
rather than the emasculation and overturning of earlier reforms.14 Third, they seriously misrepre-
sent U.S. strategic thinking at the time. The militarization of American security policy was still a
future development, and Washington had not yet embarked on a conscious alliance-building
strategy.
Despite the undoubted tension between the superpowers, the American government’s
perspective was limited rather than global in scope. For example, rhetoric notwithstanding, the
U.S. government in supporting Europe via the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, was
attempting to bolster the confidence and position of its Western allies via economic aid and
political support rather than launching a world-wide struggle against international communism.15
Even following the Czech coup of early 1948, Washington emphasized reassurance for Europe
rather than retaliation against a Soviet threat which American intelligence reports suggested was
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unlikely to develop into military aggression.16 Moreover, Congress rejected military (as opposed
to economic) aid to Europe and resisted the establishment of a formal alliance with the West
Europeans. Against such a background, Kennan’s immediate goal involved simply denying
Japan to the Soviet Union—preventing Asia’s potentially most powerful industrial country from
drifting into the Communist orbit rather than enlisting an active ally in the defense of the Free
World. Indeed, Kennan’s thinking at this stage echoed the balance of power philosophy of the
nineteenth century, and involved creating separate, independent power centers rather than the
division of the world into two ideologically opposed, super-power dominated spheres of interest.
A neutral Japan would not constitute, in Kennan’s view, a threat to American interests, and
Washington, in 1948, was willing to see a middle-of-the-road government in Tokyo centered on
the Socialist Party, rather than a more explicitly conservative, right-wing administration.17
Kennan’s initial speculation regarding a neutral Japan was soon eclipsed by the intensifi-
cation of Cold War tensions both globally and particularly in East Asia. The emergence of com-
munist government in China in 1949 and the articulation of NSC 68 in April 1950 both encour-
aged a shift towards a more explicitly adversarial relationship between East and West in which
both Moscow and Washington were anxious to create and maintain a network of dependable
allied support. With Paul Nitze replacing George Kennan as head of the PPS in January 1950,
the political and economic character of America’s containment strategy was increasingly over-
shadowed by an emphasis on a military response to the Soviet threat. The past tendency to rely
on a strategy of strong-point defense was replaced by a much more wide-ranging and ultimately
undiscriminating policy of resisting Soviet expansion whenever it might occur. The new policy
called for a major U.S. rearmament campaign, eschewing Kennan’s psychological subtlety in
favor of rhetoric of bipolar conflict and representing the Soviet threat in terms of readily quanti-
fiable Soviet military capabilities rather than the hard to define but nonetheless important inten-
tions of the men in the Kremlin.
75
18 NSC 73, July 1, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol. 1, 1950, pp. 332
and 338.
19 Kennan to Dulles, July 20, 1950, State Department decimal files, 694.001/7-250, NA.
Where Japan was concerned, the consequence of this important shift in attitudes, was
gradual rather than immediate. Even following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, any
instinct to militarize the relationship with Japan was muted rather than explicit. While Washing-
ton policy-makers feared that Japan might be vulnerable to communist infiltration and subver-
sion—and therefore should take steps to bolster its internal security by strengthening its recently
created National Police Reserve—a direct attack on Japan was considered improbable in the
immediate future.18 In parallel with such practical initiatives, senior U.S. officials, particularly
within the State Department, remained conscious of the importance of addressing the political as
well as the strictly military dimension of relations with Tokyo. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Pentagon, preoccupied with the need to maintain and solidify the U.S. base presence in
Japan, were inclined to block moves to bring the Occupation of Japan swiftly to a close, their
civilian colleagues—men such as Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs, John Allison, Director of the State Department’s office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and
perhaps most important, John Foster Dulles, Truman’s specially appointed consultant on Japan
—shrewdly recognized the danger of dictating terms to Japan and the importance of winning a
committed and active ally. Delaying a peace treaty would jeopardize, possibly fatally, the deli-
cate task of wooing Japan as a long-term partner.
This stress on co-operation, in the context of the constraints imposed by the international
situation as well as domestic political conditions both in the United States and in Japan, runs like
a leitmotif through State Department thinking on Japan both in the final years of the Occupation
and throughout the 1950s. As early as July 1950, even amidst the chaos and confusion of North
Korea’s seemingly irresistible pressure to swallow its southern rival on the Korean peninsula,
Kennan was urging on Dulles the need to act cautiously and with restraint towards Japan.19
Dulles, it soon became apparent, took Kennan’s advice to heart. In the critically impor-
tant and difficult process of negotiating a Peace Treaty between Japan and the former wartime
allied powers, he employed his considerable intellectual and diplomatic skills to offset pressure
from countries such as Britain and Australia, inclined towards imposing on Japan a binding,
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overly legalistic, and in certain cases punitive settlement. The Labor Government of Clement
Attlee, for example, lobbied early on in the peace treaty process for a variety of restrictions,
including the inclusion of a war-guilt clause in the preamble to the treaty, formal limits on
Japan’s right to rearm, specific limits on Japan’s shipbuilding capacity, and the abrogation of
Japan’s preferential trading rights in Africa.20 Dulles, in part as a consequence of his experience
as a delegate to the Versailles Peace Conference of 1918, where he witnessed at first hand the
dangerous consequences of imposing excessively restrictive terms on a defeated opponent, had
become sensitized to the importance of establishing a secure and long-term foundation for post-
war relations with Japan.21
This constructive approach required avoiding restrictive measures and slights to Japan’s
leaders and their desire for sovereign independence within the protective mantel of America’s
military presence in the Far East. It also involved creating opportunities for a genuinely equal
dialogue and exchange of ideas between two strikingly different cultures—a process in which
Dulles played an important, initiating role, particularly via his support for the creation of the
International Christian University of Japan (IUJ) and later, the establishment of International
House, a center for visiting, foreign academics and researchers in the heart of Tokyo.22 This em-
phasis has persisted throughout the post-war period and arguably explains the longstanding per-
sonal ties that have helped the bilateral relationship weather periodic crises and tensions.
Despite Dulles’s recognition of the need to avoid antagonizing Japan unnecessarily, the
United States would inevitably face significant obstacles in developing a constructive and recip-
rocal relationship with Japan in the years ahead. Part of the problem, it has to be said, was of
America’s own making. The new 1947 Japanese Constitution, drafted in effect by the SCAP
reformers under MacArthur’s direction, had put in train a host of important politically progres-
sive reforms, but it had also, notably, via article nine—the famous “peace clause”—ruled out the
possibility of major rearmament, or at the very least rearmament that might be used for anything
other than purely defensive purposes. Moreover, under the leadership of Prime Minister Yoshida
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Shigeru, the Japanese government shrewdly avoided moving rapidly to promote rearmament of a
type favored by the Americans. In part this was a matter of simple self-interested calculation.
Japan could rely on the U.S. military presence in post-Occupation Japan—a presence provided
for (although not, it should be said guaranteed) under the terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
of 1952—and which reflected wider American strategic priorities. Given the conflict in Korea
and the potential threat posed by Communist China, the United States was not about to abandon
its basing privileges in Japan. Against such a backdrop, Japan was able to focus its immediate
energies on economic reconstruction, while minimizing the risk of a return to the militarism that
had proven so destabilizing during the 1930s, a point on which Yoshida (who had himself been
incarcerated by the Japanese authorities in the final years of the war) was especially sensitive.
Yoshida’s motivation in resisting rapid rearmament also reflected wider domestic polit-
ical realities. As leader of the right of center Liberal Party, he found himself caught between two
critical political extremes. On the left, he faced the Socialist and Communist parties, fiercely
critical of the relationship with the United States and advocating either alignment with the Com-
munist bloc, or in the case of the Socialists, a policy of strict unarmed neutrality. On the right,
Yoshida confronted both the Democratic Party and a smaller group of disgruntled Liberals asso-
ciated with Hatoyama IchirÇ, two groups that embraced a range of policy options, including a
preference for traditionalism and Japanese political and social mores—loosely defined—as well
as support for a more rapid pace of rearmament than that favored by Yoshida. Traditionalism
encouraged a degree of scepticism regarding the new Constitution, which was seen as foreign
and imposed rather than the product of genuine consultation. This, in turn, contributed to a long-
running campaign throughout the 1950s by the political Right to revise the Constitution, a posi-
tion that, it should be noted, Yoshida identified with, although rarely in public.
It is important to stress (particularly since this point is largely under-reported in the aca-
demic literature) that the Americans—at least within the State Department—were well aware of
the difficulties that this situation presented, particularly in finding a political constituency, either
among the country’s leadership or within the general public which would readily and unambigu-
ously align itself with the United States. As the Occupation drew to a close, moderate conserva-
tism increasingly became linked to the re-emergence of a commitment to nationalist ideals as
well as criticism of the Occupation and the Constitution, a trend that State Department officials
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recognized, with considerable foresight, would develop into powerful pressure for constitutional
revision.
This growing resentment of the imposition of foreign concepts and practices also influ-
enced and was capitalized on by the Left, and by 1951, the Japanese Communists had “already
attempted to exploit the alien, un-Japanese character of American life and its utter irreconcilabil-
ity with Japan’s native culture and traditions.”23 Moreover, this pattern was prominently reflected
in ideological debates among Japan’s left-wing intellectuals, as many Marxist academics and
commentators increasingly sought to replace class-based analysis and criticisms of modernity
defined in Western and European terms with a more distinctly Japanese, nativist tradition. In-
deed, a wide body of opinion throughout Japan appears to have been increasingly predisposed
either to question the legacy of the Occupation or to try and find some legitimate means of re-
connecting with or reasserting a coherent sense of national identity (for example, by supporting
neutralism or looking to China as an Asian and therefore culturally familiar model). This was a
trend that was likely to complicate the development of post-Occupation alliance relations. In the
words of one State Department official:
Many Japanese are discontented and frustrated because ideals and traditions of a
lifetime have been rudely brushed aside. Others are irked by specific Occupation
reforms and controls. Some are alarmed by the way the Occupation has set orga-
nized labor and other liberal forces into motion. Thousands were purged and
regardless of their present re-instatement will never forget or forgive the humili-
ation of their pariah-like disqualification. A few, but perhaps a very important
few, have bitterly resented the war crimes trials and the execution of Japan’s
former top leaders. . . . It is most essential, therefore, that we recognise that the
post-peace treaty position of the United States in Japan will be vulnerable at many
points to anti-American agitation on the part of rightists as well as leftist
elements.24
Here, in this analysis, was both an echo of Kennan’s 1948 criticisms and an emphasis, parallel-
ing Dulles’s observations, on the importance of culture in shaping political behavior and alliance
relations. For the Americans, addressing this situation involved a basic difficulty. Endorsing
either the Communists or Socialists was clearly not a viable option, given the former’s hostility
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to the United States, and the latter’s support for neutrality. At the same time, backing moderate
conservative opinion (represented in 1951 by Yoshida’s liberals) ran the risk of making the
United States appear unprincipled and self-serving, both in the eyes of the Left and, it should be
emphasized, of the Right. In the ideologically charged environment of post-war Japan, an Amer-
ican endorsement of constitutional revision could easily seem like political opportunism, given
the parallels between the 1947 Constitution and the ideals of America’s own Founding Fathers.
MacArthur’s provision of a new Constitution—both the manner in which it was introduced and
the foreign tenor of some of its political terminology—had, to some degree, created a policy-
making straightjacket for post-war U.S. administrations in their dealings with Japan. Stable and
strong government in Japan arguably required the creation of an effective consensus on national
political values, both within the governing elites and amongst the populace as a whole. Nation-
alism extended across the political spectrum and was expressed in different forms; both the Right
and Left could bolster their claim to be promoting Japanese interests by criticizing the United
States.
Dulles, to his credit, both as special consultant on Japan during the Truman Administra-
tion and later as Secretary of State under Eisenhower, recognized the importance of working sen-
sitively within these constraints. While he was not averse, in private conversations with Japanese
officials, to making the case forcefully for rearmament, he was careful to avoid any suggestion
that America was intent on intervening in Japanese domestic politics. In autumn 1953, for exam-
ple, Vice-President Nixon, while on a visit to Tokyo, had unexpectedly announced publicly that
it had been a mistake during the Occupation for the United States to seek a permanently demili-
tarized Japan—a suggestion that had been positively received by conservative Japanese political
opinion, but which also had implied U.S. endorsement of constitutional change and which had
been quickly criticized by left-wing and media opinion. Although a revision of article nine might
have aided U.S. rearmament plans, Dulles preferred to justify Japan’s right to self-defense in
terms of article 51 of the United Nations Charter and was insistent that the State Department
would “never say a word about amending the Japanese Constitution.”25
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In light of the evidence that key policy-makers on the U.S. side recognized the dangers of
imposing terms on Japan and the need to solicit active co-operation from Japanese government
officials, it remains puzzling that the literature has tended to stress the alleged shortcomings on
the American side. In part, this reflects a failure to distinguish between short-term initiatives and
long-term objectives. The 1952 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, for instance, was criticized for lack-
ing an explicit U.S. guarantee to come to the defense of Japan and for including a provision
allowing U.S. forces to intervene, at the request of the Japanese government, to quell domestic
unrest. Undoubtedly these two points were a point of contention amongst Japanese political
parties, especially in the latter part of the 1950s. They were, however, addressed as part of the
process of revising the security treaty between 1957 and 1960. Moreover, it should be stressed
that the San Francisco settlement was viewed by both sides as provisional in character. Stress
was placed on reaching an early settlement in an effort to diffuse domestic tensions associated
with the Occupation, and certain issues, principally territorial ones relating to both Japan’s north-
ern islands as well as the so-called article three territories of Okinawa and the Ryãkyãs, were
intentionally left unresolved. Moreover, the bilateral security treaty was open-ended. Japan made
at best only a general nod in the direction of rearmament rather than an explicit commitment, and
with the treaty itself free from any time limit, both sides anticipated revisiting the issue at some
unspecified point in the future.
1952–1960: Alliance Pragmatism Versus Domestic Division
With the formal ending of the Occupation in 1952 and the emergence in 1953 of the new
Republican administration headed by Dwight Eisenhower, the U.S.-Japan relationship was in
some respects in a relatively healthy state. There were continuities from the previous administra-
tion, since Dulles was now Secretary of State and John Allison was soon to take up the position
of Ambassador to Japan. Not unexpectedly in light of this, the past stress on building an active
alliance partnership continued as a dominant theme in the thinking of State Department officials
involved in Japan-related affairs Yet, moving from identifying to realizing this objective re-
mained problematic, not least because of the problems of creating consensus among a Japanese
populace and leadership that remained sharply divided over the question of Japan’s role in the
Cold War. On the rearmament issue, the Yoshida government continued to drag its feet, and
even when it was replaced by the Hatoyama administration of 1955 (strengthened by the formal
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merger of the Liberal and Democratic Parties into the new Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and
more committed to building up the country’s military capabilities), rapid progress remained elu-
sive. Although the formal creation of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in 1954 and the establishment
of a National Defense Council in 1956 had represented important advances, economic difficul-
ties continued to discourage the government from devoting extensive resources to rearmament.
Moreover, personal rivalries within the Japanese cabinet frequently conspired to prevent the
articulation of a clear government position, not only on the rearmament question but also on a
range of important issues related to Japan’s diplomacy and particularly its relationship with the
United States.
All too often, Washington found itself having to interact with a sharply divided govern-
ment in Tokyo, whose senior members seemed overly eager to place their personal ambitions
ahead of either Japan’s national interests or anything resembling a coherent government policy.
This problem was particularly pronounced during the 1950s and arguably has been a critical
factor in efforts to build an effective and proactive working partnership between the two govern-
ments throughout the post-war period. In August 1955, for example, Shigemitsu Mamoru, For-
eign Minister in the Hatoyama cabinet, had travelled to Washington in an effort to persuade
Dulles and the Eisenhower administration to consider replacing the existing security treaty with
a new, more explicitly reciprocal arrangement. The initiative was unsuccessful, with Dulles
arguing that domestic divisions in Japan militated against tackling the issue at this stage. Here, it
might be thought was evidence of a Secretary of State unduly dismissive of the views of a valu-
able alliance partner. Yet, Dulles’s position is readily understandable in light of the remarkable
degree to which the Japanese side was fragmented and confused about its own objectives. Senior
LDP politicians, such as KÇno IchirÇ and Kishi Nobusuke, together with prominent officials in
the Foreign Ministry, happily briefed the Americans against accepting Shigemitsu’s proposals,
and even Prime Minister Hatoyama made it clear with “embarrassing frankness,” via intermedi-
aries, that he had little confidence in his Foreign Minister.26
82
27 See, for example, Fiona Hill, “A Disagreement between Allies: The United Kingdom, the Uni-
ted States, and the Soviet-Japanese Territorial Dispute, 1945-56,” Journal of Northeast Asian
Studies (Fall, 1995).
28 “Japanese Domestic Political Situation,” September 27, 1956, RG59, ONEAA, Japan Subject
File, 1947-56, lot 58D637, box 7, NA; Crowe to Dening, August 29, 1956, FO371/121040,
A similar pattern of damaging internal division and bureaucratic isolation surfaced in the
extended peace treaty and territorial negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union between
1955 and 1956. Much of the discussion between Moscow and Tokyo focused on the vexed issue
of the “northern territories,” the four island groups of Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and
Kunashiri to the north of Hokkaido, claimed by Japan as its sovereign territory, but held by the
Soviets since their occupation at the end of the Second World War. In an apparent effort to
resolve this issue, the Soviets proposed a variety of solutions, including a compromise option in
which, in return for the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan, Mos-
cow would return the two southernmost of these islands, Shikotan and Habomai, while retaining
the remaining islands.
Traditional interpretations of these negotiations have pointed to American intervention as
the key reason for the ultimate failure of the normalization talks, arguing that Dulles deliberately
pressured Shigemitsu to reject the Russian offer by threatening to maintain effectively in perpe-
tuity the U.S. military presence in the article three territories of Okinawa and the Ryãkyãs. These
territories had been administered by the Americans since 1945, but with the understanding that
“residual sovereignty” rested with Japan. By privately implying to Shigemitsu that the United
States was prepared to abandon the residual sovereignty claim, Dulles, it has been suggested,
was effectively blackmailing the Japanese Foreign Minister, intentionally pressuring him to back
away from offering any concessions to the Soviets.27
Yet this sequence of events can be viewed in a different light, not least because of con-
siderable documentary evidence in both the British and American archives that Dulles, as he
claimed privately at the time, had raised the question of linkage between Okinawa and the two-
island proposal in an effort to provide Shigemitsu with negotiating ammunition vis-à-vis the So-
viets. Dulles, in fact, far from looking to destabilize relations with Tokyo by issuing threats was
merely suggesting that Shigemitsu might present the “risk” of American retaliation to the Soviets
as a plausible but uncontentious basis for holding firm to a four-island solution.28 The contro-
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versy surrounding Dulles’s proposal can equally well be explained in terms of internal divisions
within the Japanese government, in particular, rivalry between senior career diplomats in the
GaimushÇ (Japan’s Foreign Ministry) and the Foreign Minister himself, not to mention wider
splits within the Hatoyama cabinet and the LDP as a whole. Details of Dulles’s suggestion of a
linkage between the two island solution and the status of Okinawa had, in fact, been leaked to
the press by Matsumoto Shunichi, a leading Japanese Foreign Ministry official involved in the
talks with Moscow, “with the intention of embarrassing not so much the Americans as
Shigemitsu himself.” Matsumoto felt that ceding sovereignty over the Southern Kuriles to the
Soviets was too high a price to pay for the return of Shikotan and the Habomais, and it was clear
to the State Department that, through the disclosure, he was intentionally “knifing” his Foreign
Minister, while “sending private reports to KÇno [Ichiro] in Tokyo that Shigemitsu was botching
the negotiations.”29 Public disclosure of Dulles’s proposal had the desired effect of suggesting
that Shigemitsu had failed in his ambition to reach an agreement with the Soviets, but also
indirectly fostered the misleading public perception that the Americans were intervening to close
off Japan’s negotiating options. Certainly, the Soviets, via their own media outlets, were quick to
trumpet this interpretation. Understandably, against this background, the State Department were
frustrated to discover that they were working with a deeply divided government. In the words of
one U.S. official, “it is hard to do business with these fellows when they are all knifing each
other to beat the band.”30
The problem of internal bureaucratic and political divisions on the Japanese side contin-
ued, throughout the 1950s, to pose a major problem in building an effective alliance partnership
with Japan. For example, during the Lucky Dragon crisis of 1954, poor co-ordination and rivalry
between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Education, Health and Welfare had contributed
to erroneous press reports suggesting—despite clear offers of help from Washington—that the
United States had failed to extend adequate medical treatment to the hapless Japanese fishermen
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caught in the fallout from U.S. hydrogen bomb testing in the South Pacific.31 In turn, this con-
tributed to a climate of public and media-driven distrust of the U.S. government, verging on
paranoia, which threatened to seriously destabilize alliance relations.
Undoubtedly, there were shortcomings on the American side, both in terms of the speed
with which Washington responded to the crisis and the willingness of some officials, such as
Lewis Strauss, the head of the U.S. Atomic Energy Council, to be less than candid in detailing
the background to the crisis. Strauss’s position, however, was an isolated one and needs to be
balanced against the efforts of the Operations Co-ordinating Board in Washington, and John
Allison, the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo, to adequately respond to Japanese concerns. Moreover,
there were wider issues that complicated crisis management on the American side in the imme-
diate aftermath of the crisis, not least of which was the need to prevent the Soviet Union from
learning details of the type of technology that had been used in the original test explosion. The
pressure for secrecy ensured that Washington was unable to disclose to Tokyo precise informa-
tion on the composition of the radioactive ash resulting from the explosion. This constraint, was
naturally hardly helpful in winning public confidence in Japan but it reflected the uncomfortable
but accurate reality of a Japanese government system that was notoriously prone to leaks, unable
to guarantee the confidentiality of official information, and in certain dramatic instances exposed
to high-level penetration by Soviet agents. The extent to which Japanese nationals had been
caught up in Moscow’s elaborate espionage network was first uncovered in August 1954, fol-
lowing the defection to the United States of Yuri Rastvorov, a KGB official and also second
secretary in the Soviet mission in Tokyo.32
The critical stance of Japanese public opinion, particularly on nuclear related issues, cre-
ated particular problems for Japan’s conservative politicians, especially those who recognized
the importance of the military dimension of the relationship with the United States in guaran-
teeing Japan’s security. It contributed to a general climate in which the country’s most senior
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leaders were publicly obliged to distance themselves from, or in certain instances actively criti-
cize, the government in Washington, while privately endorsing and accepting American security-
related policy proposals. This was true, for example, in the case of Okinawa, where privately and
periodically LDP officials recognized, albeit with some regret, the need to accept a continuing
U.S. presence on the territory and an administrative structure that was entirely independent of
Japanese control.33 More strikingly, it was also reflected in the government’s tolerance of the
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy of the U.S. government regarding the stationing of U.S. nuclear-
capable forces on Japanese territory. Recently released U.S. archival material documents clearly
shows that senior Japanese government officials were willing covertly to accept the presence of
such “special weapons” while routinely and misleadingly informing the Diet, the country’s
parliament, of the government’s uncompromising opposition to the introduction of nuclear
weapons.34
It would be an exaggeration, of course, to assume that responsibility for the failure to
develop a fully-fledged and active alliance partnership with Japan over this period rested entirely
with Japanese authorities, or was the product solely of domestic divisions within Japan. Just as
there were obstructive forces in Japan, so too in the United States, important bureaucratic actors,
most notably the military—both the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—could be unduly
inflexible and unimaginative in responding to the Japanese position. This was particularly true in
matters relating to Okinawa. Moreover, there were issues, particularly the issue of trade and po-
litical relations with China, where a more accommodating response by all the major players on
the U.S. side might well have paid dividends in terms of strengthening ties with Japan. None-
theless, it is important to stress the extent to which senior government officials, especially in the
State Department, made the case for taking Japan seriously. John Allison and Douglas Mac-
Arthur, II, as ambassadors in Tokyo, routinely argued for flexibility and responsiveness to Japa-
nese concerns, and their recommendations were sympathetically received both by Dulles and in
certain important instances by the President also. Eisenhower, for example, as a former com-
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mander, was acutely aware of the need to minimize the long-term U.S. military presence in Ja-
pan and, together with Dulles, explored the possibility of a base consolidation program designed
to limit the size of the U.S. military footprint in Okinawa.35 Building down the American troop
presence in Japan during the late 1950s was a key goal of the Eisenhower Administration. The
United States had backed away from a strategy of urging rearmament on Japan by as early as
1955, premised not on any desire to restrain or contain Japan, but rather on the belief that only a
politically and economically stable Japan would be likely to align itself with American inter-
ests.36 As Eisenhower remarked at one point to Senator Styles Bridges, “I’m not concerned about
‘buying friends’ or purchasing satellite countries or any other thing—that is all false. As a free
country, the only ally we can have is a free ally, one who wants to be with us—that is what we
are trying to develop.”37
1960–1978: Economics Eclipses Security—-the Advent of “Low-profile” Diplomacy
By the beginning of the 1960s, it quickly became apparent that the early, ambitious aspi-
rations of Dulles and his State Department colleagues were unlikely to be realized, despite the
positive breakthrough achieved in successfully negotiating a new U.S.-Japan Mutual Security
Treaty, part of a three year process that was finally concluded in 1960. The intense and some-
times violent popular demonstrations in Tokyo, organized by students and progressive forces
concentrated in the capital against both the new security treaty and, more importantly, the style
of leadership of Kishi, the Prime Minister at the time (widely criticized as authoritarian and reac-
tionary), dramatically and abruptly closed off the prospect of substantial rearmament and the
emergence of a conventional, proactive Japanese security stance that the Americans had hoped
for. Although the Mutual Security Treaty was successfully enacted, Kishi was forced to resign to
take responsibility for both the civic unrest that had plagued the capital and the cancellation of
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President Eisenhower’s visit to Japan, and also in the face of internal opposition from rival fac-
tion leaders within the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Against this background of domestic disorder, Ikeda Hayato, Kishi’s successor, pursued
the line of least resistance and intentionally adopted a “low profile” foreign policy, focusing on
economic development and income doubling as a means of forging a new non-ideological
domestic consensus. Ikeda’s tactical maneuver succeeded dramatically in restoring the LDP’s
political fortunes, and the new Prime Minister, in embracing a national “income doubling” agen-
da, helped put in place a set of policy norms and conventions that, in large part because of his
successes, were quickly copied by his successors. Ikeda’s strategy also benefitted from the will-
ingness of the new Kennedy Administration that took office in 1961 to similarly concentrate on
the economic aspects of the bilateral relationship.38 Ikeda served as Prime Minister from 1960 to
1964, and was followed by SatÇ Eisaku who enjoyed a relatively long tenure as Prime Minister,
remaining in office until 1972, when he was replaced by Tanaka Kakuei. Both Ikeda and SatÇ
were political proteges of Yoshida, and their concentration on economic priorities during a
period when the country was enjoying dramatically high rates of industrial growth and prosperity
added weight to the notion of a conscious policy continuity or “Yoshida line” tying together the
immediate with the later post-war years. However, this image of a new coherent Japanese nation-
al policy agenda, although compelling and attractive, particularly when allied with a distinctive
and, to some observers, uniquely Asian model of political economy was at best only a partial
description of a more complex reality. It masked the continuing tendency of Japanese leaders to
articulate the progressive norms of the new post-war pacifist and anti-militarist Japan, while pri-
vately underlining their commitment to the pragmatic and realist goals of the traditional nation-
state and of their principal security partner, the United States.
This public-private distinction remained during the 1960s and early 70s, reflected most
strikingly in Prime Minister SatÇ’s willingness in 1969 secretly to grant to the Americans the
freedom to reintroduce nuclear weapons into Japan in the event of a Far Eastern security crisis.39
SatÇ’s covert deal with the Nixon administration was part of a bilateral quid pro quo intended to
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secure U.S. agreement to return Okinawa to Japan. This decision was in stark contrast with the
Prime Minister’s earlier public expression, in 1968, of the country’s three non-nuclear principles
(rejecting the possession and manufacturing by Japan of nuclear weapons and prohibiting their
introduction into Japanese territory). The Japanese Prime Minister, it seems, was quite happy in
private to entertain policy initiatives that would have been anathema to the bulk of the Japanese
electorate. Indeed, recently released files from the Johnson Presidential library reveal that as ear-
ly as 1965, SatÇ, in private conversations with the then Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer,
had indicated his “common sense” belief that Japan should “have nuclear weapons.”40
Yet, despite such forthright attitudes, there were very real obstacles to any substantial
deepening of co-operative alliance ties between Washington and Tokyo. Much of SatÇ’s accom-
modating stance on the nuclear issue can be explained in terms of the Prime Minister’s own per-
sonal ambitions and his powerful commitment to regaining the article three territories. When it
came to active support for America’s strategic position, both globally and within East Asia, the
Japanese leadership was characteristically cautious. The unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict
among the Japanese public militated against any strong support for the U.S. position beyond rhe-
torical backing and occasional financial assistance, although Tokyo was quite happy to benefit
from the economic dividends associated with American weapons procurement and the continu-
ing U.S. base presence in Japan. Even the suggestion, encouraged by the 1969 Nixon-SatÇ com-
muniqué, that Japan had aligned itself with the United States by acknowledging that the security
of the Korean peninsula was “essential to Japan’s own security,” was quickly downplayed by the
Japanese authorities who sought subsequently to strenuously avoid being tied into anything
resembling a regional security commitment.41
Japanese caution in this context was understandable—not only because of the post-war
reluctance of Japan to become embroiled in armed conflict of any sort, but also because the gov-
ernment appeared to have few friends or committed supporters at the senior-most levels in
Washington. Certainly, under Nixon’s leadership, interest in Asia became concentrated on
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China—a reflection of strategic opportunities and also the personal preferences and expertise of
both the President and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. Where Japan did feature as
a major U.S. policy concern was often in relation to trade and economic issues—for example, in
the long-running dispute over Japanese textile imports—and here interaction between the two
administrations was more likely to be confrontational than co-operative.
1978–1991: a Deepening but Limited Defense Dialogue
It was only by the late 1970s and early 1980s, following the intensification of Cold War
tensions with the Soviet Union, especially the growing Soviet naval threat in the Pacific, that
official Japanese security policy began gradually to shift in a more activist direction. Under the
assertive leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, the security relationship with the
United States and the West as a whole was now much more explicitly endorsed. Japanese de-
fense planners began, for the first time, to attempt to define a national security doctrine, and via
public statements, important technology-sharing arrangements with Washington. Most important
of all, through the U.S.-Japan 1978 Joint Defense Guidelines, Japanese and American leaders
sought to institutionalize what had been, in many respects, a fledgling and rather one-sided mili-
tary alliance. Closer security relations with Washington included:
C The issuing in 1976 of the country’s National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), the first
serious attempt by the Japan Defense Agency to provide a clearly articulated definition of
the country’s defense doctrine.
C Agreement by Washington and Tokyo in 1978 on a new set of U.S.-Japan Joint Defense
Guidelines outlining how the two countries would co-operate in the event of armed attack
on Japan. Japan’s military would be responsible for repelling, limited, small-scale aggres-
sion while awaiting support and reinforcement from U.S. forces.
C Prime Minister Suzuki’s 1981 announcement that Japan would guarantee the security of
its sea-lanes for a distance of 1,000 nautical miles beyond its shoreline.
C A 1983 technology sharing agreement between Washington and Tokyo intended to pro-
mote the flow-back of important new defense technology from Japan to the United
States.
C Public statements in 1983 and 1985 by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone characterizing
Japan as “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Pacific and explicitly identifying Japan with
the security interests of the anti-Soviet Western alliance.
Such initiatives—important though they undoubtedly were—took place in a rarefied
atmosphere. They reflected elite level co-operation rather than widespread popular support on
either side of the Pacific, and all too often rhetorical commitments were only partially matched
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by practical achievements. Moreover, the initiative for security co-operation and for setting
strategic priorities often rested with Washington. Tokyo’s security perspective was more often
than not filtered through American lenses, and there was little scope for a distinctively Japanese
response to regional security challenges—either in a bilateral or a multilateral context. Although
it is possible to identify a long-standing Japanese official preoccupation with the need to promote
regional stability, this operated mainly in the economic sphere (for example via the use of ODA
or in support for ASEAN) and involved Japan in a supporting rather than an initiating role, often
in a manner that underlined the lack of a coherent set of Japanese security and foreign policy pri-
orities. The clearest expression of this was Prime Minister Æhira’s “Comprehensive Security
Doctrine” of 1980, a relatively unsuccessful attempt to use ODA to bolster, largely at U.S. direc-
tion, the position of strategically vulnerable front-line states such as Turkey, Pakistan and South
Korea.42
While there was much talk in the 1980s of “internationalization” or kokusaika, policy
often appeared to be inward rather than outward-looking—a tendency perhaps best epitomized
by the interest of Japan’s politicians as well as the Japanese business and defense communities in
promoting self-sufficiency and the indigenous production (kokusanka) of leading-edge defense
technologies.43 This is a tendency that surfaced most explicitly and dramatically in the bilateral
dispute in the mid-1980s between Washington and Tokyo over plans to jointly develop and pro-
duce a new fighter aircraft, the FSX, as a replacement for the aging F-1. The dispute was impor-
tant not only in highlighting the deep distrust that existed on both sides of Pacific—a far cry
from the cooperative agenda that Dulles had hoped for in 1951—but also because of important
bureaucratic developments in Washington signaling an increasing tendency for security priorities
in the alliance to compete for attention, and in certain instances take second place, to U.S. com-
mercial and economic interests.
In the face of these tensions, Japan had powerful incentives to retreat from high-profile
involvement overseas or an active partnership with the Americans. The political focus remained
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stubbornly local rather than international, and Japanese leaders quickly discovered (in an inter-
esting inversion of the tendency in U.S. politics for national leaders to use foreign policy to boost
their standing domestically) that valuable political victories could best be secured on the home
rather than the foreign front. Prime Minister Nakasone’s key political successes were, for exam-
ple, concentrated in the domestic arena, in the fields of education, administrative reform, and the
deregulation of the tobacco and telecommunications sectors. It was in this context that he was
able to build important bureaucratic coalitions of support and win the backing of a domestic pub-
lic that was rarely impressed by the Prime Minister’s attempts to walk tall on the world’s policy-
making stage.
Post-cold War Adjustments
Despite the gains of the 1980s, post-Cold War bilateral relations between Washington
and Tokyo have been anything but stable and in some respects have imposed contradictory pres-
sures on Japan, alternately encouraging and discouraging Tokyo from strengthening its security
co-operation with Washington. At the same time, friction has generated its own, dialectic-like
pressure for positive change, with concerned officials on both sides of the Pacific scrambling to
offset any deterioration in bilateral ties.
Trade Tensions
Intensifying trade friction between Washington and Tokyo during the early 1990s placed
the bilateral partnership under major pressure, with economic issues threatening to overwhelm
or, at the very least, destabilize the long-standing security partnership between the two countries.
Candidate Clinton, in positioning himself against George H.W. Bush during the 1992 presi-
dential primaries, exploited the contentious issue of alleged Japanese protectionism in order to
appeal to traditional Democrat constituencies, while also promoting the virtues of “strategic
trade” theory and a cooperative partnership between the public and private sectors as a means of
copying Japan’s supposedly distinctive model of economic development.44
The Democrats’ electoral gambit not only paid dividends in the presidential campaign but
also continued to influence trade relations with Japan, particularly in shaping a “managed trade”
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agenda during the two Clinton administrations. (By contrast, the pressure in favor of strategic
trade policies quickly dissipated, as it became clear during the mid to late 1990s that Japan’s
economic success had unraveled and that past achievements could not be unambiguously attrib-
uted to central government targeting, however market-sensitive it may or may not have been.)
The consequence of this adversarial approach to economic relations with Japan was the growth
in Japan of widespread official and popular irritation, if not active dislike (kenbei) of the United
States, exacerbated by the rape by U.S. marines of an Okinawan school-girl in 1995. Added to
this was the U.S. administration’s apparent tilt in the direction of the PRC, symbolized most
dramatically by Clinton decision to visit Beijing in June 1998 without incorporating Tokyo into
his Asian itinerary—a development that encouraged some in Japan to argue that “Japan passing”
(a policy of consciously overlooking Japan) had been added to the existing pattern of “Japan
bashing.” Towards the end of the 1990s, bilateral economic relations became further strained in
the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, as U.S. Treasury officials were increasingly crit-
ical of the Japanese government’s apparent failure to respond sufficiently decisively to the local
turmoil, given its preoccupation with reducing Japan’s fiscal debt rather than reflating the Japa-
nese economy as a means of boosting demand and export opportunities within the region.
Closer Security Ties
Despite the intensification of these political and economic tensions, they were partially
offset during the 1990s by progress on the security side of the relationship—an area where Japan
has, it should be stressed, made some of the running on its own initiative. Some of the impetus
for the reinforcement of bilateral security ties originated in the United States as State and
Defense Department officials, increasingly concerned by intensifying bilateral trade friction,
sought in the mid 1990s to re-emphasize the benefits of joint security co-operation and to re-
extend the alliance to address the evolving post-Cold War security situation in Asia. U.S. official
reiteration of its commitment to maintaining a high profile security presence in the region was
highlighted with the issuing of the Pentagon’s 1995 East Asian Strategy Report. In Japan, a sim-
ilar point of view was expressed with the publication in August 1994 of the Higuchi Report, a
study commissioned by the Hosokawa Administration to examine national security following
growing fears over the proliferation risks associated with North Korean in the early 1990s. While
the Higuchi Report recommended that Japan broaden its military ties with other states in the
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region as a means of increasing Japanese flexibility, its central conclusion stressed the impor-
tance of maintaining a strong security relationship with Washington.45
With both Washington and Tokyo equally committed to reinforcing the bilateral security
relationship, the two countries were during the 1990s able to substantially strengthen and en-
hance their defense cooperation through a variety of agreements including, inter alia:
C The establishment in 1997 of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) which,
in response to the 1995 Okinawa rape controversy, recommended the consolidation of
U.S. bases on Okinawa (principally via the relocation of a U.S. marine heliport at
Futenma) as a means of defusing base-related tension and in order to respond to local
grievances.
C Agreement between Washington and Tokyo in 1997 on a new Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) intended to ensure partial Japanese support for the training
of U.S. forces in Japan, as well as joint exercises and operations during emergencies.
C Final approval by the Japanese Diet in May 1999 of the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guide-
lines, initially endorsed by the new governments in 1997. The guidelines provide an
important, new, clearly defined institutionalized structure for bilateral co-operation via
the creation of a Bilateral Planning Committee, Bilateral Co-ordination Forum, and
Bilateral Co-ordination Center.46
C Approval in August 1999 by both governments of a memorandum of understanding set-
ting out the terms for a two to five year program to study the feasibility of jointly devel-
oping a Naval Theater-Wide Anti-ballistic Defense system (TMD). The memorandum
represents the culmination of bilateral talks that began in 1993 and was a direct response
to the emerging regional missile threats posed by both Beijing and Pyongyang.
C Agreement in March 2000 by U.S. State Department and Japanese Foreign Ministry offi-
cials to establish a joint commission, focusing on arms control and non-proliferation
initiatives47
Persistent Irritations
While these initiatives represented important steps in the consolidation and strengthening
of the security relationship, there have been a number of important recent developments that
reflect either continuing bilateral irritation or a difference of outlook by the two governments on
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defense-related issues. In reaction to North Korea’s 1998 launch over Japan of a medium-range
Taepodong ballistic missile, the Obuchi government decided in March 1999 to develop and
launch four intelligence satellites by fiscal 2002-3. The decision in part was prompted by the per-
ception in some official quarters in Tokyo that Japan had become too dependent on the United
States for intelligence and advance-warning information of possible missile attacks and, there-
fore, was ill-prepared to respond swiftly to North Korea’s missile launch.48 The decision also
reflected pressure from a variety of interest groups within Japan (including conservative politi-
cians, defense specialists and industrialists) in favor of an accelerated indigenous satellite pro-
gram as a means of bolstering Japan’s defense and foreign policy autonomy. U.S. government
officials responded critically, questioning the merits, in terms of cost-effectiveness and alliance
co-ordination, of pursuing entirely independent development rather than purchasing existing
U.S. satellite technology. However, by September 1999, an issue that had threatened to develop
into a replay of the, at times, acrimonious FSX controversy of the late 1980s, appeared to have
been diffused, as both governments exchanged official notes setting out the terms for a joint-
development project and allowing for the sale of certain U.S. commercial components to Japan.49
Despite progress on the satellite issue, Washington and Tokyo continued during 1999 and
2000 to wrestle over a number of bilateral irritants. U.S. government officials were frustrated by
the slow reaction of their Japanese counterparts to complaints regarding harmful dioxin emis-
sions from a rubbish incinerator located next to the U.S. Atsugi naval base; disagreement over
Japan’s level of host-nation support (HNS) for U.S. bases in Japan imposed strains on ties with
Washington, as Japan’s Ministry of Finance pointed to the down-turn in Japan’s economy as
justification for a scaling back on Tokyo’s commitment.50 More significantly, perhaps, Okinawa
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remained a contentious issue between the two countries largely because the current governor,
Keiichi Inamine (despite having seemed initially supportive of the base-relocation strategy asso-
ciated with the SACO committee), appeared to have aligned himself more closely with local
opposition groups in Okinawa, calling for a 15 year time-limit for the new basing arrangements
intended to replace the previous Futenma facility. U.S. defense planners have been, and remain
opposed to formal time-limits, fearing the impact this would have on other American facilities
elsewhere in the region, and failure to resolve this issue remains a significant problem for both
sides, exacerbated since July 2001 by yet another rape incident involving a U.S. serviceman.
Revitalizing the Alliance
Against the backdrop of these tensions and in anticipation at the end of 2000 of a presi-
dential transition, it is hardly surprising that there should have been pressure in the United States
to re-examine the fundamentals of the security relationship with Japan. The impetus for a reas-
sessment of the alliance was bipartisan, with both Republicans critics and members of the Clin-
ton administration warning that relations with Tokyo had stalled.51 The product of this concern
surfaced in a thoughtful report released in October 2000 by the National Defense University.
Headed up by two longstanding Japan-hands—Richard Armitage for the Republicans and Joseph
Nye for the Democrats—the report argued vigorously for a more “mature partnership” between
the two countries, stressing that the 1997 defense guidelines should be seen as a floor rather than
a ceiling for future defense cooperation. Past U.S.-Japan policy was criticized for being too epi-
sodic and betraying a lack of leadership. In its place, the report lobbied for an unambiguous U.S.
commitment to the defense of Japan, including the Senkaku islands; enhanced cooperation be-
tween the armed forces of the two countries; and a more mobile and flexible U.S.-Japan defense
structure in which the Marines currently based in Okinawa should have a larger regional role.
The report also argued for the removal of Japan’s prohibition on the right of collective defense;
wider sharing of defense technology; radically expanded intelligence co-operation; and clear
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U.S. recognition that a more consciously independent and distinctly Japanese foreign policy need
not conflict with America’s diplomatic priorities.52
Significantly, a number of the authors of the report have now assumed leading positions
in the Bush White House. Armitage is Deputy Secretary of State, while Torkel Patterson and
Michael Green are both serving as Asia specialists on the National Security Council. Moreover,
with Paul Wolfowitz as Deputy Defense Secretary and James Kelly recently appointed as Assis-
tant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs—two individuals with considerable exposure to
Japan-related issues—knowledgeable and experienced “Japan-hands” are well represented in the
administration. In light of this, it seems fair to assume that bilateral relations with Tokyo will be
approached creatively and with sensitivity for Japanese concerns. This does not necessarily min-
imize the importance of other powers—notably China and the two Koreas—in Washington’s
thinking, but it arguably opens the door for increased co-operation between Washington and
Tokyo. Already there have been a number of encouraging indicators including:
C The relative speed with which the Bush Administration reacted to the Ehime Maru crisis
following the accidental sinking in February 2001 of a Japanese fishing boat by a U.S.
submarine. Notable in this process has been the repeated, public apologies issued by a
number of senior U.S. officials.
C The positive atmospherics surrounding the July 2001 summit meeting between President
Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi and announcement of an ambitious joint economic ini-
tiative—the U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth—intended to address the chal-
lenge of structural economic reform in Japan. The selection of Robert Zoellick (another
official with long experience of dealing with Japan) as United States Trade Representa-
tive (USTR), and the administration’s high profile commitment to free trade, suggests
that economic relations are likely to be less of a problem area than they were under Clin-
ton, notwithstanding differences over the Kyoto Protocol and Tokyo’s dismal record on
whaling issues.
C Continued American backing for multiparty regional security programs involving the
United States, Japan and South Korea—both the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) and the Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group (TCOG)—
two initiatives intended to ameliorate tensions with North Korea. Despite early fears that
Washington might be adopting an uncompromisingly hard-line towards Pyongyang,
especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, recent evidence suggests that
there is more continuity than change in America’s approach towards Kim Jong-Il’s
regime.
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Uncertainty Regarding Japan’s Response
Despite these positive indicators, it remains uncertain whether by themselves they will
prove sufficient to lift the bilateral relationship to a significantly higher, more involved and
mutually supportive level of co-operation. Much will depend on how Japan chooses or is able to
respond. To an observer surveying Japanese post-1991 foreign policy in the round, Tokyo’s re-
action to new regional challenges has often appeared measured and thoughtful. However, while
there is much evidence of creative diplomacy at work, in both a bilateral and a multilateral con-
text (especially on the part of Japan’s Foreign Ministry), there is little to suggest that the initia-
tives of past and present administrations have been part of an overarching strategic plan or
“vision” for the region. Moreover, recently, particularly following the advent of the Koizumi
cabinet in April 2001, there have been troubling signs of serious bureaucratic confusion among
senior officials. Revelation of an embezzlement scandal within the GaimushÇ provoked unprece-
dented personnel changes, including the enforced retirement of four highly-placed civil servants,
including Administrative Vice-Minister Yutaka Kawashima, the senior-most career Foreign
Ministry official and, in the judgement of some observers, one of the most gifted and able offi-
cials in his generation.53 At the same time, Koizumi’s choice of Foreign Minister—Makiko
Tanaka—while popular with the electorate, risked destabilizing Japan’s foreign policy. Tanaka
was criticized widely, both in the Japanese media and by members of her own party, for being
overly accommodating towards Beijing and for attempting to pursue a diplomatic agenda at odds
with that of her own government and senior foreign ministry officials. To her detractors, the new
foreign minister appeared heavy-handed, remarkably undiplomatic in relations with Japan’s
allies (most notably the United States) and overly inclined publicly to challenge the authority of
the Prime Minister. Finally, in February 2002 Koizumi fired Tanaka. As a consequence of this
upheaval, the government is likely to face difficulties in prioritizing different policy agendas and
in marshaling support both domestically and internationally in a manner that will best advance
the country’s national interest.
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Mixed Messages Regarding U.S.-Japan Relations
In terms of the security relationship with Washington, there are tentative signs that the
defense communities on both sides of the Pacific may be moving closer together. Japanese
defense bureaucrats, while traditionally relatively weak policy actors, appear to recognize the
importance of enhancing operational clarity as part of the new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines,54
and there have been a number of recent legislative changes, affecting for example the air refuel-
ing capabilities of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces, that suggest a continuing pattern of evolving
defense realism within the political leadership. More broadly, in the field of co-operative and
collective security, Japan has continued to display a constructive and sometime initiating role in
a variety of contexts that could be calculated to dovetail closely with American interests, includ-
ing sponsoring anti-piracy proposals in Southeast Asia; supporting the monitored dismantling of
the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapon-stocks; helping to destroy Japanese wartime chemical
weapons left over in mainland China;55 continued participation in KEDO and TCOG; and engag-
ing—at least until very recently—in separate bilateral dialogue and personnel exchanges with
the Chinese and Russian navies.
Yet these positive developments need to be set alongside more problematic issues. While
the Japanese government broadly welcomed the election of Bush as a positive development in
terms of bilateral relations, some senior Japanese officials have been privately concerned by
what they see as continuing confusion in America’s policy toward the PRC.56 Similarly, RyÇzÇ
KatÇ, a leading GaimushÇ policy maker, has warned of the dangers that technical developments
and military modernization might pose for the long-term durability and strength of the bilateral
relationship.57 This is particularly true where ballistic missile defense—both the theater and
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national variants—are concerned—topics that have been surprisingly under-emphasized in
public discussions and Diet debates.58
The problem not only relates to fears that National Missile Defense (NMD) might en-
courage the United States to downplay its traditional alliance relationships, or concerns that
Japan might be drawn unwittingly into a regional conflict with China over Taiwan. It also in-
volves serious, unresolved questions relating to the domestic management and coordination of
the country’s national security interests. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) co-operation, for exam-
ple, is likely to provoke inter-service rivalry between the different branches of the Japanese mili-
tary, since the Air and Ground Self-Defense Forces are likely to see the new initiative (a sea-
based proposal) as competing with their own existing weapons systems development projects. In
addition, there are important command and control requirements that need to be resolved in
designing an effective TMD, issues that will have an important bearing on the manner in which a
Japanese Prime Minister—traditionally a relatively bureaucratically constrained decision-maker
—will be expected to manage a crisis situation. Equally important are the legal questions asso-
ciated with this new technology. Japanese security doctrine rests on the somewhat curious
assumption that the country (and by extension the government) enjoys the right to collective
defense but is not entitled to exercise it. A future regional TMD system may well involve a
number of participating countries (Japan, the United States, and South Korea, for example) and,
therefore, the legality of such an arrangement is likely to be subject to much scrutiny. (Even
though the Koizumi cabinet is committed to re-examining the prohibition on collective security,
it is unclear whether the government will succeed in removing this constraint.) Similarly, devis-
ing an effective TMD involves important questions relating to where (in terms of its launch and
flight trajectory) a hostile missile ought to be intercepted. Such issues inevitably will force
Japan’s defense planners to look hard at the assumptions underlying the country’s non-offensive
defense doctrine in determining whether or not it is legally acceptable as well as practicable to
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target a hostile missile either over Japanese territory, or in international airspace, or in the
sovereign territory of the belligerent power that launches the missile in question.59
Multilateralism, Milieu Goals, and Evolving Norms
It should be stressed that the Japanese government’s ability to broaden and modify its
relations with the United States and with some of its regional partners and former adversaries has
not been exclusively a response to changing international factors. It has also been substantially
influenced by shifts in opinion domestically. Both public opinion and the views of party politi-
cians have shifted markedly in response to the new regional security challenges, generating, as a
consequence, a policy environment more receptive to an increasingly realist foreign and defense
policy.60 North Korea’s unpredictable and often destabilizing behavior, for example, has prompt-
ed a discernible shift in public concern in Japan. According to a Yomiuri Shinbun newspaper poll
carried out in the late summer of 1999, 72 percent of respondents expressed a strong interest in
defense issues and 46 percent favored improvements in Japan’s emergency legislation to allow
the national government to respond swiftly and effectively to a threat to the country’s security.61
Other indications of a developing realist inclination have been the generally high levels
of Diet support (a more than 70 percent approval rate) for the new U.S.-Japan Security Guide-
lines; passage in the Diet in August 1999 of LDP legislation officially recognizing the “rising
sun” flag and the kimigayo anthem as national symbols; and cross party-support, in both the LDP
and Japan’s main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), for a more active
Japanese defense policy, involving measures for more effective territorial defense and possible
Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations involving the direct use of military force.
Similarly, occasional public statements by senior Japanese government officials—such as former
Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka’s suggestion that it would be constitutionally permis-
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sible for Japan to launch a pre-emptive strike against North Korea if it felt a missile attack was
imminent—have implied that the government may be less constrained by traditional post-war
Japanese pacifist cultural norms.
Attitudinal changes, however, take time before they begin to have a substantive impact
on actual policy. Certainly, it is highly unlikely that Japan would become (as some have argued)
an independent, expansive security player in the region. For one thing, the Japanese military
lacks the critical go-it-alone defense capability needed if it wishes to strike out independently
from the Unites States. Although Japanese military spending has historically been the highest of
all of the states in the region, Japan’s armed forces remain crucially deficient in a number of key
areas, including ship-based air support, long-range air support, and access to aircraft carriers.
The army lacks strategic or even major tactical mobility,62 and politicians continue to block
operational reforms intended to enhance the flexibility of the Japanese military.
Even where attitudinal changes offer the prospect of medium to long-term policy shifts—
such as current, cross-party backing for the establishment of two Diet committees to examine
and deliberate on the question of constitutional reform (the first such initiative since the last
examination of the Constitution between 1957 and 1962)—significant security-related taboos
linger (in addition to the practical challenges associated with constitutional revision) and con-
tinue to limit the scope for a major, immediate, and complete break from Japan’s post-war
defense traditions.63 In the face of such constraints, it makes sense for the Japanese government
to concentrate on expanding its network of security relations in both a multilateral and a bilateral
context as a means of maximizing its policy-making flexibility and discretion. A cursory glance
at recent decisions by the government reveals that this has indeed been a trend in recent years,
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although not in manner that suggests a well-defined set of official priorities where particular
relations are concerned. At most one can argue that Tokyo has been motivated by “milieu goals”
—the desire to become involved in a variety of multilateral fora, often in a non-traditional
security setting, as a means of encouraging stability in an increasingly unstable and fluctuating
regional environment.64 The attractiveness of such an approach from a policy-making perspec-
tive is that it leaves room for a flexible adjustment of the two aspects of Japan’s post-war dual
security identity—both the recent increasing realist inclination and the long-standing, idealist
post-war legacy with its stress on co-operation and mutual accommodation, associated most
powerfully with article nine of Japan’s peace constitution, the country’s nuclear allergy, and the
official preference for a non-offensive defense policy.65
At the same time the immediate practical gains from this scatter-gun like approach to
security policy-making remain very unclear, even if individual initiatives offer the prospect of
success. Japan’s preference for a financial rather than a personnel-based contribution to the 1999
East Timor crisis reveals the continuing difficulty of turning to the United Nations in order to
boost its regional or global security credentials. Similarly, the emphasis in 1998 by former Prime
Minister Keizo Obuchi on “human security” has attracted considerable academic interest,66 but
the focus, for now at least, seems more rhetorical than results-oriented. Even Japan’s participa-
tion since 1996 in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process, and its close association with the
Asean Regional Forum (ARF), where Tokyo had a key initiating role in 1994, have realized only
modest benefits for Japan, despite providing the somewhat reassuring backdrop of regular meet-
ings and integrating China and, more recently, North Korea into regional discussions.67 The same
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is true of Japan’s association with the APEC process where a key initiating role has yet to trans-
late into a decisive leadership position.68 Ultimately, Japan’s regional and security priorities
remain unclear and the country continues to labor under a “multi-track diplomacy” that poten-
tially stands in the way of an integrated foreign policy.69
Where ties with Washington are concerned, claims that Japan will remain rigidly and
exclusively wedded to its traditional security dependence on the United States seem unfounded.
There is considerable pressure and recognition in both Tokyo and Washington that the relation-
ship needs to mature to accommodate a broader and more explicitly independent role for Japan
in regional and even global security concerns. What is unclear is how best to attain this objec-
tive. For American policy-makers the dilemma the challenges faced by the United States in the
1950s: how to encourage greater Japanese independence and activism but in a manner that
supplements and reinforces, rather than conflicts with American strategic interests. Enhanced
dialogue, together with efforts to promote greater operational coherence is a useful starting point,
but there will also need to be a greater willingness on the part of Japan to articulate a clear and
long-term vision of its security priorities. Securing such change will require substantial adminis-
trative reform, the continuing amelioration of the traditional, but increasingly out-dated domestic
constraints standing in the way of Japanese strategic flexibility, and above all decisive leadership
at the very top of the Japanese political spectrum. The direct election of the Prime Minister—a
much mooted proposal in recent months—may offer one route to this type of leadership,
although it remains fraught with political and legal difficulties.
Unsurprisingly, given the plethora of bureaucratic and psychological obstacles standing
in the way of sweeping and immediate reform, it has taken an unprecedented and unpredictable
event to accelerate the process of change in Japan. The horrifying September 11, 2001 terrorist
assault on New York’s World Trade Center produced a swift response from Japan’s government,
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particular from Prime Minister Koizumi. This was not limited to easily proffered rhetorical sup-
port. It also included financial assistance to New York City, to the front-line states of India and
Pakistan, and most importantly, an unambiguous offer of Japanese SDF-based logistical and
medical support for U.S. forces involved in any future anti-terrorism campaign. The significance
of this last development should not be underestimated, since it may presage a removal of Japan’s
long-standing ban on participation in collective security initiatives. Japanese officials are well
aware that failure to contribute tangibly (in the form of men and materiel rather than simple
financial support), to any allied initiative against Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist network, would be
politically and diplomatically disastrous for Japan. Already, the Japanese parliament is deliber-
ating on how best to respond to the crisis and there appears to be an emerging cross-party con-
sensus in favor a more vigorous Japanese role that goes well beyond the relatively slow, pri-
marily financial contribution provided by Japan during the Gulf War of 1991. Yet, for now at
least, we are perhaps too close to events to anticipate the precise form of Japanese participation
and the extent to which Japanese public opinion will be supportive of any American-led
response, not to mention the degree to which Japan’s neighbors will be alarmed by a more
proactive Japanese security policy. At the very least, it should be stressed that these changes are
part of a larger, long-term pattern of evolving security realism by Japan. In the short-term, both
popular and official opinion are likely to continue to evolve in a more activist direction, in the
process deepening and strengthening existing ties with the United States, yet in a context where
enhancing Japanese foreign and security policy flexibility remains a priority for Japan’s leaders.
In this sense the terrorist attack of September 11 may prove to be one event which (Macmillan’s
pessimism notwithstanding), serves to highlight the underlying strengths rather than the
shortcomings of relations between Washington and Tokyo.
1 Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific
Region. Online at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/tmd050499.pdf. Accessed February 2001.
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EAST ASIAN RESPONSES TO THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
Adam Segal
The highest form of generalship is to attack the enemy’s strategy, the next best is to attack the
enemy’s alliances, the next in order is to attack the army in the field, and the worst of all is to
besiege walled cities.
Sun-Zi, The Art of War
The rise of ballistic missile capabilities in East Asia—especially in China and North Ko-
rea—has raised fears in the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan of increased regional
instability. This increased sense of vulnerability is in part due to the perceived military efficacy
of these weapons. Military planners throughout the region noted the death of twenty-eight
American soldiers in Saudi Arabia in a Scud attack during the Gulf War, and few can ignore the
risk of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Yet a large por-
tion of this increased sense of exposure derives from the perception that ballistic missiles seem
designed to strike at the center of U.S. strategy in the region, and that the status of this strategy
itself is increasingly uncertain. The 1994 Report on Theater Missile Defense Options for Asia
Pacific, for example, argues, “The U.S. kept the stability in the region, deterred aggression
through bilateral alliances, through forward deployment of armed forces, through active diplo-
matic engagement, and through military response when necessary.” “Ballistic missiles with
WMD [weapons of mass destruction] warheads,” the report continues, “provide a military capa-
bility that has the greatest potential to put U.S. forward-based forces at risk and to threaten U.S.
allies and friends.”1
While the United States reaffirmed its commitment to an Asian strategy based on strong
bilateral alliances and fostering multilateralism in 1998, other regional actors are concerned
about the future of this “hub and spoke” strategy; they worry about both U.S. withdrawal and
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U.S. unilateralism.2 Increasingly, the assumption that the U.S. military presence provides for
regional stability has been questioned.3 In the past, Chinese rhetorical criticism of “hegemonism”
was balanced by an acceptance of the role the United States played as regional stabilizer. More
recently China appears less willing to accept this role for American troops in Asia, and in the
Defense White Paper it offered an alternative vision of security—“a new concept of security”—
that explicitly criticized the U.S. alliance structure as a vestige of “Cold War” thinking.4 Uncer-
tainty in the region means that all actors will be hedging, pursuing initiatives internally and over-
seas that are designed to safeguard their own interests.
In this context, the development and deployment of theater missile defenses (TMD)
appears to some as the best available means to combating the threat to U.S. forces and to U.S.
strategy in East Asia. At the most basic level, effective missile defense will protect forward-
deployed troops and limit the military efficacy of ballistic missiles. But at a more political level,
technological solutions also structure U.S. relations in the region. How theater missile defense
technologies are researched, developed, and deployed are expected to facilitate alliance responsi-
bilities and ensure the cooperation of U.S. allies in the region. Theater missile defense technolo-
gies may reinforce the “hub and spoke” pattern of relations the United States depends on in East
Asia; they may also put new pressures on U.S. security relations.
Deployment of TMD may generate significant security costs to the United States and its
allies in the region, reducing regional stability in the short and long term. Possible Chinese and
North Korean reactions include: the deployment of a larger number of short range missiles; Chi-
nese development of multiple reentry vehicles or multiple independently targetable reentry vehi-
cles; the strengthening of North Korea’s desire to test and develop longer range missiles; the
development of countermeasures; and the purchase of theater missile defense and other off-the-
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shelf systems from Russia. TMD may also increase suspicion and raise tensions between all the
major actors in the region.
In this essay I introduce the current theater missile defense systems under development
and their expected effectiveness. I also discuss the factors affecting deployment decisions in
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, as well China’s response to these systems. In the last section of the
paper, I explore some alternatives to theater missile defense. If one of the main concerns about
missile defenses is the threat to U.S. strategy in the area, than there may be responses that ad-
dress these more political concerns without raising military costs. There may be other responses
to the threat of ballistic missiles, both military and political, that do not have the same risks.
Theater Missile Defenses
Theater missile defenses fall into three categories: lower tier (or low altitude), upper tier
(high altitude), and boost phase. Issues surrounding TMD vary by what type of system we are
talking about, whom the defense is intended for, and whom it is supposed to defend against. The
most vocal political conflict has emerged over upper-tier systems like Navy Theater-Wide
(NTW). These upper-tier systems have larger footprints—they defend larger areas—and may
alter the strategic balance by acting more like national missile defenses (NMD) for smaller
regions like Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, depending on where and how they are deployed. In
addition, the higher technical requirements of these systems may tighten existing or create new
alliance structures since they require close cooperation between defense partners.
Lower Tier Defenses
Designed to intercept missiles low in the atmosphere, lower tier defenses have relatively
slow-flying interceptors. These slower speeds mean that interceptors cannot travel very far and
so lower tier theater missile defenses cover only relatively small areas. Intercept takes place at
altitudes less than 20 kilometers; interceptors maneuver to the target using their fins to steer
through the air. Lower tier defenses are designed to intercept short-range ballistic missiles with
ranges roughly 600 to 1500 kilometers. These defenses may also work against aircraft and cruise
missiles (see table 1).
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Table 1. Theater Missile Defense Systems
Lower Tier Deployment Mode
Approximate radius
of defended area Defend against:
PAC-2 Truck-mounted 10-15 kilometers Short range missiles,
ranges up to 600 km;
aircraft
PAC-3 Truck-mounted 40-50 kilometers Short range missiles,
ranges up to 1500
km; aircraft
Navy Area Defense Ship-based 50-100 kilometers Short range missiles,
ranges up to 600 km;
aircraft
Upper Tier Deployment Mode
Approximate radius
of defended area Defend against:
THAAD Ground-based;
transportable by
aircraft
Few hundred
kilometers
Short and medium
range missiles,
ranges up to 3500
km. May have
capacity against
ICBMs
Navy Theater Wide Ship-based More than a few
hundred kilometers
Short and medium
range missiles,
ranges up to 3500
km. May have
capacity against
ICBMs
Boost Phase Deployment Mode
Approximate radius
of defended area Defend against:
Airborne Laser Airplane Possibly Huge Short and medium
range missiles,
ranges up to 3500
km. May have
capacity against
submarine-launched
ICBMs
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, Fact Sheet: U.S. National and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Programs.
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The United States currently has one lower theater defense in operation, others in develop-
ment. The Patriot PAC-2 (Patriot Advanced Capabilities) defends a small area against aircraft
and ballistic missiles with a range of up to about 600 kilometers. The interceptor uses a “blast
fragmentation” warhead meant to explode within several meters of its target. Korea, Taiwan, and
Japan have all deployed the PAC-2. In contrast, PAC-3, which is supposed to defend against
missiles with a longer 1500-kilometer range, will be “hit-to kill”; it will destroy targets by hitting
them directly. Navy area defense will also use an explosive warhead to defend against missiles
with ranges between 600 and 1000 kilometers, but it will be ship based.
Upper Tier
The United States is currently developing two upper tier systems: Theater High-Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) and Navy Theater Wide (NTW). These systems are designed to inter-
cept missiles high in or above the atmosphere, which permits large ground areas to be defended.
Both systems use hit-to-kill vehicles that maneuver to their targets by using thrusters to change
their trajectory. THAAD is a land-based system designed to defend against missiles of ranges up
to 3500 kilometers and to be transportable by airplane. Interception of the kill vehicle and the
incoming warhead must take place high in the atmosphere at altitudes above forty kilometers. It
is intended to help protect areas when employed in conjunction with PAC-3 or Navy Area lower-
tier point defense systems.
After nine failures, THAAD intercepts were successful twice in 1999. These two suc-
cesses did little to re-establish confidence that THAAD would be deployed as scheduled in 2007.
Phillip Coyle, the director of operational test and evaluation for the Pentagon, called the tests
“highly scripted,” and not as challenging as the conditions that THAAD would need to handle to
actually knock an incoming missile out of the sky.5
Intended as a theater defense against intermediate range missiles, Navy Theater Wide
will be deployed at sea on Aegis-class cruisers. The system will use an exo-atmospheric kill
vehicle that can only attempt to intercept an incoming missile at an altitude above 80-100
kilometers. The kill vehicle, guided by radar on the Aegis cruiser and by its own on-board
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infrared sensors, is expected to destroy the warhead by colliding with it. Basing the navy theater
wide system on ships will increase the system’s mobility; in some cases, NTW could be de-
ployed near the launch site, allowing the system to operate in different theaters and possibly to
defend relatively large areas. The fact the system can only intercept at altitudes above 80-100
kilometers means that it would be unable to defend against short-range missiles.6
The development schedule of Navy Theater Wide has been delayed several times and
continues to slip. The initial NTW system (called Block I), expected to be able to intercept
missiles with a range of about 1000 kilometers (like the North Korean Nodong), was originally
planned for deployment in 2007. The Pentagon restructured the plan in late 1999, saying deploy-
ment was to take place in three stages: Block IA, Block IB, and Block IC. Block IA, to be de-
ployed by 2006, will be a single ship carrying up to six test missiles. Scheduled for two years
later, Block IB will include two ships with fifty missiles. And in 2010 Block IC would come on
line; this system envisions eighty missiles on four ships and could be used for missile defense,
air defense, or both at the same time.7 Senior defense officials announced in February 2001 that
Block I has been scrapped so the navy can concentrate on Block II.8
Block II is expected to use a faster booster, an improved kill vehicle, and upgraded radar
to intercept missiles with a range up to 3500 kilometers.9 The system is scheduled for deploy-
ment at an unspecified date after 2010. Japan has agreed to cooperate in the development of this
system, providing technology for the missile nose cones, warhead shapes, infrared target seekers
and rocket motors.
Because, as mentioned before, both THAAD and NTW kill vehicles must intercept their
targets high in or outside the atmosphere, these defensive systems may be susceptible to counter-
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measures. If seeking to deliver a chemical or biological weapons, the attacker could divide the
agent among hundred of submunitions in order to overwhelm the defense. If using a nuclear or
conventional warhead, the attacker could disguise the weapon to make it look like a decoy.
Placing the warhead in a lightweight balloon made of aluminized mylar and releasing it along
with a large number of similar, but empty, balloons would make it indistinguishable from the
decoys to the defense sensors. The attacker could also cover the warhead with a shroud cooled
by liquid nitrogen. This would make it nearly impossible for the kill vehicle’s infrared sensors to
detect the warhead at a great enough distance to have time to maneuver to hit it.10
Boost Phase
The United States is also designing boost phase systems to intercept missiles during the
early part of the missiles’ flight. During ascent, missiles are slow moving and have very bright
exhaust gases that are easy to track. The advantage of boost-phase defenses is that they destroy
the missile before the warhead and any decoys are released; counter measures could not defeat
the system.
There is currently one boost phase system under development. Based on a modified
Boeing 747, the airborne laser (ABL) would target a laser on the body of short or medium range
missile until the metal heated to structural failure. For theater missiles, the airplanes must be
within several hundred kilometers of the launch, so the plane would either have to fly outside of
the borders of the country, or the United States would have to establish air superiority to protect
the ABL from attack.
Ballistic Missile Threats in The Region
The primary short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats to U.S. forces, friends, and
allies in the Asia-Pacific Region come from North Korea and China. Although little is known
about the North Korean program, the country has dedicated significant resources to ballistic
missiles over the last thirty years. Today, Pyongyang fields a force comprising some thirty-six
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launchers and 700 missiles.11 Using indigenous technology as well as technologies transferred
from the Former Soviet Union, China, and Egypt, the North Koreans have built several types of
short and medium range missiles. The Hwasong-5 has a 340 km range and 1000 kg payload, and
the Hwasong-6 has a 500 km range and 700 kg payload. In 1996, the Department of Defense es-
timated that North Korea’s arsenal includes several hundred of these missiles.12 A 1995 Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) report estimates that North Korea can produce about 50-100 Scud
missiles a year (see table 2).13
According to U.S. military analysts, these weapons support North Korea’s goal of reuni-
fying the peninsula by force. In a statement to Senate Armed Services Committee, General
Thomas Schwartz, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces
Command, and U.S. Forces in Korea, characterized the North Korean military strategy as man-
dating “the achievement of surprise, prosecution of a short and violent war, prevention of major
U.S. reinforcement of the peninsula, and negation of the ROK’s mobilization.” The General con-
tinued that “realizing they cannot match Combined Forces Command’s technologically advanced
war-fighting capabilities, the North’s leadership focuses on developing asymmetrical capabilities
such as ballistic missiles . . . designed to preclude alliance force options and offset U.S. conven-
tional military superiority.”14 With the ability to threaten South Korea and Japan, North Korea
can potentially deter the United States from striking North Korean nuclear facilities, retaliating
for attack on the South, or intervening should there be instability north of the de-militarized
zone.
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Table 2. North Korean Missiles
Estimated Number (by 2005) Range (km) Deployment Date
Scud B 100? 300 1981
Hwasong-5 150? 330 1984
Hwasong-6 250? 500 1989
Nodong-1 12-36/100* 1300 1999
Taepodong-1 0 1500-2000 2000
Source: Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missle/index.html.
*U.S. military analysts put the number of Nodong much higher at “about 100.” See Statement of General Thomas
Schwartz, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year
2001 and the Future Years Defense Program. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., March 7, 2000, p. 6.
The number, type, and range of Chinese missile are far greater than North Korea’s (see
table 3). China deployed its first medium range missile in 1966 (most likely targeted on Japan)
and deployed its second generation, the DF-3, in 1971.15 Between 1981 and 1991 it developed
and fielded five new systems including the mobile medium range DF-21 in 1985 and a mobile
short-range ballistic missile, the DF-15, in 1990. During the same time, China also researched
missile defense countermeasures like saturation, maneuvering reentry vehicles, shaping, stealth,
decoys, and depressed trajectories.
Table 3. Chinese Missiles
Estimated Number (by
2005)
Range/CEP
(km/meters)
Deployment
Date
DF-11/M-11 200-300 300/150 Early-00s
DF-15/M-9 450-500 600/<600 1994
DF-21 50-80 1800/700 Early 1990s
DF-3 50-80 3000/1000 1970s
Source: Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/theater/index.html
Beijing’s stated goal is to achieve Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland, preferably
by peaceful means. The immediate task, however, has been to keep Taiwan from moving further
along the path toward independence and to compel Taipei to accept Beijing’s view of the “one-
China” principle. The acquisition of M-9 and M-11 short range ballistic missiles over the past
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decade by the People’s Liberation Army, coupled with repeated statements that “China will not
commit itself not to resort to force,” have reinforced Beijing’s willingness to try to intimidate
Taiwan. China has had long- and medium-range missiles deployed since the early 1980s. What
has changed since 1995 and 1996 is how the United States and U.S. friends and allies in Asia
view Beijing’s missile capabilities and intentions toward Taiwan.
China’s missile buildup also serves to offset the technological weaknesses of its conven-
tional forces, especially in comparison to Japan and the United States. Chinese analysts have not-
ed that one of the major mistakes the Iraqis made in the Gulf War was to allow the allied forces
to build and reinforce bases in Saudi Arabia for months before attacking. As Thomas Christensen
describes, China sees ballistic missiles as effective weapons against a technologically superior
enemy. Christensen cites an internally circulated PLA text—Zhanyi Xue [Military Studies]—that
envisions under almost every type of war-fighting scenario a concentrated attack on the enemy’s
assets by Chinese missile forces. Moreover, the conventional missile force is described as having
sufficient range and accuracy for attacks on naval bases, airstrips, and command-and-control
centers.16
South Korea
U.S. missile defense requirements are not the same as South Korean defense priorities.
On the one hand, additional lower-tier TMD deployments, both land- and sea-based, by U.S.
forces could possibly help defend ports, airfields, and key U.S. military facilities that would be
essential in fulfilling alliance responsibilities to come to the aid of the Republic of Korea (ROK).
On the other, South Korea has to balance its own security concerns with its desire for peace and
eventual unification with the North as well as its expanding relationship with China.
The immediate causes for the U.S. deployment of TMD on the Korean peninsula were the
breakdown of the inter-Korean talks on mutual inspection and rising military tensions on both
sides of the de-militarized zone. In 1992, North and South Korea agreed in principle to mutual
inspections of nuclear facilities. After the North’s refusal to accept a South Korean proposal for
short-notice inspections of all suspected nuclear sites, the inter-Korean talks on mutual inspec-
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tions broke down in November 1992. North Korea subsequently threatened to withdraw from the
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993. After the DPRK tested the Nodong and as tensions grew
between the United States and the North over nuclear inspections, the United States decided to
deploy Patriot missile batteries to South Korea in mid-1993. South Korea initially objected, fear-
ing the disruption of the ongoing nuclear talks, but acquiesced when it appeared that North Ko-
rea was reinforcing its troops along the de-militarized zone. The United States finally deployed
five PAC 2 batteries with sixty-four missiles each in March 1994.
All during the 1990s, South Korea pursued a range of missile defense options. The ROK
negotiated with Russia, Israel, and the United States on purchasing different defenses. As early
as December 1992, Russia began discussing the building of a S300 system for TMD. In October
of 1993, the ROK Ministry of Defense began holding discussion about participating in the U.S.
TMD program. Fearing incompatibility with the defense systems of the U.S. forces stationed in
Korea—and the entry of Russian defense contractors into South Korea—Washington pushed for
the purchase of a U.S. system.
South Korea’s interest in purchasing a TMD system was significantly weakened by the
1997 Asian financial crisis. And in March of 1999, the South Korean Ministry of Defense an-
nounced that it did not plan to participate in the U.S. TMD program. While emphasizing South
Korea’s vulnerability to a North Korean attack, spokesman Young-Gu Cha indicated that South
Korea lacked sufficient funds to create an effective TMD system and that the geography of the
Korean peninsula precluded a missile defense system from being militarily effective. Seoul is too
close to the border for a TMD system to be able to stop incoming North Korea Scud-type mis-
siles.17 In addition, given missile impact dispersion, loss of agent viability, and unclear meteoro-
logical conditions, North Korea is more likely to use means of delivery other than ballistic mis-
siles for chemical or biological weapons.18
Apparently no longer interested in upper tier TMD, South Korea has increasingly ex-
pressed in interest in extending the range of its short-range missiles. Currently, under an agree-
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ment with the United States, South Korean missiles are limited to 180 kilometers. Under a new
agreement, South Korea would join the Missile Technology Control Regime and be allowed to
develop missiles with a range of 300 km. This would put Pyongyang and most of the rest of the
North in the range of conventional missiles.
Decisions about the deployment of any TMD system or extending missile ranges are
complicated by South Korea’s growing relationship with China. While China has supported the
North over the last fifty years, Seoul’s expanding economic, military and political ties with
Beijing are a factor in TMD acquisition. Bilateral trade grew from $4.4 billion in 1994 to $23.7
billion in 1998; today, the countries have become each other’s third largest trading partners. In
addition, the two militaries have routine high- and functional-level exchanges.19
Taiwan
A March 1999 Pentagon report on the cross-straits military balance argued that Taiwan’s
most significant vulnerability is its limited ability to defend against the growing number of Chi-
nese short-range ballistic missiles.20 China is said to target these weapons on Taiwanese airfields,
command and control nodes, and naval facilities. These weapons may not be particularly accu-
rate, but missile attacks may have the ability to demoralize Taiwan’s leaders and its general pop-
ulation as well as disrupt trade and the stock market. As the accuracy of these missiles increases,
they will be both a military and political risk.
Taiwan’s current air defense system consists of three sets of Patriot systems along with
six sets of the indigenous Tien-Kung I and Tien-Kung II (Sky Bow). In June 1994 Raytheon
agreed to provide PAC-2 to Taiwan, but delivery was slow. After the March 1996 crisis, the
United States agreed to speed delivery of PAC-2, which began in January 1997. In 1999, during
the annual arms sales talks, Taiwan requested four Aegis-equipped destroyers and the PAC-3.
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The Clinton administration deferred any decision on the sales; and in April 2001 the Bush
administration approved an arms package that did not include either system.21
The Tien Kung series TMD was originally developed to intercept China’s 3000 km-range
DF-3 missile, but will more likely be used to counter DF-15 and DF-21 (600 and 1800 km range,
respectively) missiles. In 1997 the Tien Kung successfully intercepted a target missile.22 Taiwan
has considered purchasing Russian S-300 systems, but decided against it because of incompati-
bility with the U.S. TMD it already operates.23 Taiwanese leaders have noted the need for an
increased reliance on an indigenous system should the United States decide not to sell future
missile defense systems to Taiwan.
There are both military and political reasons for Taiwan to participate in a U.S. TMD
system. Most obviously, the Chinese missile threat is real and continues to grow. China began
deploying short-range DF-15 and DF-11 missiles opposite Taiwan in 1990, and the total number
of missiles deployed is expected to grow from 200 to possibly over 600 in the next several
years.24 These missiles require only six to eight minutes to cross the Taiwan Straits. An over-
lapping system of PAC 3 and Aegis-equipped ships may give Taiwan limited protection against
Chinese ballistic missiles and diminish the effectiveness of a preemptive attack. An effective
defense would not only deter the Chinese, but also provide psychological reassurance to the peo-
ple of Taiwan. In addition, workable missile defenses may remove the incentives for Taiwan to
develop more offensive measures like longer distance missiles.
Yet the military effectiveness of any system will probably be highly limited. Any upper
tier system will be unable to intercept short-range missiles, and China may be able to overwhelm
the PAC 3 and Tien Kung defenses with a saturation attack. A missile attack could come from
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multiple directions. If the Chinese used medium range missiles in an attack, these missiles have
re-entry speeds likely to preclude a high probability of intercept by lower-tier systems. Upper
tier systems like NTW would also be susceptible to countermeasures; according to U.S. intelli-
gence reports, flight tests of the DF-21 in November 1995 and January 1996 included decoys.25
Moreover, U.S. defense analysts have questioned whether Taiwan will be able to operate the
more complicated ship-based Aegis systems effectively.
The debate in Taiwan over TMD acquisition has reflected an awareness of these limita-
tions. Some Taiwanese military analysts worry that missile defense is “a big money pit,” divert-
ing resources from other more critical needs. They also fear that the system might be provocative
and encourage an even greater build-up of Chinese missiles. By late 1998, Taiwan had reserva-
tions about acquiring TMD beyond PAC-2. But based on an analysis of the ballistic missile
threat, the Ministry of Defense made three related decisions in January 1999 on Taiwan’s
defense requirements. First, Taiwan would invest $1 billion over the following three years to
purchase six PAC-3 missile fire units to provide coverage for Taichung and Kaohsiung, as well
as Taipei.26 Second, Taiwan would only be interested in lower-tier TMD systems, whether land-
or sea-based. Finally, Taiwan would withhold judgment on requesting any future upper-tier
systems.27
Political factors may, in fact, play a larger role than military issues in the Taiwanese
decision-making process, especially in the case of Navy Theater Wide. The political benefits for
Taiwan are at least threefold. First, interest in TMD strengthens U.S.-Taiwan relations, espe-
cially in the military sphere. Many defense analysts were alarmed after the missile tests that the
United States and Taiwan had no way to coordinate a response to future Chinese military mea-
sures. In this context, the process of cooperation required to operate an upper tier missile de-
fense—especially the sharing of intelligence and satellite information and increasing force inter-
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operability—would be more valuable than the possible security benefits of the actual delivery of
any system. Taiwanese Defense Minister Tang Fei himself stated that: “The introduction of a
TMD system would bear a political significance bigger than its military significance.” For Tai-
pei, the acquisition of missile defenses may have less to do with countering the Chinese missile
threat than demonstrating evidence of U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense.
Second, TMD activates and promotes a sustained interest in Taiwan’s security in the
Congress. This has been particularly important to Taiwan after the “three no’s” and the apparent
shift toward China during the June 1998 Clinton-Jiang Summit.28 Taiwanese request for arms
sales, especially of ballistic missile defense systems, allowed Congressional Republicans to
charge the Clinton administration was “soft” on China; in April 2001 the Bush administration
approved a major arms package for Taiwan, but no missile defense systems.29 The 1999 Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act, offered by Senators Jesse Helms and Tom Delay, called for the “the
continued provision of additional defense articles and defense services in accordance with the
Taiwan Relations Act, including missile defense equipment; satellite early warning data; air
defense equipment; and diesel-powered submarines, Aegis combat systems, and other naval
defense systems.”30 If passed, the Act would have required enhanced military exchanges between
the United States and Taiwan and calls for the establishment of a direct communications link
between the U.S. Pacific Command and Taiwan’s military headquarters.
Finally, for domestic political reasons, both the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and
Kuomintang (KMT) must respond to the Chinese missile threat. The DPP has called for the re-
organization of defense away from fixed Patriot sites and a move to Aegis-based systems. It has
also argued that Taiwan should engage in joint research or at least ensure the transfer of technol-
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ogy for TMD systems.31 The KMT Central Standing Committee has also declared that Taiwan
should join a TMD system
Japan
Japan was one of the first U.S. allies to acquire the Patriot system in the mid-1980s and it
upgraded to PAC-2 after the Gulf War. Enhancements to the system were made in 1994 and sub-
sequently called PAC-2 Plus. Discussions about Japan’s participation in research of a U.S. upper
tier system began in 1993 when the two sides formed a TMD working group. It took five years
and the test launch of the Taepo Dong in 1998 to get Japan to participate officially in the R&D
of NTW.32 A second potential threat from Chinese intermediate range missiles is rarely stated
publicly for the rationale behind TMD, although some Japanese argue that it is the real threat
driving the system.
Following its usual practice, the Japanese Defense Agency has separated the research, de-
velopment, and procurement phases of Navy Theater Wide.33 Not only is this separation unusual
from a U.S. perspective—in the United States research and development are generally linked—
but the point of separation falls well within the weapon development stage as defined by the
Pentagon. This has allowed the U.S. side to include Japan in its research and development phase
while Japan officially commits only to joint research.34 There are therefore two further policy
decisions to be made in Tokyo: whether or not to proceed with the development phase, and
whether to procure and deploy the system. Japan initially intended to finish a study about wheth-
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er or not to go past the development stage in 2003, but was that date has been pushed back to at
least 2006.35
NTW could be deployed against threats from North Korea or China. An effective defense
would not only protect Japan from attack, it would also reduce North Korean perceptions that it
could split the U.S.-Japan alliance in a time of crisis. TMD would hedge against a stronger China
in the future, and some argue that it might be used as a bargaining chip to negotiate a reduction
in Chinese missiles. Under most conditions, a missile shield would help Japan carry out its role
of protecting U.S. troops in the region. One or two NTW ships stationed near Japan would be
sufficient to intercept a Nodong, with a range between 1000 and 1300 kilometers, launched at
any part of Japan. NTW Block II could in principle defend against DF 21 and DF 3 missiles
(1800 and 3000 kilometers respectively). Using a ship-based system like NTW would mean that
the system would in fact not have to be based on Japan, unlike the army’s THAAD.36
The other potential security (and political) benefit from Navy Theater Wide would be
strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Cooperation on the NTW program is seen as an important
component of a healthy alliance relationship. The Japanese may eventually provide technical
support and monetary assistance, and their involvement in the program will also lend important
political support to the United States in the region. Even among Japanese who are skeptical of
the project, there is a feeling that Japan cannot say no to proceeding with the NTW program. As
stated by Hisahiko Okazaki, a longtime diplomat and now head of a research organization in
Tokyo: “We don’t need a missile defense for Japan. But America wants the cooperation, and we
should always show we are reliable allies. If it costs money, we pay money. For Japan, the target
should be the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance.”37
Despite these potential benefits, there are, of course, also costs to Japan. Even if a system
is built, its effectiveness is unknown. Both Korean and Chinese missiles may employ counter-
measures. In addition, a missile fired by North Korea may be more likely to carry chemical or
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biological weapons, rather than a nuclear warhead.38 Official estimates are that the DPRK has
enough plutonium for “at least one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.”39 During any crisis, North
Korea may consider these weapons too valuable to use on a relatively untested missile of un-
known reliability; the DPRK could instead use a much more reliable method of delivery. North
Korea is believed to have the capacity to produce large quantities of chemical or biological
agents, and would place these agents in sub-munitions or bomblets on the warhead. This method
of delivery would facilitate dispersal of the agent and overwhelm the NTW interceptors.
In addition to the technical concerns, there are domestic political and regional factors that
will influence Japan’s development of TMD. The cost of missile defense may be difficult to jus-
tify after a decade of economic recession; there are other items in the military budget including
the F-2 fighter aircraft and intelligence satellites that will be fighting for funding. Any TMD
work that appears to be increasing Japan’s military power may attract domestic opposition to a
“military buildup,” and possibly raise constitutional issues. Smaller systems, like point defense,
would probably not be a problem for Japan, but the more expansive plan of merging NMD and
TMD under the Bush administration may be unconstitutional. Such a plan would require Japan
to share hardware, intelligence, and command centers with U.S. forces. The Japanese military
might be asked to try to shoot down a missile that might be aimed somewhere other than Japan.
In the past, such “collective” military defense with another nation has been interpreted as
unconstitutional.40
NTW will also make managing relations with China more difficult. While the Chinese
have been vocal in their opposition to Japan’s participation (and their objections will be dis-
cussed below), Japanese officials appear largely unmoved by China’s objections. The Japanese
argue that Navy Theater Wide is purely defensive, and unless China plans to attack Japan, it
should not care about defenses. Yet most Chinese analysts are likely to interpret Japan’s partici-
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pation in NTW as breaking Japanese norms of self-restraint and leading to an eventual military
buildup. The end result of a TMD system may be that Japan faces more Chinese missiles than
currently deployed.
Finally, in the last decade, Japan has taken an extremely proactive role in international
arms control agreements. It was a key supporter of the extension of the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) and of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). If theater
missile defense, or more likely national missile defense, help unravel the WMD and missile
control regimes, Japan will increasingly find its defense policies at odds with its arms control
goals.41
China
Theater missile defenses present an extremely complicated challenge to China and its
goals in the region. In the face of overwhelming U.S. superiority in conventional weapons, Chi-
nese military planners believe they must rely on asymmetric capabilities, especially ballistic mis-
siles.42 Chinese leaders are also extremely worried that TMD will reduce China’s ability to
coerce and threaten Taiwan, thus encouraging Taiwanese independence.
The challenges of TMD, like the responses, vary based on the system and who is building
it. Broadly speaking, China has not vocally opposed lower tier TMD (as long as it does not in-
clude Taiwan). Foreign Ministry official Sha Zukang has argued that “we do not envisage a dis-
pute concerning development of what we call genuine TMD. Here I am referring to those anti-
theater missile systems used solely in a limited area.”43 What China does oppose is the develop-
ment, deployment, and proliferation of antimissile systems that it believes have potential stra-
tegic defense capabilities in the name of TMD and go “beyond the legitimate self-defense of
relevant countries.”
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Upper-tier systems like NTW make higher technical and political demands on the coun-
tries they are deployed in and so create different problems for China. In looking at Japanese par-
ticipation in TMD, the Chinese fear an increased role for Japan in regional security. Justifica-
tions for building the system in Japan which rest on North Korea have not convinced Chinese
analysts. Some Chinese analysts worry that the technologies involved in NTW will help Japan
develop ballistic missiles.44 Those in China with lingering suspicions of Japan’s military past
have expressed concern about Japan’s growing plutonium stock, and see the acquisition of a
missile defense as a shield to go along with a potential sword.
China also worries about how NTW technologies will be developed and who will share
them. Chinese analysts are not happy about the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and
note increasing military interoperability, intelligence sharing, and integration of the Japan
Defense Agency into U.S. command.45 The Chinese are even more concerned that Navy Theater
Wide technology in Japan will be transferred to Taiwan, or that it could be used during a crisis in
the Taiwan Straits. Even if it is not transferred to Taiwan, Chinese analysts worry that coverage
of an NTW system designed for Japan, but deployed in the south, would extend to the island.
Japanese officials insist that Japan’s only role in a crisis will be protecting U.S. forces, not direct
involvement in defending Taiwan. However, Chinese officials have argued that the 1997 revised
defense guidelines between the United States and Japan are ambiguous; they fear that the guide-
line’s reference to “situations in areas surrounding Japan” does not exclude Taiwan and so
directly links NTW, Japan, and the Taiwan issue.
Finally, the Chinese also fear that NTW in Japan will in fact be part of a larger national
missile defense for the United States that undermines China’s strategic deterrent. Recent pro-
posals for national missile defense includes interceptors based in the continental United States as
well as a sea-based system with high-speed interceptors. Depending on their location and their
fly-out time, these anti-missile missiles may be able to intercept China’s intercontinental ballistic
missiles, weakening China’s already small deterrent force.
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China has voiced multiple opposition to the transfer of any type of theater missile defense
to Taiwan. As a senior Chinese official stated in January 2000, “If the United States wants to
develop a theater missile defense system for its own defense needs, that is its own business.
What China does not want to see is TMD covering Taiwan. If that happened, then it would
damage U.S.-China relations.”46 Most simply, TMD transfers would complicate China’s military
options and reduce the military effectiveness of China’s missile forces. Shielded from these mis-
siles, TMD transfers would encourage those within Taiwan who seek independence. Moreover,
TMD, according to the Chinese, would be a harmful intrusion on internal Chinese affairs and a
violation of the three Joint Communiqués governing U.S.-Chinese relations.
The Chinese also worry that the intelligence and information sharing needed to operate
TMD systems (especially upper tier) are the first steps toward the re-establishment of a U.S. mil-
itary alliance with Taiwan. At the very least, a Taiwan-deployed theater missile defense would
require U.S. military specialists to train Taiwanese units. Satellite data would have to be trans-
ferred, probably by a direct link between Cheyenne Mountain and Taiwanese military command.
According to Chinese analysts, transfers to Taiwan could eventually be part of a joint Northeast
Asia missile defense network that would include the United States, Japan, and South Korea. In
addition, some Chinese analysts have argued that the transfer of TMD technology to Taiwan
would help Taipei develop offensive ballistic missile programs of its own; China believes that
Taiwan is developing the 600 km Sky Steed ballistic missile from the Sky Bow surface-to-air
missile.47
Alternatives to TMD
The above discussion suggests there are significant potential costs as well as benefits to
the United States developing a regional TMD system. Theater missile defenses may bring lim-
ited protection against ballistic missile threats, and they may also provoke a regional arms race.
The United States must differentiate between situations in which the burden-sharing of develop-
ment costs and deployments is sensible, and those in which there are reduced risks if the United
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States goes it alone.48 Especially because most of the systems under discussion rely on untested
technologies and will not be ready for deployment for five or ten years, the United States should
think hard about including Taiwan and Japan into TMD programs.49
There may be political and military solutions that address the issues discussed above that
do not include the immediate risks of TMD. For all of its partners in the region, the United States
should make clearer its ability and willingness to respond to ballistic missile attacks; such a
move would strengthen extended deterrence, convincing allies that U.S. interests are at stake. As
Thomas Christensen has suggested, the United States should announce that it will not use mili-
tary force to defend a Taiwan that has unilaterally declared independence, but that it will defend
Taiwan vigorously if China uses force to try and coerce unification in the absence of a declara-
tion of independence.50
More specifically, while Chinese missiles may be a potent weapon of terror, they may be
less of a military threat.51 If the PLA wanted to target Taiwanese airforce bases and airstrips,
given the low accuracy (circle of equal probability, or CEP) and relatively low yields from 500
kg conventional warheads, China would have to fire a large number of warheads at each airfield.
Studies of an Indian attack on a Pakistani airfield suggest that India would have to fire anywhere
from 96 to 672 Prithvi missiles to close one airfield (assuming a CEP of about 500 meters, a
yield of 1000kg, and two airstrips per airfield).52 Assuming the DF-15 has a CEP of 300 meters,
127
53 Calculations are by Iain Johnston. CEP estimates from FAS. Use of GPS guidance, which the
Chinese are working on, would greatly increase accuracy. See Mark Stokes, China’s Strategic
Modernization: Implications for the United States. Online at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/
china/doctrine/chinamod.htm. Accessed February 2001.
54 Michael Swaine, Taiwan’s National Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons Procurement
Process (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).
55 Theater Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region, Henry L. Stimson Center Working Group
Report (Washington, DC), June 29, 2000.
56 If NTW were trying to hit a DF-15 at its apogee, or just after it passes above 100 km (which
would be preferable to get a few shots) it might have to be deployed at or less than 500 km from
the Strait for a minimum energy trajectory and 300 km for a depressed trajectory. Calculations
based on estimates by David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists.
57 Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East
Asia,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 49-80.
and assuming two airstrips for Taiwanese airfields, the PLA will have to use about 650 missiles
—about the total number the Pentagon projects for 2005—for one airfield.53 Also, because the
PLA has fewer launchers than missiles, it would need to fire in multiple salvos, giving the Tai-
wanese air force time for repairs or redeployment. Instead of participating in TMD, Taiwan may
be better off improving early warning systems and command and control facilities, as well as
hardening airfields and strengthening passive defenses.54
All of this could be paralleled by increases in informal contact between the United States
and Taiwanese military.55 If the United States decides to go ahead with an antimissile system,
TMD on U.S. ships is probably a better choice than TMD on Taiwanese ships. These ships could
be deployed to protect U.S. troops in Japan, and if necessary, outside the Taiwan Straits to pro-
tect Taiwan. How far outside the Straits these ships will be depends on intercept flight speed,
how high in the altitude the United States tries to intercept, and the trajectories of Chinese mis-
siles; it is possible that U.S. ships will be have to deployed directly in the entrance of the Straits,
making them an inviting target for the PLA and raising the possibility of direct conflict between
the United States and China.56 Still, at least in the next five to 10 years, deployment on U.S.
ships may bring security benefits without political costs.
In the case of Japan, there are real risks to encouraging Japan to assume a greater role in
TMD development.57 Japanese participation may exacerbate the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.
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If the primary benefit of missile defenses to Japan is maintaining a healthy alliance, the United
States could find other research projects on which the Japanese can work. It could bracket mis-
sile defense issues within the overall alliance structure, reassuring the Japanese that pulling out
of joint research would not mean forfeiting the chance to purchase any future system. The United
States will deploy its most effective TMD system to protect its own troops, and Japan would
accrue the security benefits without the political costs.
In addition, the United States could also consider rededicating itself to multilateral solu-
tions to ballistic missiles, exploring more cooperative or regional security agreements. Strength-
ening the missile technology control regime (MTCR) would require China’s participation, but
China might be more willing to cooperate if it were assured that any TMD would not include
Taiwan. In a regional forum, all of the participants might be able to negotiate a limit to offensive
and defensive systems.
Finally, the United States could pursue bilateral negotiations with North Korea and China
which may help reduce the threat of attack. The recent announcements from North Korea that it
is considering ending its moratorium on the testing of long-range missiles in response to the
“hard line stance” of the Bush administration may be more than a penchant for blackmail; it may
also reflect a desire to get negotiations started again.58 The United States and DPRK could move
to revive the cooperative nuclear agreement of 1992, which included a provision for the estab-
lishment of a joint inspection regime of nuclear facilities. Expansion of this regime to missile
facilities could be an effective confidence building measure reducing the need for theater missile
defenses.59
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In the case of China, some of have suggested that the two sides may be able to negotiate
an informal “rules of the game” for missiles and defenses.60 In return for China revealing more
about the expected end point of its current build-up of short-range missiles, the United States
could limit the number, range, and speed of intercepts. While the success of these negotiations is
certainly not guaranteed, the process may be as important as the outcome. The negotiation pro-
cess would have the symbolic importance of, if not accepting Chinese security concerns, then at
least recognizing them. Unilateral pursuit of theater missile defense suggests to the Chinese that,
despite public justification to the contrary, these systems are designed to contain China.
None of the above steps are exhaustive and there are certainly barriers and difficulties to
implementing them. The purpose of listing them is not so much as to test their political viability,
but to suggest alternative approaches to security in the region to TMD alone. These measures are
cheaper than theater missile defense and may reduce the unintended consequences of uncon-
strained military competition between the United States, Japan, China, Taiwan, and North Korea.
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Appendix: List of Acronyms
ABL Anti-ballistic Laser
CEP Circle of Equal Probability
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DF Dong-Feng (East Wind)
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DPP Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
KMT Kuomintang (Taiwan)
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NMD National Missile Defense
NTW Navy Theater Wide
PAC Patriot Advanced Capabilities
PLA People’s Liberation Army
ROK Republic of Korea
THAAD Theater High-Altitude Area Defense
TMD Theater Missile Defense
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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CHINA’S PERIPHERY POLICY AND CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Suisheng Zhao
Although China has been seen as a rising power with global significance in the post-Cold
War world, its security relies heavily upon maintaining good relations with neighboring coun-
tries in the Asia-Pacific region. A Chinese strategist, Wu Xinbo, admits that although China has
a great power self-image it does not have adequate strength to play the role commensurate to this
self-image. Therefore, “China is still a country whose real interest lies mainly within its bound-
aries, and to a lesser extent, in the Asia-Pacific region where developments may have a direct
impact on China’s national interests. . . . In terms of interests and resources, it is fair to say that
China is a regional power with some limited global interests.”1 With limited capacity in tradi-
tional economic and military terms, China has to focus its resources on the Asian-Pacific region.
Over one decade ago, Steven Levine stated that “outside Asia, China’s role is determined more
by what China may become than by what it already is.”2 This statement is still true today. Thus
Beijing has to formulate its foreign policy in particular to response to issues close to home.
For a long time in the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however,
China was “a regional power without a regional policy.”3 The tensions with many of its neigh-
boring countries became an important source of threat to China’s national security. Beijing was
in constant alert against possible invasions of hostile powers via its neighboring countries and
fought several wars with neighbors or with hostile powers in neighboring countries to defuse the
threat. China’s relations with Asian Pacific countries began to improve gradually in recent
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decades after it made a comprehensive periphery policy. This improvement has had significant
impact on its security environment.
This paper analyzes the recent changes in Beijing’s policy and relations with its Asian
neighbor and its impacts on China’s security environment. It starts with an examination of Bei-
jing’s making of its periphery policy, then goes on to explore the subsequent changes in Bei-
jing’s security environment. The last section will analyze the challenges to Beijing’s periphery
policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
Beijing’s “Good Neighboring Policy”
China often calls its Asian neighbors “periphery countries” (zhoubian guojia). Although
it was always aware of the importance in maintaining stable relations with these periphery coun-
tries for its national security, Beijing was never able to make an integrated policy toward neigh-
boring countries. There were many factors responsible for the absence of China’s regional
policy. One was frequent domestic turmoil and policy change, which severely limited China’s
ability to make any coherent foreign policy, including regional policy. The second was China’s
traditional cultural complacency and the legacy of sinocentrism, which took China as the center
of Asia for granted. The third was what Levine called China’s ambiguous position in the region:
“more than merely a regional actor, but still less than a global power,” which left China in an
uncertain relationship with its Asian neighbors.4 The fourth was China’s unique position in the
bipolar Cold Word setting, which forced Beijing to see its security in global rather than regional
terms.
Most of these factors began to change after China launched market-oriented economic
reform and opening up to the outside world in the early 1980s. Externally, while China con-
fronted no serious security threat throughout the 1980s, its strategic position in the triangular
relationship between the United States, the USSR, and the PRC declined along with the détente
between the two superpowers and the end of the Cold War. Internally, Deng Xiaoping and his
reform-minded colleagues were determined not only to halt the domestic political turmoil that
characterized the early years of the PRC but also to create a favorable international environment
for economic modernization. In response to the new situation, the reform-minded leaders in
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Beijing made a deliberated effort to devise an integrated regional policy, known as “zhoubian
zhengce” (periphery policy) or “mulin zhengce” (good neighboring policy), to cope with the
changes that challenged China’s understanding of its relations with neighboring countries.
A study by You Ji and Jia Qingguo points to three new trends in Asia that led reform-
minded leaders to pay a special attention to its periphery.5 The first was the prospect of a “pacific
century,” which Beijing embraced with the hope that fast economic growth in the Asia-Pacific
region could offer new energy to China’s economic prosperity. Taking the opportunities created
by the restructuring of the world economy, China was determined to integrate its economy with
the rest of the region. The second was the emergence of “new Asianism,” which claimed that the
success of Asian modernization was based on its unique values. This concept resonated in the
hearts of many Chinese leaders, reformers and conservatives alike, because it challenged the
Western ideological and economic centrality. Chinese leaders wanted to help drive this evolving
trend of Asianism by working closely with its Asian neighbors. The third was the development
of regional or sub-regional blocs following the collapse of the bipolar system. Beijing decided to
take advantage of the collectivism that might provide new mechanisms useful for China to face
the West. “[m]ultilaterialism, albeit highly limited, developed as China started cooperation with
neighboring states on transnational security problems (e.g., environmental pollution, illegal im-
migration, drug-trafficking, organized cross-border crime, etc.).”6
In light of these new developments, Beijing’s leaders began to make a periphery policy
that would help China to achieve the goal of creating a regional environment conducive to its
economic modernization and national security. According to Liu Huaqiu, Director of the Foreign
Affairs Office of the State Council, the objectives of the good neighboring policy was to “active-
ly develop friendly relations with the surrounding countries, preserve regional peace and sta-
bility, and promote regional economic cooperation.” To carry out this policy, Chinese leaders
showed a benign face in negotiations with neighboring countries over a series of disputes. As Liu
stated,
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China advocates dialogues and negotiations with other countries as equals in
dealing with the historical disputes over boundaries, territorial lands, and terri-
torial seas and seeks fair and reasonable solutions. Disputes that cannot be settled
immediately may be set aside temporarily as the parties seek common ground
while reserving differences without letting those differences affect the normal
relations between two countries.7
Specifically, Beijing’s periphery policy was aimed at exploring the common ground with
Asian countries in both economic and security arenas by conveying the image of a responsible
power willing to contribute to stability and cooperation in the region. It is important to note that
Beijing’s good neighboring policy, just like any other parts of its foreign policy, was closely re-
lated with its reform-minded leaders’ objective of economic modernization. In order to achieve a
high rate of economic growth, these leaders looked for the common ground in cooperation with
neighboring countries in order to take a share of the rapid economic growth in the region. This
economic motivation was very influential in guiding China’s periphery policy, evident in their
attempt to make diplomacy “serving domestic economic construction” (waijiao fuwu yu guonei
jingji jiangshe) after the inception of market-oriented economic reforms.8
Their efforts have been very successful. The overall foreign policy goal since the late
1970s has been set to maintain a peaceful international environment for economic moderniza-
tion. Reform-minded Chinese leaders argued that economic power was both a means and an end
of foreign policy. They defined economic modernization in the terms of economic security of the
nation. A Chinese scholar described that economic security
underscores the safety and survivability of those economic parts or sectors vital to
the country’s growth, the livelihood, and its whole economic interests. Indispens-
able for achieving such a security are elements ranging from favorable internal
and external business environments, to strong international competitiveness, to
status and capabilities in world politics. The final goals for economic security are
to enhance national economic power, to secure domestic markets while expanding
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external ones, and to guarantee national interest and advantage in competition and
cooperation abroad.9
In order to obtain economic power and security, Beijing was interested in the economic
development models of Japan and other successful East Asian Newly Industrial Countries
(NICs) and hoped for economic gains from increased trade and investment between China and
these Asian countries. As a result of this policy effort, China traded more and more with Asian
countries than with other regions after the 1980s. The total trade amount with Asian countries
was only $16.6 billion in 1980, but it reached $48.5 billion in 1990 and $175.69 billion in 1995,
right before the Asian financial crisis, counted for over 60 percent of China’s total foreign
trade.10
In the traditional security arena, political leaders in China have made every effort to pre-
vent their neighboring countries from becoming military security threats. A number of periphery
countries were perceived as posing such threats due to the following two reasons: border dis-
putes and their relations with outside powers hostile to China. Accordingly, Beijing’s periphery
policy has two security goals in mind: to settle border disputes “through consultations and nego-
tiations”11 to prevent alliances of its neighbors with outside powers hostile to China. The first
policy goal has involved China in a search for secure boundaries and a look for peaceful settle-
ments in land and maritime territorial disputes. The second policy goal has involved China in
developing strategic relationships and finding common grounds with Asian countries in resisting
pressures on market penetration and human rights issues from Western powers. Under these cir-
cumstances, China’s periphery policy has been shaped principally by the dynamics of two major
sets of relations. One is the dynamics between China and the global power of the United States.
The second is the interactions between China and regional rivals such as Japan and India.
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Beijing’s special attention to its periphery does not mean that China is willing to turn its
back on the world and simply cultivate its own garden. As You and Jia said, Beijing’s periphery
policy
is not just about putting the backyard in order. PRC’s diplomatic history has
clearly showed that troubled relations with the surrounding nations in the past had
seriously narrowed China’s foreign policy options, especially toward major
powers. . . . Closer integration with Asia has become a must in China’s regional
foreign policy initiatives.12
In other words, establishing good relationships with neighbors is aimed at providing
China with a more secure environment in its periphery as a leverage to increase its influence in
world affairs.
Improvements of China’s Security Environment in The Asia-Pacific
Indeed, China’s security environment in its periphery improved greatly after it began to
formulate and implement the good-neighboring policy. In his study of China’s peripheral secu-
rity environment (zhoubian anquan huanjing), a Chinese security expert, Yan Xuetong, asserted
that as China found more and more common security interest (gongtong anquan liyi) with
peripheral countries, China began to enjoyed a more peaceful environment together with its
neighboring countries in recent years. The result was an increased mutual trust between China
and its neighbors and an enhanced national security for China.13
Yan’s assertion was based on his observation that China and its neighbors shared two
fundamentally common security interests. One was to prevent a world war and a new cold war
from taking place and the second was to avoid regional military conflict. According to Yan,
although some countries might be concerned that China’s rise would upset the balance of power,
most countries agreed with China’s terms of strategic balance in the region. Yan divided China’s
periphery countries into three categories according to the degrees of their agreement with Chi-
na’s terms of strategic balance. The first category of countries shared China’s interest in devel-
oping a regional multipolarization in which China would be one of important strategic power and
play a balancing role. These countries included Pakistan, North Korea, Burma, Nepal, Cambo-
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dia, Malaysia, Singapore, Russia, and central Asian states. They hoped to see China becoming
powerful to reduce the pressure of the United States intervening in their internal affairs. The
second category of countries included Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines,
Vietnam, New Zealand, and India. They hoped to maintain the existing strategic balance in
which the United States had the strategically advantaged position. These countries didn’t want to
see China become a balancing power to the United States. But they did not have major conflicts
of interest with China. The third category of countries, mainly the United States and Japan, were
concerned over the rise of China and wanted to establish a multilateral mechanism in China’s
periphery to prevent China from becoming a security threat to their interests. Yan believed that
because China shared common strategic interests with most of the periphery countries, China
had enjoyed and could continue to enjoy a favorable security environment in the periphery for
the near future.14
It was indeed a prudent policy that China followed in its efforts to find shared strategic
interests with neighboring countries. By implementing this policy, China has improved its rela-
tions with most of periphery countries in the recent decades. This improvement came roughly in
two chronological stages: the late Cold War period of the 1980s and the post-Cold War period of
the 1990s.
The first stage started with China’s economic reform and opening up to the outside world
in the early 1980s. Two policy shifts were significant in this period. The first was to abandon
ideology as the guidance and develop friendly relations with neighbors regardless of their ideo-
logical tendencies and political systems (buyi yishi xingtai he shehui zhidu lun qingsu). This
policy shift was stated in a Chinese foreign policy history book as one of the five major policy
shifts in the 1980s.15 The second significant policy shift was to change the practice of defining
China’s relations with its neighbors in terms of their relations with either of the Soviet Union and
the United States (yimei huaxian, yisu huaxian). China would develop normal relations with
neighboring countries regardless of their relations with the Soviet Union and the United States.
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These policy changes resulted in an improvement of China’s relations with some periphery coun-
tries previously in tension during the period.
One good example was the normalization of relationship with Mongolia, which had long
been perceived as a Soviet satellite on China’s northern frontier. A border agreement between
the two countries was signed in November 1988. Another example was China’s effort to improve
its relationship with India. This effort resulted in the ice-breaking visit of Indian Prime Minister,
Rajiv Gandhi, to Beijing in December 1988, the first such visit after the Sino-India border war in
1962. China declared that this visit marked the beginning of a normal relationship between these
two countries.16 Maintaining a good relationship with North Korea and at the same time improv-
ing their relationship with South Korea was a third example. The so-called “traditional friend-
ship” between China and North Korea had always been delicate, as North Korea had swung
between Moscow and Beijing for many years. This relationship became particularly difficult in
the 1980s when differences in ideology, economic and political systems, and foreign policy were
growing between these two communist neighbors. However, Beijing managed fairly good rela-
tionship with the North while successfully established close relations with the South at the end of
the 1980s.
The improvement of the relationship with Taiwan was still another example. To create a
peaceful international environment for its modernization drive, Deng Xiaoping decided to shift
Beijing’s policy from “liberating Taiwan” by force to a peaceful reunification offense by sug-
gesting talks between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (KMT) in
the early 1980s. Yie Jianying, the Chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Com-
mittee, specifically proposed santong (three links, i.e., commercial, postal, and travel) and siliu
(four exchanges, i.e., academic, cultural, economic, and sports) between the two sides.17 Al-
though the Taiwan government suspected Beijing’s policy as “united front” tactics at first, it
responded to Beijing’s peaceful inducement under domestic pressures and began to ease restric-
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tions on trade, investment and travel to the mainland after 1986.18 By the end of the 1980s,
economic and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Strait developed rapidly.
The Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War marked the
beginning of the second stage of improvement of China’s relations with periphery countries. The
massacre led to economic sanctions by and deterioration of relations with Western countries.
However, it had little negative impact on China’s relations with its Asian neighbors, as the
human rights records in most of these countries were not better than that in China. To a certain
extent, these Asian governments were sympathetic to China’s authoritarian rule and struggle
against pressures from the Western countries. To improve China’s international environment
after Tiananmen, Beijing’s leaders made a series of policy adjustments. A former Chinese diplo-
mat characterized these adjustments in twelve Chinese characters: wendingzhoubian (stabilizing
periphery), kaiduowaijiao (expanding diplomacy), liuzhuanjumian (altering the situation). Spe-
cifically, reformed-minded Beijing’s leaders decided to further reduce the role of ideological fac-
tors in China’s foreign relations and stop drawing lines according to a country’s social-political
system or attitudes toward China. The emphasis was on the improvement of relations on China’s
periphery in order to establish a secure and stable periphery environment.19 As a result of this
effort, it was really ironical that while China’s relations with the Western countries soured, its
relations with Asian-Pacific neighbors improved after the Tiananmen Incident.
Taking the example of the improvement of the relations between China and the Southeast
Asian countries, China normalized diplomatic relations with several influential Southeast Asian
countries in the early 1990s: Indonesia (August 8, 1990), Singapore (October 3, 1990), Brunei
(September 30, 1991), and Vietnam (November 1991). In spite of the rising concern over the
China threat among many Southeast Asian countries, they not only sided with China against the
U.S. pressures on the human rights issue, but also accepted Beijing’s position that the reunifica-
tion with Taiwan was China’s domestic affair. China was invited to attend the ASEAN post-
Ministerial Conference in 1991 and became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in
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1994 and ASEAN’s comprehensive dialogue partner in 1996. Since then, China has actively par-
ticipated in what they called “shanhui jizhi” (three meeting mechanism) of ASEAN Foreign
Ministerial Meeting, Enlarged ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, and ARF.20
The Asian financial crisis that started in summer 1997 provided a good opportunity for
China to further improve its relations with Southeast Asian countries. Although China was not
immune from its effect, it withstood the crisis better than many of its neighbors. As the World
Bank indicated in the aftermath of the crisis, “China’s growth is one source of stability for the
region.”21 Beijing’s leaders took a policy of “stand-by-Asia” and even sent several billion dollars
in aid to afflicted Southeast Asian economies. In response to the speculation that China would
have to devaluate its currency, Renminbi, under the economic pressures, China’s premier, Zhu
Rongji, repeatedly promised to maintain its stability. A Chinese devaluation would have set off
competitive devaluation across the region. This “beggar thy neighbor” competition could undo
Southeast Asian countries’ recovery efforts and would have devastating economic and political
consequences for the whole region. China’s positive response to the crisis in comparison to
Japan’s paralysis helped China gain influence very significantly. Because Southeast Asia now
depended, to a hitherto unprecedented degree, on China’s ability to stabilize its currency, China
hereby significantly improved its relations with Southeast Asian countries, particularly in eco-
nomic terms. During the Asian financial crisis, China obtained the power to shape Asia-Pacific
development in ways that it never had previously. As a result, at the first ASEAN-plus-1 summit
meeting between the leaders of nine ASEAN members and Chinese president Jiang Zemin in
Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, a joint declaration was published to establish a good-neigh-
boring and mutual-trust partnership between China and ASEAN oriented towards the 21st
century.22
In the 1990s China also significantly improved relations with its neighbors in the north
and northwest. Formal diplomatic relations with South Korea were established on August 24,
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1992, which marked the success of China’s policy to secure balanced relationship with both
South and North Korea. To continue maintaining the balance relationship, Beijing was very
careful not to anger North Korea; to this end it refrained from developing any military contact
and security relations with South Korea. Instead, it focused on bilateral trade and investment
relations with the South while it made every effort to keep strategic relations with the North. In
this position, China hoped to better defend its interests in the future reunification process of two
Koreas. As You Ji indicated, “this strategy envisages the likely orientation of China’s strategic
interest in a Korea that is reunified, peacefully. China hopes to see that there will not be a U.S.
military presence after Korea’s reunification. It hopes to see that the reunified Korea will take a
position that is pro-China rather than pro-Japan.”23
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China also secured a good start with the
newly independent central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan in 1992. Three of the five central Asian states share borders of more than 3,000
kilometers with China. Securing its relations with these countries is crucially important to ensure
China’s border area stability and energy supplies, or as a Wall Street Journal report indicated, to
“buttress the twin pillars of its future economic growth: political stability and plentiful energy.”24
According to this report, China shared with these countries the concern that radical Islam, in-
spired by the example of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, would stir ethnic and popular revolt.
China’s westernmost region is inhabited by Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs, and it fears fun-
damentalist fervor. Russia has been bogged down in guerrilla war with Muslim nationalists in
Chechnya. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have cast militant Islam as their main enemy.
This common concern led these countries to work with China to contain ethnic fundamentalism.
Eager to prevent Islamic militancy from fueling separatism in Xinjiang, China has dispatched
waves of senior politicians and military delegations to Central Asia. It gave parachutes, medicine
and other supplies to airborne forces and border guards in Tajikistan, which has been convulsed
by civil war. It also pledged military aid to Uzbekistan, which has been raided annually by an
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Afghanistan-based opposition group called the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Another im-
portant issue on the agenda for China’s relations with these central Asian states is energy sup-
plies, as these countries could be an excellent source for China’s future energy supplies. Accord-
ing to this report, China’s own conservative estimates show oil imports filling half the six mil-
lion barrels a day it will need by 2010, up from just under a third today and zero less than a
decade ago. Its need for natural gas, too, is projected to soar fivefold, to 3.9 trillion cubic feet. To
meet demand, China has been exploring frantically in Xinjiang, a search Exxon and other energy
giants have joined at various times, and also invested in two oil fields in Kazakstan.25
To maintain good relations with bordering central Asian states, Chinese president Jiang
Zemin took a lead in the “Treaty of Enhancing Military Mutual Trust in the Border Areas”
signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in Shanghai in April 1996.
This group has since then been known as the “Shanghai Five.” At first, the Shanghai Five was
designed as a talking shop on minor issues of borders and territory among China and its Central
Asian neighbors. Yet in a few short years, the group has begun to address political and military
questions, and shared problems like organized crime. The five countries signed a “Treaty of Mu-
tual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas” in April 1997. At its June 2001 meeting
in Beijing, the Shanghai Five accepted a new member, Uzbekistan, and agreed to meet under a
new name, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These six countries agreed on political, mil-
itary and intelligence cooperation for the purpose of “cracking down on terrorism, separatism,
extremism” and to maintain “regional security.” Reportedly, Iran, Mongolia, India, and Pakistan
are interested in joining the organization, which Chinese president Jiang called the “Shanghai
Pact.” A Western observer believed that the use of Shanghai Pact is perhaps intended “to evoke
the former Warsaw Pact.” According to this observer, “Together, the Shanghai Pact countries
have a population of 1.5 billion; they control thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons,
and this combined conventional military forces number 3.6 million.”26 It was from this perspec-
tive that an Australian newspaper report stated that “The newly formed Shanghai Co-operation
Organization, bracketing China, Russia and four Central Asian republics, is poised to emerge as
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a potent force against United States influence and a rising tide of Islamic militancy in the
region.”27 A reporter of The Christian Science Monitor also believed that
The Shanghai meeting of Russia, China, and four Central Asian nations is an
effort to develop an organization that could one day offer a modest geopolitical
counterweight to Western alliances. Its timing and substance are considered sig-
nificant, with Russia and China already drawing closer after signing a number of
bilateral agreements.28
Indeed, Beijing’s relationship with Russia improved spectacularly in recent decades. The
most important factors that brought these former communist giants close were twofold. First, the
Soviet/Russian search for security and economic reform matched China’s yearning for stability
in the aftermath of Tiananmen. Second, both countries were resentful over the high-handed
behavior of the United States. While growing American pressure increasingly irritated China, the
Western reluctance to provide large-scale assistance disappointed Russia. Thus, “there was an
increasing convergence of views between Moscow and Beijing over the need to create alterna-
tive poles in world affairs to the one dominated by the US.”29 This convergence of views paved
the way for the improvement in Sino-Russian relations.
Following Boris Yeltsin’s first official visit to China in December 1992, Beijing and
Moscow institutionalized a twice-a-year summit meeting system at president and premier levels.
A Western observer found that this sustained summit diplomacy was similar to “the Gorbachev-
Reagan (the Yeltsin-Bush) summits” in 1985-92, which helped put an end to the Cold War.30
Jiang and Yeltsin met five times in six years by the end of 1997. In spite of Yeltsin’s critical
health situation, the sixth summit was held in a Moscow hospital in November 1998 and Yeltsin
visited Beijing for the seventh summit in December 1999. The 1999 Sino-Russian Summit cul-
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minated in a landmark Joint Communique criticizing American hegemony and denouncing
“human rights interventions” by foreign countries. China officially declared Chechnya a matter
for Russia, stating, “The Chinese side supports the government of the Russian Republic’s action
in fighting terrorism and splitism forces.” For its part, the Russians officially supported China’s
sovereignty over Taiwan. The communique criticized the United States both for its attempt to
undermine the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as well as for its refusal to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The communique states, “The Russian side supports the Chi-
nese side in opposing the position of any country under any form of bringing the Chinese prov-
ince of Taiwan into a (anti-missile defense) plan.”31
The Sino-Russian relationship was first defined as a “constructive partnership” in 1994
and “strategic” was added in the Sino-Russian Joint Communique published on April 25, 1996,
four days after the publication of U.S.-Japanese Joint Security Statement on April 17, 1996. This
relationship was finalized as a “strategic cooperative partnership oriented towards the 21st Cen-
tury” in 1997. After the retirement of Yeltsin, Chinese leaders continued the partnership with
Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin. At the July 2001 summit in Moscow, the presidents of the
two former communist powers signed the Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Coopera-
tion to defend mutual interests and boost trade. Although the treaty may be a marriage of con-
venience in that both China and Russia faced pressure of the only superpower, the United States,
after the end of the Cold War, it was significant in terms of the improvement of the bilateral
relationship between these two former communist giants. As one observer indicated, “since their
first meeting in 2000, Putin and Jiang have met eight times to coordinate what the new treaty
describes as their ‘work together to preserve the global strategic balance’.”32 Reuters’ report also
indicated that this friendship pact “provided a legal framework for friendship now re-established
after decades of mistrust over border and ideological disputes.”33
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The Sino-Russian partnership resulted in the declaration of the demarcation of the eastern
section of Sino-Russian border at the Jiang-Yeltsin Beijing summit in November 1997. A China
Daily commentary celebrated that
After six years of close cooperation on the basis of consultation, mutual under-
standing and mutual concessions, the 4,300-odd-kilometer frontier will become a
landmark of peace and friendship between the two countries and peoples, laying a
solid foundation for stronger good-neighborly relations and regional stability and
prosperity.34
As a result of successfully implementing the periphery policy, China’s security along its
borders has been substantially improved. China becomes more confident in its security environ-
ment when there is less immediate military threat to China’s security. A Chinese official publica-
tion proudly declared that “Today, looking around our neighboring areas from east to west and
from north to south, we have basically established a relatively stable periphery environment
around our neighboring areas. Our country has established good neighboring relations with all
our neighbors. This is the best period since the founding of the PRC.”35
Challenges to China’s Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific
China’s periphery policy has served its interest in establishing a stable regional environ-
ment and promoting economic modernization along pragmatic lines. There is no reason to doubt
the sincerity of Beijing’s leaders in furthering good relations with neighbors when Jiang Zemin,
at his report to the 15th CCP National Congress in October 1997, stated that “China’s moderniza-
tion requires a stable international environment” in Asia as elsewhere.36 China’s ability to devel-
op good neighboring relations was certainly enhanced by the successful power transfer from
Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin at the 15th CCP’s National Congress in September 1997. This
new leadership has made it clear that China’s best interest is to make cooperation rather than
conflict in Asia.
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However, China still faces many serious challenges if it wants to further improve its
security environment in the periphery. Although Beijing’s leaders have declared the victory of
the good neighboring policy, the success has largely been along its land borders in the North and
West. The security environment along China’s East and South frontiers, particularly the coastal
frontiers where China’s major economic and political centers are located, have not been im-
proved as much. Some new problems have also occurred in these areas. In particular, there are at
least four sets of challenges that Beijing’s leaders have found difficult. One is divisive territorial
disputes with several neighbors; the second is rivalry with other regional powers; the third is the
fear of its weak neighbors of the threat of China; and the fourth is the management of the most
important relationship with the United States.
China’s Border Disputes with Neighbors
The first challenge is to settle border disputes in the following three categories.37 The first
category is land boundaries. Before the arrival of Western imperialist powers, territorial bound-
aries along China’s frontiers had little significance under the tributary system. After the decline
of the Chinese Empire in the 19th century, Western powers not only took over many of China’s
tributaries, but also pushed the frontiers forward into areas that China would have preferred to
control itself. These new frontiers were often institutionalized in what China called “unequal
treaties.” As a result, after the founding of the PRC, communist leaders in Beijing found them-
selves in a series of territorial disputes with its neighbors. The second category is the so-called
“lost” territories: Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The third category is maritime boundaries
involving both bilateral and multilateral relations. Bilaterally, China is in dispute with Vietnam
over the demarcation of the Tonkin Gulf and with Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai in
Chinese), a group of rocky islets lying on the edge of the continental shelf about 100 miles north-
east of Taiwan. Japan considers these islets as part of the Ryukyus, whereas China claims them
as part of the Taiwan province and therefore part of China. The major multilateral dispute is
over the Spratly/Nansha islands in the South China Sea, which is believed to be a potentially
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resource-rich region possessing oil deposits. Beijing draws a maritime boundary running from
Taiwan southwestward virtually along the coasts of the Philippines and East Malaysia and Bru-
nei, and then northward more or less along the coast of Vietnam. The Philippines, Malaysia,
Brunei, and Vietnam have disputed this claim.
Border issues are related to sovereignty, which is Beijing’s most important concern in its
foreign relations. Beijing has been firm in negotiations over all three categories of territorial dis-
putes. Some progress towards the settlement of these disputes has been made, albeit very limited.
The most important progress is over land dispute with Russia, which shares a total of 4300-odd-
kilometer borders with China: about 4245 kilometers on the Manchurian sections and 55 kilome-
ters between Kazakstan and Mongolia. China made progress in this settlement primarily because
most of the areas in question do not in general contain Chinese populations. China signed the
first border agreement in May 1991 with the USSR on the Manchurian sections of the common
border. In September 1994, the second agreement was reached on the delimitation of the Sino-
Russian border in the Altai region, between Mongolia and Kazakhstan. Ratified in 1996, it led to
the concrete demarcation in 1997. The Sino-Russian Joint Statement in November 1997 prom-
ises that the two sides “will complete demarcation of the Western section of the Sino-Russian
border within the agreed period of time.”38 The Chinese-Russian Border Demarcation Commis-
sion was disbanded upon finishing its work in April 1999, when more than 2,084 border signs
and markers along their borders were set up and 2,444 islands on the border rivers were divided.
About 1,163 of these islands go to Russia and the others go to China. The only unsettled terri-
tories are three large islands: two on the Ussuri River and one on the Argun River, all of which
are currently controlled by Russia.
The Chinese government has been extremely firm on the second category of territory dis-
putes because it believes that people in these territories are ethnically and historically Chinese.
Taking back these territories involves not only the vital security interest of China but also the
legitimacy of the regime. Beijing recovered Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999. Taiwan is
now the focus of dispute in this category. Beijing has tried to use the same method to recover
Taiwan as it did with Hong Kong and Macao, offering economic inducement and proposing a
“one country, two systems” formula since the early 1980s. But this peaceful offense has not
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achieved its objectives. While total trade across the Strait rose from $5 billion in 1990 to $25
billion in 1997 and to $32.386 billion in 2000, making Taiwan the second (after Japan) largest
supplier to the mainland and China the third largest market of Taiwanese goods, the political
relationship between the two governments remains officially nonexistent and hostile. In frustra-
tion and to show its determination, Beijing launched a series of military exercises in the Taiwan
Strait in 1995-96.39 However, military coercion has not stopped Taiwan’s political centrifugal
tendency either. President Lee Teng-hui proposed a “special state-to-state relationship” in July
1999 in spite of Beijing’s military threat. Chen Shui-ban, the candidate of the pro-independent
party, DPP, was elected as Taiwan’s 10th president in the fiercely contested 2000 election. Al-
though Beijing has made it clear that it is willing to fight a war if necessary to recover Taiwan, it
still has to be concerned about the reactions of the United States and other Asian-Pacific coun-
tries, as well as the resultant rupture of China’s economic development. Beijing’s leaders have
been left very little room to maneuver in this effort of national reunification.40
The progress in the third category of disputes is extremely limited. In the cases of dispute
over Tonkin Gulf and Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, no agreement or compromise has been reached
with Vietnam and Japan. In the South China Sea, while Beijing has shown a certain degree of
flexibility by suggesting “shelving the disputes and working for joint development” (gezhi
zhengyi, gongtong kaifa), China’s maritime neighbors have been very assertive in contesting
Beijing’s sovereignty claims. As one study indicated, “although China has offered joint develop-
ment to other claimants, its concept of joint development seems to involve joint development of
the producing oil and gas fields on other claimants’ continental shelves—and then only after
China’s sovereignty has been recognized.”41 In addition, as the same study pointed out, Beijing
has continued to “insist on bilateral solutions and its interest and sincerity in participating in a
multilateral cooperative solution remains in doubt.” China’s position has been criticized and
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even ridiculed by other claimants in the South China Sea. Although Beijing and Hanoi reached
an agreement in defining their disputed 1,300-kilometer land border after Chinese Premier Zhu
Rongji wrapped up his visit to Vietnam in December 1999, no resolution was found over the two
large islands groups, the Paracels and the Spratlys, over which China claims sovereignty. China
has occupied the Paracels since 1974, and in 1988 it had a military clash with Vietnam over
them. Vietnam also still occupies most of the Spratlys, but the Philippines has stepped up its
claims over them in recent years. Protesting Chinese construction activity on Filipino-claimed
Mischief Reef in 1998, the Philippine military set up patrols in the disputed archipelago and
announced that the Philippine navy would fire warning shots if Chinese vessels got closer than
five miles to its patrols.42 Beijing has not given up its claims of sovereignty over these islands
because they are extremely important for China’s security and energy supply. Sovereignty
claims over these islands keep all of China’s options open regarding resources, should any be
discovered. However, Beijing’s sovereignty claim may eventually bring China into conflict with
all the countries in Southeast Asia. Were that to happen, “China’s ability to use force is con-
strained by the possibile reactions of the United States, Japan, and ASEAN, which would prob-
ably view such action as an attempt by Beijing to dominate the South China Sea.”43 Although the
sovereignty claim is crucially important for Beijing’s leaders, it is certainly an extremely diffi-
cult decision for them to squander China’s military resources and their political capital to seize
these barren flyspecks.
Rivalry with Other Regional Powers
The second major challenge to China’s peripheral security is how to work with other
regional powers, namely, Japan and India, to secure peace and stability together in the Asian-
Pacific region.
For obvious historical and geopolitical reasons, China’s relationship with Japan has
always been difficult. Japan was China’s most cruel and destructive enemy for a half century
between 1895 to 1945. Japan also allied with the United States to contain China, before these
two countries established diplomatic relations in 1972. Although a Sino-Japan peace treaty was
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signed in 1978, this formally friendly relationship has been largely superficial. While China has
regarded Japan as a successful model of economic modernization and tried to lure Japanese trade
and investments, Japan has been unwilling to build up a potential rival unnecessarily. Japanese
loans and investment have come to China only on a modest scale for years. According to one
study, in the period between 1980 and 1996, the total amount of Japanese investment in China
was $14.6 billion in comparison to $34.6 billion from the four small East Asian Tigers of Hong
Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.44
Disappointed, Beijing’s leaders have blamed Japan for its arrogant and unfair trading
practices. In particular, they have been extremely alert to any signs of Japan’s remilitarization.
Beijing has played the “guilt card” as a weapon. During Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in Novem-
ber 1998, the first visit by a PRC president, Jiang reminded Japanese leaders at almost every
public occasion that the past is far from forgiven or forgotten. Beijing has done everything to
discourage Japan from aspiring to leadership of the region or taking on a greater global or re-
gional political role. At a seminar on Northeast Asian Security held in Shanghai, Chinese strate-
gists asserted that “Northeast Asia is the only region where China has a strategic advantage. One
of China’s strategic goals should be to delay Japan’s advancement toward becoming a major
military power.”45
However, China’s strategy has not been very effective. When President Jiang visited
Japan expecting to dominate the scene, the Japanese refused to give a formal written apology for
war atrocities even though South Korea had received this apology earlier, and refused to exclude
the Taiwan Strait from its security agreement with the United States. Japan also refused to utter
the “three no’s” (no support to Taiwan independence; no support to one China, one Taiwan; and
no support to Taiwan’s bid to join the United Nations) on the Taiwan issue, although President
Clinton had made the pledge in his visit to Beijing earlier. In the meantime, no matter what
China thinks, Japan has taken a more and more critical position on China’s military moderniza-
tion efforts. As June Teufel Dryer indicated, “China’s economic growth was accompanied by
152
46 June Teufel Dryer, “Sino-Japanese Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 28
(2001): 375.
47 China News Digest-Global (electronic news), December 12, 1998.
48 China Daily, May 19, 1998, p. 4.
increase in the defense budget that averaged 12-13% each year. Given the absence of any exter-
nal invasion threat and the presence of many domestic problems, this worried the PRC neigh-
bors. Japan began to complain about the lack of transparency in Beijing’s defense decision-
making.”46 In response, Japan has made China the major target of its national defense strategy. It
is hard, in this case, to be optimistic about the future relationship between these two important
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Their rivalry is certainly a major challenge to the success of
China’s periphery policy.
India is another budding rival of China in Asia. Although these two countries made
friends by working together in the promotion of the national independent movement in the third
world during the 1950s, they became enemies and fought a border war in 1962. Sino-Indian rela-
tionship began to improve in the late 1980s. China and India signed two agreements on maintain-
ing peace and tranquility and confidence building measures in the border area in 1993 and 1996
respectively. President Jiang Zemin visited India in November 1996. Even as Beijing was culti-
vating a more friendly relationship with New Delhi, it was shocked by India’s going nuclear in
May 1998 and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes’ characterization of China as “a major
threat to Indian security.”47 Beijing was furious and accused India “running against the interna-
tional trend of peace.”48
However, this event was not a bolt from the blue. Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry has
never stopped in the following three issue-areas. The first is the Pakistan issue. While China has
sought to improve relations with India, it has maintained a long-term strategic partnership with
Pakistan, against which India has waged three wars against in the five decades since its indepen-
dence. New Delhi believes that China has used the Sino-Pakistan alliance to check the growing
influence of India in Asia. Tibet is the second issue. Although India has publicly affirmed Bei-
jing’s position that Tibet is part of China, it did not welcome China’s incorporation of Tibet,
which otherwise might serve as a buffer between these two countries. China has been irritated
that India has allowed the Dalai Lama and his exile government to reside in Dharmasala and to
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campaign for Tibetan independence. The third issue is the two segments of the 2,500 mile Sino-
India border that are still disputed: the southeastern Himalayan Mountains, now administered by
India, and the Aksai Chin Plateau, through which a major Chinese highway links Tibet and Xin-
jiang. Solutions to these troubled issues have to be found in order for China to establish a truly
good neighboring relationship with India.
The China Threat to its Weaker Neighbors
With its rapid economic growth, China has been regarded as the coming superpower in
the 21st century. This realization has given rise to the speculation about a “China threat,” particu-
larly among China’s weak neighbors. They worry that, after China modernizes, Beijing would
like to have East Asia as its exclusive sphere of influence, a modern equivalent of the traditional
tributary system. Beijing has denied this speculation and offered repeated assurance that “China
will never seek hegemony.”49 However, this assurance has not eased the fear of China’s weaker
neighbors.
To be objective, military expansion cannot be considered a serious Chinese objective at
least in the foreseeable future. China lacks the military power and faces immense internal and
external challenges to an expansionist policy in Asia. The presence and influence of the United
States and the strength of dynamic regional powers, such as Japan and India, have defined and
will continue to define the boundaries within which China’s power may be asserted. Unless
unforeseeable vacuums of power develop in Asia, it is difficult to conceive of China acquiring
the hegemonic role that the United States long had in the Western Hemisphere or that the USSR
played in Eastern Europe.
However, there is a perception gap between China and its weaker neighbors: “China,
viewing itself in global terms, does not always realize how strong it is when place in regional
context. The rest of Asia, viewing China in a regional perspective, does not always realize how
weak it is on a global scale.”50 In this case, although China remains relatively weak in many of
the measurable indicators of power, China’s weaker neighbors see China in terms of its consid-
erable potentials and the long historic record of cultural and political domination of the region.
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China is slow to understand and properly respond to the suspicion and fear of its weaker neigh-
bors. Talking about China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries, for example, a Chinese
scholar believed that “as soon as the mutual trust is established, good neighboring relations and
partnerships would be able to be complete.” He asserted that “the foundation for the mutual trust
has been laid. The only problems are to overcome some barriers to the mutual trusts.”51 How-
ever, the nature of the relationship is much more ambivalent than this understanding. As one
Western scholar indicated, “while most of ASEAN’s policies towards China are guided by the
economic perspectives of a huge Chinese market, explaining ASEAN’s constructive engagement
strategy towards China, Beijing’s ambiguous foreign and security policies are simultaneously a
major concern in the region.”52 According to this scholar, “The rapid modernization programs of
China’s armed forces (including its nuclear arsenal), Beijing’s territorial claims in the entire
South China Sea and its gunboat policies towards Taiwan have raised widespread concern over
irredentist tendencies in China’s foreign security agenda.”53 The fear of the perceived China
threat is partially responsible for stimulating a rush to arms in many Asian-Pacific countries after
the end of the Cold War.54 Many of China’s weak neighbors have determined to enhance their
defense self-reliance capacities and military preparedness to better deal with regional contin-
gencies.
This ambivalent relationship has been further complicated by China’s traditional attitudes
toward its weaker neighbors. While pursuing a good neighboring policy, it continues to see
periphery countries with a degree of condescension. Taking the example of China’s attitudes
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toward Vietnam, a weaker neighbor that China ruled for centuries in history, the Chinese still
view their influence in Vietnam as generous and civilizing. Deng Xiaoping justified China’s
invasion in 1979 in terms of teaching a lesson to the disrespectful Vietnamese who enjoyed sub-
stantial Chinese support during the war against the Americans but sided with the Soviet Union
and challenged Chinese sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea after the war. Viet-
nam joined ASEAN, a high-profile international organization, to reduce its isolation and vulner-
ability to the Chinese threat in 1995. Apparently, Chinese leaders have been displeased to see
Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN. However, they have no option but to live with the fact that
their weaker neighbors could make alliance in coping with China. How to handle this situation is
certainly a serious challenge to China’s periphery policy.
Relations with the United States
Managing the relationship with the United States, the only superpower in the post-Cold
War World, is the most significant challenge for China to establish a positive security environ-
ment in its periphery. The United States is a forwardly deployed power in Asia-Pacific, main-
tains formal security treaties with Japan and South Korea, and is the primary weapon supplier to
Taiwan. Whether or not Beijing can successfully handle the above-mentioned other challenges,
to a large extent, depends on the nature and level of American involvement in Asia and on the
U.S. policy toward China. The United States has the ability to influence China’s periphery policy
by affecting the policies of some of China’s neighbors and the overall security environment in
the Asian-Pacific region. However, China’s ability to influence U.S. policy is very limited
because it does not have much leverage over U.S. policy, which is largely a hostage to its
domestic politics.
The Sino-U.S. relationship has been on a roller coaster since Tiananmen. It deteriorated
after 1989 and warmed up briefly during the period between President Jiang’s visit to Washing-
ton in October-November 1997 and President Clinton’s visit to Beijing in June-July 1998. How-
ever, Sino-U.S. relations have been under strain again since late 1998. The U.S. Congress was
angry over charges of China’s nuclear spying and political payoffs, the Clinton administration’s
careless handling of U.S. technology transfer to China, reports of China’s new suppression of
political dissidents, import obstacles as the Chinese economy slowed, and the PLA missile build-
up along the Taiwan Strait. As the domestic criticism over the Clinton administration’s engage-
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ment policy increased, the Sino-U.S. relationship was pushed onto a difficult path. Chinese Pre-
mier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Washington in April 1999 failed to halt this down-turn. The NATO
bombing of the Chinese embassy on May 7, 1999 further pushed these two countries toward the
edge of confrontation. Although the downward spiral was temporarily arrested, the relationship,
as a Chinese scholar indicated, was “stabilized only at a low level” in the last months of the
Clinton administration.55
When George W. Bush took the White House in January 2001, Chinese leaders became
especially concerned about the outlook for U.S.-China relations as Bush had termed China a
“strategic competitor” rather than the partner that President Clinton had termed it earlier. This
concern proved real as a series of incidents in the first four months after Bush took office seri-
ously strained Sino-American ties. The most important one was the accidental mid-air collision
between a U.S. Navy EP-13 spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet on the South China Sea on April
1, 2001. Although this incident was finally resolved without lasting impact, the Sino-U.S. rela-
tionship was further strained. As a Washington Post article reported in the aftermath of the crisis,
“China’s leaders are increasingly concerned that Washington and Beijing are headed for a con-
frontation as China emerges as an economic and military power in Asia.”56 A series of actions
taken by the Bush administration in its first 100 days of tenure seemed to confirm Beijing’s
concerns. Bush backed a national missile defense system, which China feared would negate its
nuclear deterrent. Over Chinese objections, the U.S. government permitted Taiwanese President
Chen Shui-bian unprecedented access to the United States, allowing him to stop twice in Amer-
ica and meet lawmakers in his transit visit to New York City and Houston in June 2001. Bush
also shelved the peace process for the Korean Peninsula and hosted the Tibetan spiritual leader,
the Dalai Lama, at the White House. He approved a multibillion-dollar weapons package for
Taiwan in May 2001, including, for the first time, offensive weapons such as submarines. A pro-
China Hong Kong magazine listed all these actions and believed that
Although it is still hard to say that the United States is ready to invade China, all
this showed that the United States was indeed openly creating a tense military
157
57 “US Policy of Containing China: Result of Biased, Lopsided Information,” Guangjiaojing
[Wide-Angle Mirror], no. 344 (May 16, 2001): 33.
confrontation atmosphere and raising the political pressure against China for the
purpose of driving China into a war panic.57
The deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations is certainly not conducive to China’s effort to
secure its periphery. China’s foreign policy establishment has been worried that the foundations
are being set now for long-term aggressive competition with the United States. This is not some-
thing that these Chinese leaders want to see. However, handling relations with the United States
has always been difficult for the Chinese leaders since the end of the Cold War. Many Chinese
leaders, particularly those in the PLA, have been deeply suspicious about U.S. containment pol-
icy dressed as engagement. They have pointed out that while preaching strict Chinese compli-
ance with international arms control agreements in the name of regional stability, the United
States has increased its arms sales to Taiwan and strengthened its defense links with Japan and
South Korea. China has been particularly alarmed over the U.S. announcement to build the
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system covering the Asia-Pacific following a surprise North
Korean rocket test in 1998. TMD may not only be used to protect Taiwan from Chinese missiles
but also to give Japan a more active role in regional security matters. The U.S. military interven-
tion in Yugoslavia has seriously fed China’s paranoia about Taiwan and Tibet. To add to this
concern, China has seen the decision by the Philippine Senate on May 28, 1999 to reopen its ter-
ritory for joint exercises with U.S. forces as another link in an American chain of containment
against China. China has been particularly apprehensive about the shift of the U.S. military and
strategic focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific, which would have serious consequence on Chi-
na’s periphery policy. An article in Beijing’s Liaowang Zhoukan (Outlook Weekly) speculated
that in the Asian-Pacific Region, “following the ‘new US-Japanese defense guidelines,’ the
United States will step up its deployment of Theater Missile Defense and strengthen its military
alliance, and the possibility of the establishment of an ‘eastern NATO’ cannot be ruled out.” It
further indicated that
In line with the shift of the focus of US military strategy from Europe to Asia, the
US military will redeploy its forces in the west Pacific, step up activities by mili-
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tary planes and ships, expand the scope and frequency of its aggressive reconnais-
sance against China, and step up activities for advance military probing.58
China cannot change the U.S. forward deployment and the web of alliance in Asia, at
least in the foreseeable future. Therefore, working with the United States is not a choice but a
necessity. Beijing has to find ways to stabilize relations with the United States in order to create
a favorable regional environment for its periphery policy. Confrontation with the United States
will not only complicate China’s periphery policy but also render a high cost for its moderniza-
tion efforts. As one Western reporter pointed out, “the direction of Beijing’s relations with the
United States could exert a strong influence on China’s development plans, forcing funds to be
funneled into defense spending instead of economic growth.”59
Conclusion
To establish and maintain a peaceful security environment in its periphery, China has
tried to appear as a benign power that focused on economic development and has tried to im-
prove relations with its Asian neighbors. However, it has been assertive and even belligerent
when dealing with issues relating to what it considers as vital national interests, such as territo-
rial disputes. These two-pronged efforts have often transmitted conflicting signals to its neigh-
bors and make it difficult for China to meet the challenges discussed above. The disparity
between China’s belligerent behavior and “benign” face may bring uncertainties ahead in the
Asia-Pacific, particularly considering the rapid growth of China’s economic and military power
toward the 21st century. China could become more assertive in taking back Taiwan and resolving
maritime disputes in its own terms. China’s regional rivals and weaker neighbors would have to
be more concerned about China’s might and threats. China’s growing power could also rub
against longstanding U.S. interests in Asia.
However, this situation has not seemed to bother Beijing’s leaders very much. They have
become more confident in dealing with their neighbors because of the increase in China’s eco-
nomic and military capacity. In his summary of the security environment for China’s rise in the
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Asia-Pacific, a Chinese scholar, Yan Xuetong, stated that China and its neighbors have shared
the goal of their security strategy, as all of them have wanted to maintain regional peace and sta-
bility. It is not a surprise to any country that China as big power wants to be placed in an advan-
tageous position in the strategic balance. This is a normal interest and demand in international
politics and will not pose a threat to the security of other states. “China has shared certain com-
mon security interests with all peripheral countries and has no conflict in the overall interest with
any countries although there are some contradictions in national border and reunification
issues.”60 But it remains to be seen if this optimistic view can prevail.
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2001, especially Matthew Evangelista and Judith Reppy, as well as the members of the German
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160
JAPAN’S REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY
IN POST-COLD WAR ASIA
Lisa J. Sansoucy
Introduction: From Bilateralism to Multilateralism1
Japan’s approach to regional relations in Asia has often been characterized as economic
multilateralism combined with security bilateralism.2 However, in 1991 this dichotomy began to
blur when, after years of opposition, Japanese leaders began to support multilateral approaches
to the region’s security problems as well. One example of this change in position is the diplo-
matic initiative known as the Nakayama Initiative. Under the leadership of Foreign Minister
Nakayama Taro, Japan proposed the creation of a new regional multilateral security dialogue
that would build on the existing Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN).3 Prior to the Nakayama Initiative, like their American counter-
parts, Japanese leaders had been firmly opposed to the development of multilateral security insti-
tutions in Asia, fearing that these would undermine Japan’s alliance with the United States.
Why did Japan change its position vis a vis Asian security multilateralism in the early
1990s? One reason is that in the wake of the Gulf War, Japan incurred heavy criticism for what
many countries termed its “checkbook diplomacy,” or its failure to contribute personnel to the
multinational coalition assembled in the Gulf. In response to the criticism that Japan had been
“self-indulgent” during the crisis and engaged in “contemptible tokenism,” Japanese policy
makers were keen to show the United States that they could take the initiative diplomatically in
161
4 For an overview of the effects of the Gulf War on Japanese foreign policy, see Courtney Pur-
rington, “Tokyo’s Policy Responses During the Gulf War and the Impact of the ‘Iraqi Shock’ on
Japan,” Pacific Affairs 65 (Summer 1992): 161-81. For an analysis of the effect of the Gulf War
on U.S.-Japan relations, see Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japan Relations Throughout His-
tory (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 385-89; For a sampling of the criticism of Japanese
foreign policy after the Gulf War, see Robert J. Samuelson, “The Japan Problem,” Washington
Post, April 10, 1991; and Richard Cohen, “No Time for Hubris,” Washington Post, February 28,
1991. The “tokenism” quote is from Senator John McCain in 1990, quoted in LaFeber, The
Clash, p. 388; Interview No. 6, October, 2000, Tokyo.
5 Jurek Martin, “Adding Up the Security Equation,” Financial Times, June 5, 1990, p. 23.
6 United States Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, U.S. Security
Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, DC: February 1995).
7 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan and Asian-Pacific Security: Regionalization,
Entrenched Bilateralism and Incipient Multilateralism,” Pacific Review 14, pt. 2 (2001): 165-94.
8 Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role,” p. 387.
contributing to the maintenance of global security.4 In addition, they feared that with the end of
the cold war and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the United States would withdraw mili-
tarily from the region in the early 1990s. These fears were not unfounded. In 1990, the United
States announced that it would make a ten percent reduction of its forces in the region.5 Ameri-
can forces also withdrew from the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines in 1992. America’s
intentions regarding its long-term military commitment to the Asian region were not publicly
clarified until 1995 when the so-called Nye Report, “U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-
Pacific Region,” was published.6 From the perspective of Tokyo, then, multilateralism was a use-
ful tool to keep the United States engaged in the region and to respond to American demands for
increased burden sharing.
Although Foreign Minister Nakayama’s efforts to create a regional security dialogue met
with only lukewarm support from ASEAN, as Peter Katzenstein notes, his diplomatic overtures
did have three important effects on the security policies of the major powers in the region.7 First,
the Nakayama Initiative propelled ASEAN into developing plans to set up its own multilateral
security dialogue as part of the ASEAN-PMC. These plans eventually materialized into the
ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994.8 Second, Japan’s support for multilateralism in the early
1990s nudged the United States into changing its own position toward multilateral security
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arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region.9 Finally, the Nakayama Initiative gave Prime Minister
Miyazawa K§chi some political capital and maneuvering room in pushing for multilateral secu-
rity initiatives in the early 1990s. These included the passage of the United Nations Peace-
keeping Cooperation Bill in 1992 and Japan’s contribution of unarmed Self-Defense Force
(SDF) personnel and civilian police to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC).10 Nakayama’s proposal failed to materialize, as Paul Midford has noted, but it did set
the stage for the later establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum.11
To date, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only multilateral security institution
in the Asian region. It was founded in July 1994 by the six ASEAN member states at the time:
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand and ASEAN’s seven dia-
logue partners: the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, and the
European Community. The ARF was designed as a means for consultations among member
states on regional political and security issues. It was based on an extension of the already insti-
tutionalized Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) within ASEAN. The ARF was originally com-
posed of the six ASEAN states, the seven dialogue partners, plus the states that ASEAN wanted
to engage: Russia, China, Vietnam, and Laos. Its goals are to increase confidence-building mea-
sures, preventive diplomacy, non-proliferation, and arms control in the Asian region.12 The ARF
also operates both inter-sessional support groups (ISG) and inter-sessional meetings (ISM),
governmental working groups that focus on defense white papers, military observers, military
exercises, the South China Sea, the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone, and peacekeeping
operations.13
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Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), pp. 287-324.
14 The textbook euphemistically argues that “the Japanese Imperial Army advanced southwards
to liberate countries from European colonialism.” See, “Most Japanese School Districts Reject
Disputed History Textbook,” New York Times, August 16, 2001, p. A5.
In addition to pressures from the United States for increased burden-sharing, Japanese
security policy makers faced two major obstacles in formulating policy toward the ARF. The
first is the “Japan Problem,” or the ways in which the history of Japan’s wartime aggression in
the region continues to constrain its current security policy options. The second is the “China
Problem,” or the lack of consensus among Japanese security policy makers over the nature of
Chinese power and intentions. Both of these policy problems are explained in greater depth
below.
The Japan Problem: “A Difficult Neighbor”
In constructing security policy toward the Asian region, Japanese policy makers are con-
strained by the legacies of the past. Japan’s history of aggression and colonialism in the region
makes neighboring states extremely wary of any increases in Japan’s military activities in the
region. These constraints operate across both Northeast and Southeast Asia. For example, when
the Japanese government recently approved a new revisionist history textbook that glosses over
Japan’s wartime atrocities in the region, the South Korean, North Korean, and Chinese govern-
ments registered strong protests. The textbook, created by Japan’s nationalist Society for History
Textbook Reform, was approved by the Japanese government in April 2001. Among other occlu-
sions, it fails to mention that Japan invaded China in 1932, that the Japanese Army carried out
large-scale civilian massacres in Nanjing in 1937, and that tens of thousands of Asian women
were forced into sexual slavery by imperial Japanese forces in the 1930s and 1940s.14 South
Korea’s reaction to the Japanese government’s refusal to order revisions in the textbook makes
clear the linkage between historical memory and security policy in the region. Seoul promptly
recalled its ambassador to Tokyo, cancelled a planned joint military exercise with Japan, and the
South Korean National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution demanding that the govern-
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ment block Japan’s campaign for a seat on the United Nations Security Council.15 In Southeast
Asia as well, Japan’s initiatives in the region continue to be hamstrung by the specters of the
past. For example, when Japan stepped up its exports to Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s
during the era of high economic growth, many Southeast Asian leaders viewed this as a continu-
ation of Japan’s colonial designs on the region in another guise.16 When Prime Minister Tanaka
Kakuei visited the region in 1974 he was greeted with anti-Japanese demonstrations and boycotts
of Japanese goods throughout the region. In Bangkok and Jakarta, these turned violent.17
As the vehemence of the Korean, Chinese, and Southeast Asian reactions show, Japanese
policies toward the Asian region reverberate within an echo chamber in which the cries of the
victims of Imperial Japan can still be heard. This is particularly well illustrated by the ongoing
struggles of the Asian “comfort women” to gain recognition and compensation from the Japa-
nese government. Between 1931 and 1945, approximately 200,000 Korean, Chinese, Taiwanese,
Okinawan, Indonesian, East Timorese, Malaysian, Filipino, and Dutch women and girls were
kidnapped and forced to become sex workers in a system of “comfort stations” that the Japanese
government arranged for its imperial army troops invading Asia. For almost 50 years the Japa-
nese government steadfastly denied the existence of this state-organized system of slavery and
brothels in its former colonies, and the Japanese Ministry of Education required that all text-
books delete references to it. This historical amnesia continued until 1993 when a professor at
Tokyo’s Chuo University dug up and made public some government documents from the ar-
chives of the Japanese Defense Agency that clearly incriminated the Japanese government and
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the imperial army at the highest levels.18 Outraged by the Japanese government’s refusal to offer
an apology and compensation, in December 2000 a network of surviving “comfort women” from
eight countries and their supporters organized the “Women’s International War Crimes Tribu-
nal” in Tokyo.19 The Tokyo Tribunal concluded that Emperor Hirohito was guilty of a crime
against humanity for allowing the sexual enslavement of Asian women during World War II.
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, still refuses to acknowledge the grievances of the
“comfort women” for fear of a wave of compensation claims against the Japanese government
from other World War II-era forced laborers. For Japan then, as Russians were fond of saying
during the Stalinist era, “the trouble with the past is that you never know what you’ll find in it.”20
From a policy perspective, the role that historical memory plays in constraining contem-
porary Japanese security policy may be termed “the Japan Problem.” Asian neighbors react to
the prevalence of kotonakareshugi in Japanese society, which literally translates as “let there be
no incidents-ism,” or the tendency to avoid problems and frictions at all costs.21 This failure
within Japanese domestic society to openly discuss and reconcile the issues of war guilt and
responsibility for World War II makes other Asian nations suspicious of Japan. As Han Sung
Joo, South Korea’s former foreign minister noted, “the German question has been more or less
settled. In Asia, however, Japan remains a difficult neighbor.”22
Within Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), however, there is a faction of secu-
rity policy makers who are sensitive to the “Japan Problem.” These are often senior diplomats of
the World War II generation who feel a moral liability toward their Asian neighbors for Japan’s
past aggression. Perhaps the best example is Satoh Yukio, who is now Japan’s representative to
166
23 Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Between Realism and Idealism in Japanese Security Policy: The Case of
the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Pacific Review 10, no. 4 (1997): 494.
24 Satoh Yukio, “Emerging Trends in Asia-Pacific Security: The Role of Japan,” Pacific Review
8, no. 2 (1995): 270-71.
25 Satoh Yukio, “Emerging Trends,” pp. 273-74.
26 Kawasaki, “Between Realism and Idealism,” p. 493; Satoh “Emerging Trends,” p. 273.
27 Satoh, “Emerging Trends,” p. 273.
the United Nations. At the time ARF policy was being constructed, he was MOFA’s Director-
General of the Information Analysis, Research, and Planning Division. Satoh and others within
the MOFA recognized that Japan suffered from a negative reputation in the region and that this
would hamper any Japanese attempts at regional institution building. They also knew that neigh-
boring states, especially China, would be unnecessarily provoked if Japan were to take the lead
in establishing a multilateral regional security institution. So they welcomed ASEAN’s move to
expand the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) into a wider regional security dialogue
in 1993.23 They also emphasized that existing security arrangements in the region would be
maintained, most importantly the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States. They argued
that, in addition to its basic deterrence function, the bilateral alliance would continue to serve as
the foundation of Japan’s security policy and an important regional mechanism to reduce suspi-
cions of Japan.24
Satoh and his colleagues also believed that multilateralism could complement the exist-
ing bilateral arrangements in the region and serve to ease suspicions of Japan. Satoh was con-
vinced that it was important for Japan “to place [it]self in multilateral venues, wherein the coun-
tries which are worried about the future direction of Japanese defence policy can express their
concern.”25 Multilateral security dialogues that conveyed Japan’s peaceful intentions in the
region were necessary, and the ARF could function as an effective venue for that purpose.26 In
such fora, the countries of the region could discuss ways to enhance the transparency of defense
programs, to control conventional arms transfers, and to promote the non-proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction.27 Regional security dialogues were an important policy tool, Satoh
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argued, because they could also reduce the anxiety of other Asian countries that Japan would
become a military power.28
That the effects of the “Japan Problem” can be mitigated through multilateralism is a
conclusion shared by other members of Japan’s security policy community. For example, Soeya
Yoshihide, Professor of Political Science at Tokyo’s Keio University, argues that if Japan wants
to play an increasingly activist role on the international stage in the post-cold war era, it can only
do so within the framework of multilateral institutions. “In order for Japan to play a larger and
constructive role in regional security it needs to cope with this deep distrust and fear of a reasser-
tive Japan. One diplomatic alternative for Japan is to institutionalise its presence in a regional
network of interdependence and mutual restraint, and to strengthen such a system in the security
realm.”29 Soeya also argues that it is important for Japan to incorporate assurances into its secu-
rity policy that history will not repeat itself and to emphasize the strength of its security alliance
with the United States.30
More specifically, in developing Japan’s policy toward the Forum, MOFA officials iden-
tified three major powers in the region as the primary target states to be engaged through the
ARF: China, the United States, and Japan.31 Satoh articulated this engagement strategy in the
form of three questions: 1) “How far will the United States reduce its military presence?”;
2) “How far will Japan expand its influence?”; and 3) “How far will China extend its military
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capability?”32 He saw in the ARF an opportunity to reduce the level of uncertainty and distrust
between these three states and to enhance political transparency in the region.33 MOFA officials
hoped that through the ARF, Japan, China, and the United States would be able to reassure each
other of their non-aggressive intentions and to increase the transparency of their intentions,
thereby maintaining the stability of the status quo.34
Thus, the main tenets of Satoh’s comprehensive approach to post-cold war Asian security
may be summarized as follows. Japan should: 1) promote the stability of the U.S.-Japan alliance;
2) promote the stability among China, Japan, and the United States; 3) recognize that no major
antagonistic relationship exists in the region, except on the Korean peninsula; 4) eliminate sus-
picion, uneasiness, and distrust in the region; 5) encourage the inclusion of non-traditional secu-
rity issues, such as the environment and migration, in security dialogues; and 6) encourage non-
governmental Track II cooperation and dialogues.35
Security policy makers such as Satoh who are sensitive to the “Japan Problem” sought to
address it by building into their policies what I would call “self-binding” mechanisms. Despite
the fact that the alliance between Japan and the United States continues to play an important role
in the region of reassuring Japan’s neighbors, Japanese policy makers explicitly sought to con-
struct in the ARF a multilateral security institution that was targeted, at least in part, against
itself.36 Satoh and his colleagues at the MOFA recognized the tactical importance of the ARF, for
example, as a tool to engage China and Russia, but they also included a normative element in
their policy, acknowledging Japan’s moral responsibility toward the countries it had once victim-
ized in the region. For example, Satoh notes that “It is undeniable . . . that a strong sense of guilt
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about the Japanese aggression has been working behind Japan’s policy toward China for a long
time, even after the normalization of relations.”37 Satoh also argues that the Japanese public
should have a correct understanding of what Japan did in the 1930s and 1940s and cites the
importance of accurately teaching the next generation about Japan’s recent past as a way to
enhance the level of reassurance among the countries of the region.
The China Problem: Partner or Adversary?38
Multilateral institution building also brought with it another familiar problem for Japa-
nese security policy makers: how to engage the traditional center of power in Asia, namely,
China. Uncertainty about China’s many sovereignty disputes—for example, in the East and
South China Sea—as well as its ongoing military modernization, missile technology prolifera-
tion activities abroad, and the missile build-up along the Taiwan Strait, are all of great concern to
Japanese policy makers.39 In fact, one of the first questions raised in formulating the Nakayama
Initiative was whether China should be included as a member in a regional multilateral security
institution. At first, Japan opposed the inclusion of Russia, and the three socialist states in the
region, China, North Korea, and Vietnam. It envisioned the institution as an American-led coali-
tion aimed at containing the socialist states in the region. As early as the mid-1980s, Mikhail
Gorbachev had made diplomatic overtures to Japan promoting a regional multilateral security di-
alogue based on the 1975 European Security Conference held in Helsinki. In parallel with Soviet
troop reductions in Europe, Gorbachev sought to push disarmament eastward into the Pacific.40
In an important policy speech made in July 1986 from Vladivastok, Gorbachev proposed the cre-
ation of a Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) modeled on the European Con-
ference for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). However, his proposal failed to gain Japa-
nese support. Until 1991, the MOFA was firmly opposed to including the Soviet Union in any
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kind of regional multilateral security institution for fear that this would undermine the U.S. pres-
ence in the region and ratify the existing territorial status quo with respect to the Northern Terri-
tories. These four islands of the Kurile island chain north of Hokkaido were occupied by the So-
viet Union at the close of World War II and continue to be jointly claimed by the Soviet Union
and Japan.41 The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, and the democratic transfor-
mation in Russia that followed, allowed Japan to de-link its China policy from its Russian policy
after 1991. The end of the cold war also strengthened the hand of those Asianists in the MOFA
who supported Chinese membership in the ARF.42 Thus, there was a fundamental shift in
MOFA’s thinking about security multilateralism in 1993. Prior to 1993, Japanese support for
multilateralism, exemplified by the Nakayama Initiative, was aimed at keeping the United States
engaged in the region and checking its isolationist tendencies. After 1993 MOFA’s strategy
shifted to using security multilateralism as a tool to engage China.43
Japan’s security policy community, however, was still deeply split over how to treat Chi-
na. Reminiscent of the debate among U.S. Soviet specialists in the 1960s and 1970s regarding
the nature of Soviet power (totalitarian vs. authoritarian), the debate among Japan’s China spe-
cialists since the end of the cold war has hinged on the nature of Chinese power and intentions.
Analysts within the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) regarded China as an expansionist power
that should be treated as a potential adversary. Hence, they argued that the ARF should be
directed against it.44 They were primarily concerned with the balance of power in the Asia-
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Pacific region between China and Russia, on the one hand, and Japan and the United States, on
the other. They saw the ASEAN Regional Forum as purely symbolic, useful only as a tactical
tool in bargaining with China and Russia.45 They also saw the ARF as a vehicle by which Japan
could deepen its relationship with ASEAN and other maritime states such as Australia and
strengthen its strategic position vis a vis China.46 JDA analysts group states into two categories.
The first is potential (or latent) adversaries (senzaiteki tekisei koku); and the second is actual
adversaries (kenzaiteki tekisei koku). In the case of China, which they classified as a potential,
but not yet actual adversary, they concluded that Japan could use the regular contact provided by
the ARF to discourage China from becoming an actual adversary.47
Analysts within Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, argued that China
was a status quo power that should be treated as a partner. With respect to the ARF, they argued
that the multilateral forum should include China.48 Given that the MOFA is the most powerful
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actor in security policy formulation in Japan, its vision of engaging China as a partner in regional
security prevailed.49 This can be seen, for example, in the Ministry’s steadfast avoidance of the
term “confidence building measures” (CBMs) in its regional diplomacy, since CBMs imply a
relationship between adversaries (e.g. Israel and the Palestinian Authority). Instead, Japanese
officials were careful to use the terms anshin zairyÇ, “sources of assurance,” and anshin no kÇyÇ,
“increased feelings of assurance,” in constructing their ARF policy.50 Satoh, for example, was
careful not to isolate China as the problem in the region’s security, and explicitly denied that
China was a military threat.51 Indeed, in keeping with Japan’s comprehensive approach to na-
tional security, the MOFA defined the nature of the Chinese threat in broader terms, including
problems stemming from economic dislocations, environmental pollution, and energy short-
ages.52 In the end, Japan’s ARF Policy did not explicitly identify China as an adversary, while at
the same time it built in measures for transparency, or “self-binding mechanisms,” that would
reassure China of Japan’s non-aggressive intentions. In order to reduce tensions between the
United States, China, and Japan, the MOFA wanted to collaborate with other states, particularly
with China, in disclosing military information. They also wanted the ARF to implement trans-
parency measures by which every member state would share quality information regarding their
own military programs.53
Thus, Japan’s ARF policy was constructed with two audiences in mind. On the one hand,
Japanese foreign policy makers were mindful of pressures from the United States to take on a
greater role in the maintenance of regional security and, on the other hand, they wanted to en-
gage China. In the case of the ARF, the way that these two sets of imperatives were reconciled
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was to introduce “self-binding” mechanisms, including assurances that Japan would not become
a military power, into Japan’s regional policy in order to reassure the Chinese and wider Asian
audience.
Conclusion: the Future of Asian Security
Since Japan’s defeat in World War II, Japanese leaders have placed highest priority in
their foreign relations on the maintenance of good relations with the United States.54 While high-
ly contested at times, the Security Treaty with the United States signed in 1951 and renewed in
1960 remains the most important institution for the maintenance of East Asian regional security
and the foundation of Japan’s external security strategy. It is likely that in the near term, rather
than be displaced by a multilateral security institution such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, co-
operation between the United States and Japan will increase on regional security on issues such
as the Korean Peninsula, East Timor, and the dismantling of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear
weapons’ arsenals, within the framework of the bilateral alliance.55 Evidence of this trend toward
regional security cooperation between the United States and Japan can be seen, for example, in
the September 1997 revision of the original 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Coopera-
tion which provides for the expansion of Japan’s defense perimeter beyond the 1,000 nautical
mile limit agreed to in 1981. The perimeter is now defined very flexibly to include, “situations in
areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”56
Another important development in the Asian security environment is the increased regional
activities of Japan’s police force. Japanese civilian police took part in the 1993 United Nations
Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia, for example, and Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA)
has been active in organizing regional police cooperation in the areas of drug control, transna-
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tional crime, and terrorism.57 Policing is an area in which Japan excels and can contribute to
regional security without amending Article Nine, the war renunciation clause, of its constitution.
It is thus a politically expedient way for Japan to enhance its security in the region while at the
same time responding to increased calls for burden-sharing from the United States.
Albeit for different reasons, all the major powers in the region, Japan, China, Russia,
ASEAN, and the United States, agree on the importance of maintaining the U.S. military pres-
ence in the region.58 One of the interesting discontinuities in Japanese security policy since the
end of the cold war, however, is an explicit willingness on the part of Japanese leaders to ac-
knowledge the “Japan Problem” discussed above, i.e., how historical memory thwarts Japan’s
ability to take on a leadership role in the region. As one observer noted, “During the cold war . . .
Japan didn’t have to face the issues of the past. We could always get by just ignoring it. Japan
was under the umbrella of the United States and America settled Japan’s Asian issues.”59 Now
that Japan is taking a more assertive role in the region, it is clear that its leaders also have to
come up with a new formula for addressing Japan’s problems in Asia. Japan’s attempts to
resolve these issues through multilateralism in Southeast Asia may prove to be a model for
tackling some of the more difficult security problems in Northeast Asia in the future, such as the
Northern Territories dispute.
In promoting the creation of a security institution that is in part targeted against itself, we
can also see movement in Japan’s security policy toward the kind of strategy used by Germany
for addressing questions of war guilt. As Thomas Berger argues in his analysis of German and
Japanese strategic culture, “German state elites have sought to lock in a reconstructed German
identity—pacified, democratic, and internationalist—by linking this identity to regional and mul-
tilateral institutions.”60 In Japan’s post-cold war security policy we can see a similar phenome-
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non at work. There is an attempt on the part of Japanese state elites to do something analogous to
the German example, to lock in a reconstructed, pacified Japanese state identity by tying it to
regional institutions.61 In fact, Satoh makes explicit that he is modeling Japan’s post-cold war
security policy on that of Germany. He states, “it is important for Japan to place [it]self in multi-
lateral venues, wherein the countries which are worried about the future direction of Japanese
defense policy can express their concern. Here, Japan can learn from what the former Federal
Republic of Germany had been doing since the end of the Second World War.”62
In designing Japan’s regional security strategy in the early 1990s, I would argue that
MOFA officials were engaged in the politics of post-Cold War national identity reconstruction.
By building self-binding mechanisms into their policy, MOFA officials were implicitly acknowl-
edging Japan’s war guilt at a time when this issue is still very sensitive in Japan’s domestic poli-
tics. In the German case, we see that the process of national identity reconstruction has been
going on steadily throughout the post-war period.63 German state identity has become increas-
ingly trans-nationalized and Europeanized through regional institutions during the post-war
period.64 However, this process is just now getting under way in Japan and Asia, with important
implications for the future of Asian security.
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THE CHANGING SECURITY PICTURE IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST
Cristina Chuen
Although Russia’s participation in northeast Asian security issues has been minimal dur-
ing the past decade, its role is likely to increase in the near future. What this function will entail
is still unclear and open to outside influence: without increased positive engagement (including
international assistance to Russia’s Far Eastern regions and support for improved Russian ties
with Japan and Korea), the likelihood that Russia will become a destabilizing force increases
dramatically. With some support, Russia might instead serve as a stabilizer in the Pacific.
This paper examines the Russian state at two levels, investigating how the military secu-
rity of northeast Asian nations affected by their relationship both with Moscow and with the
Russian regions. A brief look at the state of the economy and crime in Russia’s border regions
suggests that without a large influx of investment capital—whether Russian or foreign—basic
infrastructure such as roads and electricity provision will collapse, and Russia’s economy will no
longer be able to continue “muddling through,” as it has done for nearly a decade. A collapse
would have grave security implications. Adding to the peril is the sorry state of military bases
and the military industry in the Russian Far East, along with the risk that military equipment will
be smuggled or sold to other Asian nations. An economic rebound, on the other hand, could
encourage legal sales of military equipment to Asia. Whatever the outcome—economic growth
or collapse—interactions with East Asia on the national and subnational level will inevitably in-
crease. What those interactions entail depends upon the range of possible relationships open to
Russia in East Asia, whether in the political, economic, or security spheres.
Other states can have a great deal of influence over the options and choices of both
national and subnational actors in Russia. Therefore it is important that the international com-
munity understand not only Russia’s national strategic goals but also its economic and security
needs, along with those of substate actors in the Russian Far East. Economic changes will have
an especially strong effect on the military units and military industries located in the Russian Far
East. These domestic actors can in turn affect the national security policies Moscow develops.
Russia and its regions need the opportunity to play a positive role in East Asia, and need to inter-
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1 Suisheng Zhao discusses China’s interest in developing a “regional multipolarization,” in
which China would play an important balancing role. Russia may not regard China as a balancer,
but has recognized its strength and the ability of the two nations to balance the United States in
some multilateral forums when they adopt common policies. See Suisheng Zhao, “China’s
Periphery Policy and Changing Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in this
volume.
2 Should Bush and Putin make deeper cuts in nuclear weapons, an issue discussed in Randall
Forsberg’s paper in this volume, Russia’s military industry can only benefit, making it less likely
act with East Asian nations other than China. And these nations must in turn pay attention to
Russian substate actors. Otherwise Russia may be boxed into a corner and act in ways detri-
mental to the security of the region.
Russia’s Policies in Asia
Recent statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin have emphasized the importance
Russia places on its relationships in Asia. The motive is both geopolitical and domestic: Moscow
and Beijing are increasingly cooperating to bolster the positions of both nations in international
organizations, while the future in terms of economy and security for the 75 percent of Russia that
lies in Asia is strongly influenced by the mutual relationships of these two vast regions.1 To date,
Russia has only been able fully to engage China in security and economic issues, and in this ef-
fort the center exercises only partial control. Russia has also made attempts to engage Japan,
South Korea, or North Korea, but these have foundered at both the national and subnational lev-
els. While the region may not need Russia to serve as a stabilizer, it would certainly be harmed
by Russian instability. In order to decrease the likelihood that Russia might play a negative role,
it is in the interest of the international community to respond to Russian overtures, involving
Russia in more bilateral relationships and multilateral efforts in the region.
Russia’s security doctrine, by promoting the country as a major power mediating interna-
tional disputes, implies that it acts as a stabilizer in Asia. Yet that same doctrine requires the
maintenance of fairly high levels of power projection capability in the region. Should the mili-
tary be unable to maintain these levels, instability could well result. Russian military enterprises
are often ordered to fulfill central defense orders even when Moscow does not finance them,
further endangering the factories’ positions, and forcing them to find other ways to make
money.2
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to resort to illegal sales or to push legal sales of more sophisticated equipment.
3 In July 2000, for instance, Primorye Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko was invited to accom-
pany Putin on a visit to North Korea, reportedly reflecting the heavy stress that Moscow’s Asian
security policy places on direct regional affiliations. “Komandirovka v sostave delegatsii prezi-
denta Rossii” [A Business Trip as a Member of the Russian President’s Delegation], Rybak
Primorya, 21 July 2000, http://ribak.vladivostok.com, accessed 30 July 2001. In April 2001,
Khabarovsk Governor Viktor Ishayev went to Japan as head of the Russian delegation to the
Pacific Basin Economic Council, and held talks with Japanese businessmen. “Khabarovsk
Governor to Head Russian Delegation to Pacific Economic Council,” Interfax, 6 April 2001.
Regional Influence Over Foreign Policy
While the regional role in Russian foreign policy is small, it does exist, and may indeed
increase if the economy should change, either positively or negatively. Regional authorities’ eco-
nomic and political interactions with domestic and foreign actors can and do affect central poli-
cies. For example, regional leaders often take trips to foreign countries, most often to promote
trade. The center encourages such travel in the hopes that increased foreign trade will help shore
up the local economy.3 Should these trips promote arms sales not previously approved by Mos-
cow, however, the regional efforts can affect national policy, since the central government often
shies away from irritating a friendly nation by denying it the right to conclude contracts already
approved at the local level. In some instances, regional governors have even gone so far as to
speak on issues clearly within the purview of the federal government: the former governor of
Primorye fought for several years over the demarcation of the Russo-Chinese border in his
region, and had a souring effect on bilateral talks between the two nations at that time.
Central Attempts to Control the Regions
The center has been well aware of the problem of independent regional action, and has
periodically reasserted its authority during the past decade. One of the first such attempts was the
establishment of presidential representatives in 1991, after a few regions were given the right to
elect governors. However, regional interests captured many of the presidential representatives
(causing the representatives to work, in effect, as regional representatives to Moscow, not vice
versa), while regional actors stymied the actions of others or the center sacrificed them in order
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4 For instance, the first presidential representative to Primorye, Valeriy Butov, fought against
Governor Nazdratenko’s administration and was relieved of his duties by President Yeltsin on 4
January 1994. The next presidential representative to Primorye, Vladimir Ignatenko, acted as
Primorye’s advocate, not a representative of central concerns. On 23 May 1997, the Kremlin
changed course and appointed an enemy of Nazdratenko’s, local FSB head Viktor Kondratov, as
presidential representative to Primorye. Despite significant central support, Kondratov was
unable to effect any changes in Primorye, and was removed from office on 23 February 1999. On
22 October 1999, Valentin Kuzov, formerly one of Nazdratenko’s deputy governors, was ap-
pointed as presidential representative to Primorye. Territorial administration press service, Zolo-
toi Rog 12 January 1994, p. 3; Marina Loboda, “O vlastnykh kreslakh ya nikogda ne mechtal” [I
Never Dreamed of Powerful Positions], Vladivostok, 29 May 1997, http://vl.vladnews.ru,
accessed 30 July 2001; “Prezent Kondratovu ot prezidenta” [A Present for Kondratov From the
President], Vladivostok, 25 February 1999, http://vl.vladnews.ru, accessed 30 July 2001; Yev-
geniy Itarov, “Svershilos, kogda uzh i ne zhdali” [It Happened When We Least Expected It],
Zolotoy rog, 22 October 1999, http://www.zrpress.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
5 ITAR-TASS, 29 September 1996, as cited in Greg Austin and Alexey Muraviev, The Armed
Forces of Russia in Asia (London: Tauris, 2000), p. 23.
6 Austin and Muraviev, The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia, p. 26.
to appease the governors.4 By 1996, then Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov told a Duma
committee grappling with the problem of regional government actions that run counter to na-
tional policy that a “strict definition and distribution of powers between bodies of state authority
of the Russian Federation and its subjects is, probably, the most important problem of the con-
struction of the Russian state at present.”5
Three further changes under former president Boris Yeltsin gave the governors a great
deal of clout in dealing with Moscow and greater room for independent action. First, he main-
tained harmony with the regions through a variety of bilateral treaties and agreements. Second,
he changed the way the upper house of parliament was formed: in 1995 the selection method of
the 198 members of the upper house changed to provide for the automatic membership of the 89
governors and 89 regional parliament heads. Third, beginning in 1996, all regional governors
were chosen by direct election. Their importance was enhanced further via the important role
they played in helping Yeltsin win the 1996 presidential election.6
Vladimir Putin came to power riding on a war against separatism in Chechnya, and
avowed that he would reassert a national hierarchy. Instead of continuing Yeltsin’s efforts to
increase the ability of the public to control local government from below, he tried to increase
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7 Steven Solnick, “The New Federal Structure: More Centralized, or More of the Same?” Pro-
gram on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series, No. 161, October 2000,
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/Solnick161.html, accessed 30 July
2001.
8 Vadim Sukhoverkhov, “Polpredy ‘sozhrali’ Kreml” [Presidential Representatives ‘Devoured’
the Kremlin], Moskovskiy komsomolets, 17 February 2001, pp. 1-2.
9 Emil Pain, “The Evolution of Center-Periphery Relations in Russia: From Yeltsin to Putin,”
Center for Nonproliferation Studies Seminar, Monterey Institute of International Relations, 2
March 2001.
accountability to the center. By an edict prepared in secret, he divided Russia into seven large
federal districts, and appointed a presidential representative, sometimes called a governor-
general or viceroy, with the “functions” of “coordination, control and harmonization,” to each
federal district. This step followed a plan originally considered by Yeltsin in 1997, designed to
increase presidential representatives’ independence.7 Unfortunately, their duties and powers were
not well defined in the edict. Their clearest mandate was to eliminate or reform regional laws
that conflicted with the Russian constitution.8 Presumably the presidential representatives were
also supposed to make regional governors conform to national foreign policy, although how they
were to do so is unclear. Further, Putin changed the way members of the upper house of parlia-
ment were selected: governors themselves would no longer sit on the Federation Council, but
would instead each appoint a delegate; another delegate would be appointed by regional legis-
latures. While this modification reduced the governors’ presence in Moscow somewhat, it also
gave them a permanent lobbyist in the capital. To date it is unclear that it has in any way fur-
thered Putin’s centralization effort.
Naturally, regional authorities have fought to retain their powers. Republics, which have
more rights than other types of regions in the Russian Federation, reacted to the new attempt to
force them to heed Moscow by increasing their support for nationalist movements on their terri-
tories.9 Further worsening the relationship between republics and the center were statements by
northwestern federal district presidential representative Viktor Cherkesov that the status of
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10 Mikhail Afanasev, “Litsa vlasti” [The Faces of Power], Izvestiya, 22 February 2001,
http://www.izvestia.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
11 Yevgeniy Krutikov, “Skhema slomana, vagonchik tronulsya” [System Smashed, Train Gets
Moving], Izvestiya, 20 May 2000, p. 1.
12 Sukhoverkhov, “Polpredy ‘sozhrali’ Kreml.”
republics would soon be eliminated (although the presidential representatives to the Volga and
North Caucasian federal districts quickly disavowed his claims).10
At first, the regions of the Russian Far East federal district, only one of which is a repub-
lic (Sakha-Yakutiya), cautiously welcomed their new presidential representative, Lieutenant
General Konstantin Pulikovskiy, who had become famous after his 1996 ultimatum to the popu-
lation of Groznyy, Chechnya, ordering them to abandon the capital within 48 hours.11 Regional
politicians had hoped that a representative with sufficient power might bring more central atten-
tion to local problems. While Pulikovskiy initially supported some regional views, he soon came
into conflict with the Far Eastern regions, in particular Primorye and Kamchatka.
Like presidential representatives in other districts, Pulikovskiy began to fight for ex-
panded powers for himself, in particular control over financial flows between the center and the
regions. The representatives sought control over bank transfers and investments, and tried to co-
ordinate foreign trade in their districts.12 Since the ties between local factories and local authori-
ties are of long standing, however, they have proven difficult to break. Military industries per-
haps balked most, for local politicians serve as factory advocates in Moscow and factory sales-
men abroad.
Instead of wooing industry, Pulikovskiy fought local politicians. This action appears not
to have been simply of his own doing, but part of a general Kremlin plan to oust independent
regional leaders, in particular through the late 2000/early 2001 elections. The presidential repre-
sentatives only met with limited success throughout Russia, however, and no success at all in the
Russian Far East. In the Kamchatka gubernatorial election, for example, a Kremlin-supported
candidate challenged the sitting governor’s candidate, and a third man—Communist Party head
Mikhail Mashkovtsev—won. In another case, Moscow set its sights on Primorye. In early 2001,
President Putin had a telephone conversation with Primorye governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko,
who then resigned, leading to pre-term gubernatorial elections in the kray. Nazdratenko was,
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13 In the spring, Pulikovskiy accompanied Putin in Vietnam. Viktoriya Sokolova, “Da, aziaty
my” [Yes, We are Asians], Izvestiya, 2 March 2001, http://www.izvestia.ru/, accessed 30 July
2001; in June, he traveled to China. “Putin’s envoy downbeat on plans to sell energy to China,”
ITAR-TASS, 9 June 2001.
14 Igor Verba, “Vertikal vlasti, ili shest dlya golykh ambitsiy” [The Vertical of Power, or a
Springboard for Empty Ambitions], Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 March 2001, in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
15 Oleg Zhunusov, “Plenipotentiary or Political Representative?” Izvestiya, 12 May 2001, in
FBIS Document CEP20010515000067.
however, given the post of head of the Russian Fisheries Committee, thus maintaining his im-
portance to the region. With Nazdratenko out of the way, presidential representative Pulikovskiy
quickly became involved in the details of managing the Primorye government. Right after the ex-
governor’s departure from Vladivostok, Pulikovskiy suggested that his vice governors resign as
well, and he appointed First Deputy Presidential Representative Gennadiy Apanasenko to be in
charge of the kray. Pulikovskiy has also had a strong influence over the Kamchatka government
since the communists came to power in January 2001: according to local complaints, he has
made it difficult for the new governor there to consolidate power, and has benefitted from the
power vacuum by increasing his own role in that area too.
Nevertheless, the Russian Far East is a very large region and Pulikovskiy has been
stretched thin trying to monitor all developments there. While he has made several foreign trips,
going to Vietnam in spring 2001 and to China in June, ostensibly to monitor Far Eastern gov-
ernors also traveling, he is of course unable to be present at every meeting or even have his
deputies attend all of them.13
Yet Pulikovskiy has still managed to find time to try influencing gubernatorial elections
in Amur and Primorye. The extremely dirty elections for governor of Amur region were won by
35-year-old State Duma deputy Leonid Korotkov in a run-off on 8 April 2001. Korotkov beat an
incumbent who appeared to have the reluctant support of Moscow. Although Pulikovskiy char-
acterized both candidates as “tarnished” (obgazhennyye),14 the presidential representative was
widely seen to have “lost” the Amur elections.15
As for the Primorskiy election, Pulikovskiy’s role was even clearer: he had his first dep-
uty, Apanasenko, pushed forward as a leading candidate. Although Pulikovskiy reportedly pres-
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16 Igor Vydrin, “Kholodnaya zima ili goryachiye vybory?” [A Cold Winter or Hot Elections?],
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 May 2001, http://www.ng.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
17 Tolstosheyn suggested that Pulikovskiy was involved in his reinstatement. Yevgeniy Lents,
“Full Circle; Everything Back the Way It Was in Maritime Kray,” Segodnya, 10 May 2001, as
translated in “Maritime Kray Deputy Governor Pre-Election Reinstatement Viewed,” FBIS
Document CEP20010511000289; Irina Nagornykh and Aleksey Chernyshev, “Primorskiy
uzhastik” [A Primorskiy Horror Flick], Kommersant-Vlast, 26 June 2001,
http://vlast.kommersant.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
18 Mayak Radio, 28 May 2001, in “Court to Determine Candidates for Regional Election Run-
offs,” FBIS Document CEP20010528000018.
sured kray authorities to support Apanasenko’s candidacy, acting governor Valentin Dubinin
instead ran for governor himself. In response, the presidential representative’s office stopped
supporting Dubinin, and was apparently involved in the reinstatement through the courts of
former first vice governor Konstantin Tolstosheyn. This turn of events was ironic, because it was
the presidential representative’s staff that had reportedly forced Tolstosheyn out of office after
Nazdratenko’s departure in the first place: they had received information from Lieutenant Gen-
eral Viktor Kondratov linking Tolstosheyn to local organized crime figures.16 (Kondratov was
the former Primorskiy presidential representative and head of the Kray Federal Security Service
[FSB].) But Toltosheyn became an Apanasenko supporter and was often seen together with
Pulikovskiy after his reinstatement. Thus Tolstosheyn now became acting governor while
Dubinin began campaigning for governor.17
Despite Pulikovskiy’s support, Apanasenko placed third in the 27 May election. He qual-
ified for the run-off election on 17 June after the second-place finisher, Viktor Cherepkov—no
favorite at the Kremlin—was disqualified for speeches in the mass media financed through unof-
ficial funds. Indeed, the entire election appears to have been rife with fraud. Citizens brought
court cases against both Apanasenko and front-runner Sergey Darkin: Apanasenko was charged
with using the administrative resources of his office and other irregularities, and Darkin with
offering voters T-shirts in exchange for votes. But in the end neither of these candidates was
disqualified.18 In the run-off, Darkin, who was supported by former governor Nazdratenko, won
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19 Igor Verba, "Primorye s novym gubernatorom?” [A New Governor for Maritime Kray?]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 June 2001, http://www.ng.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
20 “Ni odin iz nikh, ya by tak skazal, on ne podgotovlen sovershenno k tomy, chtoby on pravilno,
yuridicheski gramotno upravlyal toy territoriyey, na kotoroy ego izbrali grazhdane. A neko-
toryye izbralis dazhe sluchayno.” Konstantin Pulikovskiy, as cited in Anna Fedotova, REN-TV
news, 28 June 2001, as cited in “Konstantin Pulikovskiy vystupil na kollegii Minyusta” [Kon-
stantin Pulikovskiy Addressed the Ministry of Justice Collegium], in Monitoring Teleradioefira,
in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
21Anna Fedotova, REN-TV news, 28 June 2001.
22 Regions.ru, Moscow, 25 May 2001, http://www.regions.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
with 40.18 percent of the votes, while 24.31 percent voted for Gennadiy Apanasenko and 33.68
percent voted against both.19
After Darkin’s victory, Pulikovskiy called upon those who lost at the elections to stop
backing lawsuits against each other and support the new governor, but he otherwise showed little
support for him. In a statement at the Justice Ministry on 27 June 2001, he complained that some
of the governors were elected “by chance,” had no legal education, and knew nothing about gov-
erning the territories they had been elected to administer.20 Further, he proposed that the coun-
try’s entire administrative system be revamped: individual krays and oblasts should be elimina-
ted, he urged; governors should be appointed, and a special law should be passed on the demar-
cation of the powers between the components of the Federation and the personnel of the federal
districts.21 He has also suggested that a district parliament be created, including the heads of all
Far Eastern District regional legislatures, and that its decisions be mandatory for all regions in
the district.22 As Pulikovskiy himself admitted, however, these were simply his personal ideas
and opinions. There has not been any official response to the suggestions, nor does it seem likely
that there will be one.
Pulikovskiy’s involvement in regional elections has weakened, not strengthened, Mos-
cow’s authority in the Russian Far East. Rumors regarding his impending retirement continue to
circulate in the Far East, fueled not only by his lack of success at local elections, but even more
so by other, more serious deficiencies of his regime. These include lack of progress in regional
preparations for the winter; inability to cooperate with regional leaders; failure to give moral
support to suffering Sakha-Yakutiya during a time of severe flooding by choosing to remain in
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23 “Esli energetiki za dolgi otklyuchat elektroenergiyu, esli ne budet tepla i zamerznet boda v
reaktore [strana i region poluchat novyy i] ne ochen malenkiy Chernobyl.” As cited in Vasiliy
Buslayev, “Kogda i za chto osvobodyat Pulikovskogo?” [When and Who will Fire Pulikovskiy?]
Yezhednevnyye Novosti, 20 June 2001, http://novosti.vl.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
24 CNS interview with Khabarovsk customs official, Fall 2000.
Primorye for election campaigns instead of transferring his base of operations; and—perhaps
most critical of all—his deep energy cuts in Khabarovsk kray, which have seriously affected the
military industry in Khabarovsk. Regarding this last, the governor of Khabarovsk kray, Viktor
Ishayev, has come forward with a stark assessment: if the Amurskiy Zavod shipyard has its
power cut off, and a lack of heat causes the water in the reactor to freeze, a “not very small
Chernobyl” may result.23 Despite Pulikovskiy’s poor showing on the regional front, there is little
indication as yet that his position in Moscow has deteriorated. He maintains his position as presi-
dential representative, even though he has done little to increase Moscow’s control over Russia’s
far eastern regions.
Regional Influence Over Local Military Bases and Military Industry
Military bases and military industry are strongly influenced by regional economies, re-
gional crime, and the actions of regional officials. The explanation lies in the inability of Mos-
cow to fully finance the country’s military operations, despite an increase in the amount of tax
moneys collected by the center. Russian bases and defense industries therefore continue to de-
pend on assistance from the local regions, giving regional leaders a strong position from which
to influence their activities. At present it seems very unlikely that the Kremlin will be able to
remove most of the governors’ real powers, other than controls over financial flows from the
center.
It is difficult to quantify regional leaders’ influence, which varies by locality. However,
there are many examples of local officials affecting the military in ways that are certainly not
mandated by the federal government. For instance, in Khabarovsk local military leaders report-
edly consult with Governor Ishayev regarding the timing of military training exercises.24 Regions
in the Russian Far East have resorted to the dangerous practice of cutting off electricity to local
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25 In July 2000, fleet commanders had electricity only a few hours per day, data transmission
equipment was down nine hours per day, and submarine crews were reduced to preparing meals
over wood fires. Agence France Presse, 26 July 2000, in “Power Cuts Put Control of Russian
Pacific Fleet at Risk,” FBIS Document EUP20000726000139.
26 CNS interview with Khabarovsk customs official, Fall 2000.
27 For instance, last November the crew of the Krasnoyarsk SSGN requested that the Krasno-
yarsk governor help them obtain funding for submarine renovations. “Ekipazh atomnoy podlodki
‘Krasnoyarsk’ poprosil Aleksandra Lebedya pomoch v finansirovanii remonta submariny” [The
Crew of the Krasnoyarsk Nuclear Submarine Asked Aleksandr Lebed for Help in the Financing
of Submarine Renovations], ITAR-TASS, 17 November 2000, in Intregrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru, accessed 30 July 2001. Regions have regularly funded food and housing
for submarine crews, and at times actual submarine upkeep. In October, Petropavlovsk-Kam-
chatskiy mayor Aleksandr Dudnikov discovered on a visit to the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatksiy
SSGN that the there were no fire extinguishers or medical kits on board. His city quickly
donated 100,000 rubles for their purchase. Elizaveta Mayetnaya, “Bratyam ‘Kurska’ speshat na
pomoshch” [They are Rushing to Assist the Brothers of the Kursk], Moskovskiy komsomolets, 14
October 2000, in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru, accessed 30 July 2001. Regions
sponsoring Kamchatka-based submarines recently signed documents obligating themselves to 55
years of such sponsorship. “Predstaviteli devyati rossiyskikh gorodov sozdali sovet shefov
soyedineniya atomnykh podvodnykh lodok Tikhookeanskogo flota” [Representatives of Nine
Russian Cities Created a Council of Pacific Fleet Submarine Unit Sponsors], ITAR-TASS, 18
October 2000, in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
28 Crime is a problem even in elite units, such as the Kamchatka Nuclear Submarine Flotilla.
Local criminal organizations have distributed cards to new recruits detailing the location of valu-
able submarine parts and the price they fetch. Thefts are a constant problem, and are often dis-
covered when a submarine prepares to put out to sea. Author’s interview with naval lawyer,
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, July 2000. Less elite units are in even more desperate straits. One
military bases, despite federal prohibitions.25 The bases themselves have devised questionable
ways of supplementing their meager funds: in Khabarovsk, for example, they have reportedly
permitted Chinese citizens to purchase housing on their grounds.26 Submarine crews have asked
for staggering levels of assistance from regional leaders.27
Dependence on local leaders is unlikely to reach the level of actual control over regional
military facilities. It nonetheless leaves both the bases and regional governments open to mutual
blackmail, influences the actions of local military leaders, and can affect levels of military pre-
paredness. The readiness of Far Eastern bases is crucial to Moscow’s ability to project power in
the region. At present, however, most bases are in crisis. In addition to power outages, they suf-
fer from high crime levels, a lack of equipment, and poor training.28 For instance, in an interview
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units, which have become increasingly hopeless. Maksim Dyachenko, “Raskhishcheniye i naka-
zaniye (po Nedostoyevskomu)” [Crime and Punishment (not à la Dostoyevsky)], Gorodskaya
gazeta, 26 October 2000, p. 2.
29 Andrey Karaulov, Center TV, as cited in Monitoring SMI, 27 May 2001, as translated in “Rus-
sia: TV Center Holds Round Table Discussion: Defense Industry Privatization, Arms Exports,”
FBIS Document CEP20010531000357.
on Moscow’s Central television, Far East District Troops Commander Yuriy Yakubovich stated
outright that the Far East Air Force and Air Defense District is only at about 50 percent readi-
ness; the aircraft are aging and there is no maintenance; and pilots rarely fly not because of fuel
shortages, but because aircraft are nearing the end of their life cycle. According to Yakubovish,
the District has not received a single piece of new equipment in seven years. The vehicles are at
least twelve years old, while some artillery pieces, anti-air and antitank systems have been
fielded for as much as 40 and more years.29
Should regional leaders’ influence vis-à-vis the center eventually wane, one would expect
two different effects—both adverse—on the local defense industry: military factories may find it
harder to locate foreign customers and persuade Moscow to accept their sales contracts; they are
also likely to have less central funding and will probably become increasingly desperate. Desper-
ation could well prompt them to undertake illegal sales, and is likely to increase the level of theft
in the plants. Thus weaker regional leaders are unlikely to make it easier for Moscow to control
the military industrial factories located in the regions.
Defense industries may be affected by crime or weak leadership, but they can also benefit
greatly from vigorous regional support. Powerful independent leaders, like Khabarovsk Gover-
nor Ishayev, are effective advocates in Moscow and good salesmen abroad. Thus the Amurskiy
Zavod shipbuilding plant in Komsomolsk-na-Amure has frequently praised Ishayev for his assis-
tance. That plant is currently in talks with India regarding the possible lease or sale of a nuclear
submarine under construction there. The plant and regional government are reported to be
strongly behind the sale, but they face opposition from Moscow. The Russian Foreign Ministry
is rightfully more wary, fearing that such a transaction would open the window to future sales of
nuclear fuel to India. A lease, for which there is precedent in Soviet times, is hardly better, for it
could also involve a fuel transfer (although the vessel could return to Russia for refueling). In
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2000, in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru, accessed 30 July 2001.
31 Vladimir Larin and Sergey Prokhorov, “Where Did Makarov Sell the Projectile?: Special
Services’ Illicit Weapons Trade,” Profil, 28 June 2000, in “Theft, Sale of Weapons Leads to
Concern About Nuclear Warhead Security,” FBIS Document CEP20001129000306.
32 To date, however, most thefts involve metals and spare parts. One of the more interesting cases
involved the smuggling of Su-27 aircraft parts from Khabarovsk to China. Two Russian military
men and one former officer assisted two Chinese citizens in stealing the equipment from the
Komsomolsk-na-Amure Aviation Production Association and active military units. One of the
air regiments had to disband due to a lack of equipment after the thefts. Boris Savelyev, ITAR-
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any event, the lease or sale of a sophisticated SSN (nuclear powered submarine) sets a bad prece-
dent, and should draw the protests from Russia’s and India’s neighbors.30 In the past, Russian
plants agreed to sell equipment to China that the federal government approved only so as not to
harm the bilateral relationship. In sum, notwithstanding the detriment both to local security and
federal interest, regional actors are clearly able to increase the types of technology for sale
abroad.
Illegal sales and thefts not only diminish Russian military readiness, but may even in-
crease the military capabilities of other nations. As yet there are no reports of successful thefts
resulting in the transfer of critical technologies to other nations. But it may only be a matter of
time. North Korea has attempted more than once to obtain the blueprints for Russian nuclear
submarines, as well as their training schedules, but apparently all their efforts were foiled; Rus-
sians themselves tried to steal and sell a top-secret radar complex for the Su-27 aircraft to China
but were also foiled.31 The sheer number of thefts, however, suggests that some may well have
involved technology transfer.32
Military Reforms in the Russian Far East
In addition to problems of underfunding, the military has been undergoing structural re-
forms. One of the first places in Russia to begin the reform of regional force structures was Kam-
chatka, in May 1998. Previously, troops and forces deployed in Kamchatka and Chukotka were
subordinated to five commands in four services (Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Force, and
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33 NIS Nuclear Profiles Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu, accessed 30 July 2001.
34 According to Yuriy Sazonov, military prosecutor of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy garrison,
by April 2001 there had already been five cases in Kamchatka involving attempts by military
staff to sell military property this year. Aleksandr Arkhipov, “Protiv dvukh ofitserov, zaderzhan-
nykh na Kamchatke po podozreniyu v torgovle radioaktivnymi priborami, vozbuzhdeno ugolov-
Army). With the formation of the Northeastern Group of Troops and Forces, all forces except the
two Kamchatka Strategic Rocket Forces bases are now subordinated to the Commander of the
Pacific Fleet (HQ in Vladivostok), with an operational commander stationed in Kamchatka. The
first operational commander was the Commander of the Kamchatskaya Flotilla, Vice-Admiral
Valeriy Dorogin. The creation of a unified group should reduce complexity and increase opera-
tional support of the forces, and it has already resulted in the shrinking of the command super-
structure and elimination of duplicate logistic and other structures. But the process of reform is
difficult, as officers and bases try to benefit from the changes and fight to maintain their posi-
tions when facing elimination. The situation in Kamchatka was not helped when Dorogin ran for
State Duma deputy, was then elected, and served as both operational commander of the North-
eastern Group and deputy for about six months, before a replacement commander was sent.
The biggest reforms in Primorye and Khabarovsk relate to base closings, and the transfer
of the nuclear-powered submarine force to Kamchatka. There are already several bases without
active nuclear vessels, including Zavety Ilyicha in Khabarovsk and Razboynik Bay in Primorye,
which still have decommissioned vessels, and Rakushka Naval Base in Vladimir Bay, Primorye,
which has been completely shut down. The facilities with decommissioned submarines continue
to require a strong guard force, as well as personnel to maintain the safety of on-board reactors.
(As of July 2001, Zavety Ilyicha had three decommissioned submarines that had yet to be
defueled, while Primorye had 15 decommissioned attack submarines with fuel, of which three
were contaminated.)33 There are also great quantities of spent nuclear submarine fuel remaining
in Primorye. This fuel remains a proliferation risk due to its highly enriched uranium. Although
some of the fuel has been in storage for many years, and its radioactivity is thus decreasing, a
nation like North Korea could still use it to construct nuclear devices, should they succeed in
obtaining it. Russia’s other Asian neighbors thus have every reason to make the desperate cir-
cumstances of the guards around such facilities a top concern.34
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noye delo” [A Criminal Case Has Been Brought Against Two Officers Arrested in Kamchatka
on Suspicion of Trading Radioactive Instruments], ITAR-TASS, 28 April 2001, in Integrum
Techno, http://www.integrum.ru, accessed 15 May 2001. Recent incidents involving thefts from
nuclear-powered submarines in the Russian Far East include a March 2000 attempt by five
guards were to steal metal from a partially dismantled Yankee-class submarine. The men, who
had been earning about $25 a month, were asphyxiated in the submarine. “Gibelnaya Chazhma”
[Fatal Chazhma], Vladivostok, 22 March 2000, http://vl.vladnews.ru, accessed 30 July 2001. In
an incident with potentially drastic consequences, in January 2000 two sailors bribed a guard and
broke into a decommissioned nuclear submarine with two functioning nuclear reactors. They
removed a number of elements from the reactor control unit and also seized radioactive cali-
brating material with the aim of selling the material on the black market. They were unable to
raise the reactor fuel rods because a mechanic, acting on his own initiative, had bolted down the
rods the previous day. Mikhail Druzhinin, “Matrosy razdolbali yadernyy reaktor” [Sailors Break
a Nuclear Reactor], Kommersant-daily, 29 January 2000, http://www.online.ru, accessed 30 July
2001.
35 Not all protests are negative. While environmental protests against commendable dismantle-
ment efforts in Primorye are unfortunate, protests against the mishandling of spent rocket fuel in
Primorye and Kamchatka may have a positive affect on military safety. Vladivostok, 20 May
1997, p. 3; “Melanzh s chasovym mekhanizmom” [Rocket Fuel on a Timer], Novosti, 2 Novem-
ber 2000, http://novosti.vl.ru, accessed 30 July 2001; “Genshtab poklyalsya nas ne travit” [The
General Staff Promised Not to Poison Us], Novosti, 24 January 2001, http://novosti.vl.ru,
accessed 30 July 2001; “Dorogina otmyvayut. . .” [They are Washing Dorogin Clean], Kamchat-
skoye vremya, 16 November 2000, pp. 8-9.
To sum up, Russia’s regions have an impact on local defense facilities and military plants
through the general level of criminality and poverty in the region, as well as through the direct
actions of regional leaders. These actions can be positive, such as the provision of assistance or
free electricity to military bases (although regional assistance is of course not a good way to fund
the military in the long run). They can also be negative, as when regions cut off electricity or
protest against activities in local bases.35 Military readiness in the region has also been affected
by the reforms of Russia’s armed services, which may strengthen forces in the long term but are
costly in the short term. The level of preparedness conditions the policies Moscow can realisti-
cally hope to implement. At present Moscow’s military maneuvering in Asia is like a Potemkin
village: all show with nothing behind it. Nevertheless, military facilities still house great num-
bers of arms as well as nuclear materials and chemicals. Should their security be breached, as the
necessary guard personnel is compromised, these materials could fall into foreign hands. This
threat could prove as great to Russia’s neighbors as its military might.
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Russia’s Relations with China
Chinese-Russian relations are now at a high point. They began to thaw already in 1986,
in the latter days of the USSR, leading to Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in 1989. The de-
crease of Russian military power in 1991 increased China’s incentives to deal with Russia, and
in December 1992 the two countries signed an agreement on the mutual reduction of armaments
and the development of more open military relations in border areas.36 In 1994 the relationship
was defined as a “constructive partnership,” with the word “strategic” added in the Sino-Russian
Joint Communiqué of 25 April 1996, four days after the U.S.-Japanese Joint Security Statement
was issued.37 At the August 1999 “Shanghai Five” summit meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan,
presidents Yeltsin and Jiang furthered harmony between the two nations, with both speaking out
against U.S. plans for theater missile defenses and U.S. “hegemony” and calling for a multipolar
world.38
During Putin’s July 2000 visit to China, he and Jiang Zemin signed five documents,
including a denunciation of American national missile defense (NMD) plans, a pledge to work
together against “hegemonism, power politics and group politics” (references to U.S. and NATO
actions), and a joint statement noting that “the incorporation of Taiwan into any foreign missile
defense system is unacceptable and will seriously undermine regional stability.” The latter was
the first official Russian endorsement of Chinese opposition to an Asian theater defense (TMD)
system. Moscow subsequently declared that Russia would “not support any form of Taiwan
independence” and would refuse to sell armaments to Taiwan.39 On 16 July 2001, President
Putin and Chinese leader Jiang Zemin signed a Treaty on Good-Neighborly Relations, Friend-
ship, and Cooperation, and a separate declaration stressing their commitment to the principles of
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the 1972 U.S.-Soviet40 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.41 Just two days later, however,
meeting with U.S. President George Bush, Putin pledged not to join forces with China should
Washington abandon the ABM Treaty to develop a missile shield.42 Instead, he said Russia and
China would emphasize economic cooperation, including military sales.43
China’s “strategic partnership” with Russia is unlikely to turn into a true security pact
unless the rest of the world forces the two nations together. Too many conflicts of interest work
against their becoming true allies, and in China’s eyes what Russia may have to offer is no sub-
stitute for Western technology and trade, although at least in the near term China continues to
show interest in Russian armaments. The two states are chiefly drawn together by geopolitical
factors. Both wish to play a role in world politics; it is in their interest to cooperate in “balanc-
ing” the United States, a country they see as trying to play an undeserved hegemonic role. To
lessen the likelihood that Russia and China might establish a true security pact, other nations, the
United States in particular, should encourage their participation in world affairs and work on
providing positive incentives to reduce cooperation in the security sphere.
As for economic ties, the more dependent the financial well-being of the Russian Far East
(both military and non-military) is on China, the less room for maneuver Moscow has. At pres-
ent, China is an important economic partner in the non-military realm, but has far from a monop-
oly position in the region. In fact, China’s own continuing efforts to reform its state-owned in-
dustries do not permit sufficient investment in Russia to help buoy its economy. Although it is
not in Chinese interest to see the Russian economy collapse, China alone cannot maintain her
neighbor’s financial health. Despite a rumor in Moscow that Beijing may offer to repay Russia’s
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international debts, there is as yet little indication that China has any intention of assisting in
Russian economic development.44
In the military-industrial sphere, however, China’s role looms large. While today’s China
benefits from acquiring Russian arms technology, Russia may soon run out of weapons it is able,
and willing, to sell. Moscow has in fact attempted to prevent the sale of critical weapons tech-
nology, lest it be turned against Russia. At times, however, subnational Russian actors have sub-
verted central controls, as noted above. Should the Russian economy collapse, the already shaky
condition of military plants in the Far East could well plummet further. Should the economy im-
prove, the factories that do not benefit thereby may try finding illegal ways to supplement their
incomes. To counter such dangers and affect these plants positively other nations can seek to
engage them, by helping them convert, purchasing their products, and/or encouraging them to
merge (larger, national companies are more easily controlled). Russia’s relationship with China
is not necessarily a danger to the United States and other states in the north Pacific. It is more
likely to become a threat, however, if Russia has no other economic or security partners in the
region.
Russia’s Relations with Japan
Russia’s relationship with Japan faces various hurdles, the most important of which is a
territorial dispute going back to World War II and the consequent lack of a peace treaty between
the two nations. The development of economic ties, which would be difficult under the best of
circumstances, has been stymied by these political problems.45 It would be in the best interest of
both nations to conclude an agreement. However, politicians in both capitals need arguments that
will play in the domestic political arena in order to make coming to a compromise feasible. In
Russia, Putin could use his reputation as a strong nationalist and point to the 1956 Soviet-Japa-
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nese Declaration to justify giving two of the disputed islands to Japan. Japan’s present govern-
ment, however, is unlikely to compromise unless other states provide some political cover.
Territorial Dispute Negotiations
The four disputed islands, called the southern Kurils by the Russians and Northern Terri-
tories by the Japanese, were seized by Soviet troops at the end of World War II. Tokyo has pro-
posed the redrawing of the Russian-Japanese border so that the islands will ultimately return to
Japan. Moscow has instead suggested focusing on a peace treaty that would formally end World
War II, or signing an interim treaty, and postponing the territorial issue. But Japan has refused to
separate the two issues, and has also tied a solution of the territorial issue to the full normaliza-
tion of political and economic relations between the two nations and increased Japanese financial
aid to Russia.
There have been hints that the Japanese stance might be softening: on 27 July 2000
Hiromu Nonaka, secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party, suggested that Tokyo de-link
the territorial and treaty questions, and on 31 July Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Yutaka
Kawashima said that Japan should consider allowing talks to continue beyond a year-end dead-
line.46 Other Japanese officials, including then-Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, however, made it
clear that the official Japanese position remained unchanged.47
With the accession of Vladimir Putin and the passing of 1 January 2000—the deadline set
in 1997 to adopt a treaty—Japan proposed a new time limit: the end of 2000.48 Putin and Mori
met four times in 2000, but came no closer to agreement. In fall 2000 Putin reportedly suggested
a way out of the deadlock: reviving the moribund 1956 Soviet-Japanese Declaration, whereby
two of the four islands—Shikotan and the Habomai group of islets—would be handed over to
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Japan after a peace treaty is signed. In 1960 the Soviet Union had rescinded the agreement, after
Japan and the United States revised their security treaty.
Not long afterwards, however, in November 2000, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Aleksandr Losyukov, the Russian diplomat who oversees Russia’s relations with Japan, averred
that the two countries were interpreting the 1956 agreement differently: the Japanese considered
the return of two islands only a prelude to negotiations on the return of the other two, while the
Russians believed the 1956 agreement allowed Moscow to retain permanent control of the other
two islands. On 1 December 2000, disputing Losyukov’s claim, the Japanese denied that the two
countries differed in their interpretation of the 1956 accord. In turn, the Russian Foreign Minis-
try countered three days later that it was not considering the handover of even two islands. The
Japanese side subsequently hardened its position as well.49
Talks between Foreign Ministers Yohei Kono and Igor Ivanov in January 2001 did not
move the negotiations forward. And by this time Losyukov was declaring outright that Russia
had no intention of ceding any of the four islands, although he did grant that Russian and Japa-
nese experts were “very actively” discussing the 1956 declaration.50 The meetings ended acrimo-
niously when Kono, against Moscow’s wishes, publicly announced that heads of state Putin and
Mori would meet on 25–26 February. After the Kono announcement, the Russians denied Kono
an expected meeting with Putin and informed him that the February summit date was off.51
Nevertheless, a new summit date, 25 March, was set during a Putin-Mori telephone call on 13
January.
Just one day later, however, on 14 January 2001 Russian bombers twice breached Japa-
nese airspace. Several times in the past decade Russian military forces have undertaken actions
that irritated Japan just when diplomatic relations were taking a positive turn.52 It is possible
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these actions were initiated by the military, either in the center or the region, to harm the terri-
torial talks. The violation of Japanese airspace came in stark contrast to the flight of Russian
bombers near Norway that same day: none of the aircraft from Russia’s northwest entered Nor-
wegian airspace. In addition, Russia had advised Norway of its intended maneuvers near the
Norwegian border, but reportedly sent Japan no such advisories.53
An additional problem the two countries may face is the possible Russian default on an
initial payment of US$6 million due on Soviet-era debts to Japan.54 As of March 2001, neverthe-
less, Russia was making some effort to begin repaying its obligations.55
At the March 2001 summit meeting in Irkutsk Putin and Mori issued the “Irkutsk Decla-
ration,” wherein the two leaders agreed that the 1956 declaration is a “fundamental legal docu-
ment” which serves as the “starting point” of the peace treaty process; this was the first written
confirmation of the validity of the 1956 pact. But the future of the peace-treaty process remained
unclear, as Mori and Putin differed in their interpretation of what the Irkutsk Declaration really
meant and set no new deadline for concluding a pact formally ending World War II hostilities.56
Furthermore, after the summit Russia and Japan disputed whether their leaders had agreed on a
“double-framework approach” to the territorial question. According to the Russian Foreign Min-
istry, “no ‘separate consultations’ were agreed upon at the March summit.” Mori, on the other
hand, asserted that Japan and Russia had come to terms on two frameworks governing the return
of the islands. One of the two would detail the conditions for returning the Habomai group of
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islets and Shikotan Island, while the fate of the other two islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, would
be addressed under a separate framework.57
The new Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, appears to be taking a harder line
toward Russia than did his predecessor. He sent a letter to Putin seeking clarification of the own-
ership of all four islands, rather than espousing the two-track approach favored by Mori. The let-
ter met with a very negative Russian response. Should Koizumi maintain his current position,
negotiations are unlikely to move forward.58 He and Putin met in person for the first time on 21
July, during the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy. Both indicated their desire to continue bilateral
talks. Putin invited Koizumi to visit Russia early in 2002, and both sides agreed to meet during
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Shanghai in autumn 2001.59
Given Putin’s well-cultivated image as defender of Russia’s national interest, he would
probably be able to use the 1956 declaration as justification for returning two of the four islands.
The strong showing of Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party in the 2001 Japanese parliamentary
elections60 indicates that the current prime minister may be the strongest Japan has had in quite
some time. But unless other nations provide some political cover, inducing concessions on the
islands issue, it is unlikely that he will be able to meet Russia halfway.
Possible Future Solutions
Radical measures seem called for in order to resolve the decades-long stalemate between
Japan and Russia. It would, for instance, certainly be in the interest of other Western and Pacific
nations to induce Japan to some kind of accommodation. Other countries, including the United
States, could promise more actively to support a seat for Japan on the United Nations Security
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Council in return for signing such an agreement; and Russia would certainly do well to promote
it. In addition, the United States, Japan, and Russia could establish a trilateral security pact link-
ing a solution to the territorial issue with Russia’s entry into NATO, and giving Japan observer
status at NATO, as well as support for a United Nations Security Council seat. Involving Russia
in international security pacts would fit in well with current attempts to ease Moscow’s fears of
U.S. missile defense plans.
A peace treaty between Japan and Russia would improve the strategic balance in the re-
gion, increasing Japanese political influence in the region and lessening China’s. If attaining a
peace treaty proves impossible, Japan should be encouraged to sign an interim agreement, sepa-
rating the territorial issue from other matters. At the very least, other nations ought to engage
both Japan and Russia in multilateral solutions to Asian security concerns, such as the problem
of missile and nuclear development in North Korea.
Increased Japanese economic activity in the Russian Far East could help to stabilize that
region, and lessen the likelihood of desperate undertakings by local Russian firms. Japan should
be encouraged, for example, to assist in the conversion of Russian military facilities to peace-
time use, but on its own Japan is unlikely to succeed in this realm. To date Tokyo’s efforts have
been plagued by problems. In particular, a project to build a radioactive waste filtration facility
in Primorye, the Russian territory closest to Japan, has faced huge cost overruns and resulted in
the loss of face and jobs by the top Japanese involved.61 It has also failed to build an institutional
base for further cooperation. On the other hand, despite some shortcomings, U.S. nonprolifera-
tion programs have created a constituency in both nations for continued cooperation. The United
States would be well advised to share its experience with the Japanese, and help them spend
profitably the money they have allocated for Russian assistance projects. Other nations too
would do well to cooperate with Japan in the Russian Far East.62
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Russia’s Relations with the Koreas
After a decade of neglect, Russia’s relations with North Korea (DPRK) have slowly
begun improving. Its relations with the South, which showed a marked improvement in the early
1990s, may once again be on the upswing. Three state visits are helping to smooth these paths: in
February 2001 Putin visited South Korea; in April Kim Il-chol, DPRK Minister of the People’s
Armed Forces, came to Moscow (the first visit by a high-level military official in a decade), and
on 4 August North Korean leader Kim Jong-il himself arrived in the Russian capital. Neverthe-
less, Russia’s ties with both nations remain at a fairly rudimentary level, although she has indi-
cated her eagerness to improve them. One positive sign was the 15 May 2001 call by South Ko-
rean (ROK) National Assembly Speaker Lee Man-sup for parliamentary talks involving Russia
and both Koreas to promote economic cooperation among the three nations.63
South Korea
South Korea has made some gestures towards Russia, for example, by joining Russia in a
statement, issued on 27 February 2001, declaring support for the 1972 anti-ballistic missile trea-
ty. Since then South Korea has felt it necessary to qualify the statement by indicating that it was
not meant as a declaration against U.S. NMD plans.64 The Russian-South Korean relationship
faces several difficulties. Russia owes South Korea some $1.8 billion. The two nations are also
having trouble overcoming obstacles to building new railway lines that would link both Koreas
with Russia.65 Finally, North Korea largely absorbs the South’s attention and resources.
Some Russian analysts have suggested that South Korea might have a role to play in bal-
ancing Chinese, Japanese, and American influence in the Russian Far East. It would be advisable
200
66 Tan Wen Li, “Concern as Putin Reaches Out for Closer Ties with Asia,” The Straits Times, 6
March 2001, in “Singapore Columnist Notes Concern over Putin’s Efforts to Boost Ties With
Asia,” FBIS Document SEP20010305000117.
67 Kim Tu-hwan, “DPRK-Russia Cementing a Cooperative Relationship,” Yonhap, 20 July 2001,
as translated in “ROK Daily on DPRK-Russia Consolidation of Friendship and Cooperation,”
FBIS Document KPP20010720000102.
for the United States and Japan to encourage an increase in South Korea’s activity in Russia
where possible. The Russian Far East is home to many ethnic Koreans, and South Korea has
shown an interest in assisting the region, no doubt in part because an economic collapse in Rus-
sia would not help the North Korean situation. It would probably make sense to involve South
Korea there even more, by having it join programs sponsored by the United States and other
countries, and by establishing a multilateral insurance program to encourage South Korean, as
well as other foreign companies to invest in the Russian Far East. The joint declaration resulting
from the February 2001 summit meeting, whereby South Korea agreed to boost Korean invest-
ment in a major Siberian natural gas field, is a step in the right direction.66
North Korea
The Russian-North Korean relationship has been slowly improving. In February 2000
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Pyongyang and concluded a “Treaty of Good Will,
Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between North Korea and Russia.” The treaty stipulates
that both countries will develop friendly relations based on mutual respect, nonintervention in
domestic affairs, equality, reciprocity, territorial rights, and international legal principles.67 Dur-
ing Putin’s visit to North Korea from 19 to 20 July 2000, a “DPRK-Russia Joint Declaration”
was adopted, which included calls for improved bilateral relations and increased cooperation as
well as joint pronouncements on several key international issues, including a North Korean state-
ment of support for Russian efforts to maintain and strengthen the ABM treaty. The declaration
also included the statement that “the DPRK and Russia oppose interference in other states’ inter-
nal affairs perpetrated under the pretext of humanitarian intervention and support each other’s
efforts to defend . . . independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” as well as the pledge
that “the two countries will contact each other without delay when the danger of invasion is im-
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minent, or when peace and security of the two are threatened”—a promise that could be inter-
preted to mean that Russia would come to the North’s aid in a conflict with the South.68
The character of these new ties is not yet set and it is thus important at this time to
strengthen the positive aspects. Since North Korea has little reason to fear Russia, Moscow could
play a positive part in multilateral talks involving Pyongyang. While some issues concerning
North Korea and its relations with South Korea, China, the United States, and Japan must be
solved on a bilateral basis, other questions, particular those that have reached a stalemate, might
benefit from opening up more wide-ranging talks including the participation of Russia. Assis-
tance in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table will give Russia more weight in Seoul,
increasing the likelihood of a further improvement in economic ties between Russia and South
Korea. Further, acting as mediator in North Korea could calm Russian fears of losing its role in
international affairs. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s request in July 2001 that Putin tell
Kim Jong-il that it is in his interest to resume talks with Seoul and Washington is a good begin-
ning.69
If Russia is not involved in a positive way in North Korea, Russian-DPRK ties will be
relegated to the military sphere. Indeed, when DPRK Minister of People’s Armed Forces Kim Il-
chol visited Moscow in April 2001, he signed an intergovernmental agreement on defense indus-
try cooperation. The pact did not appear to comprise any large Korean purchases of Russian mil-
itary equipment. However, in the run-up to the coming Putin-Kim meeting, Moscow has report-
edly promised to sell North Korea a number of high-tech weapons. According to an official Rus-
sian source cited by the Korea Herald, the North Koreans have requested S-300 ground-to-air
missiles, an anti-aircraft radar navigation system, 3,000-ton-class warships, advanced T-90
tanks, technology and technical support for the production of MiG-29 fighters, and missile and
rocket components, as well as reconnaissance photos filmed from aircraft and military satellites
on a regular basis. Apparently Pyongyang asked Moscow to provide the weapons in return for
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the North’s approval of the Traversing Korea Railways project, linking South Korea to Russia by
rail. This development contrasts with Russian Prime Minister Igor Ivanov’s statements indicating
that Russia will mainly sell spare parts, and that its arms sales will not compromise stability on
the Korean Peninsula.70 The revival of Russian arms sales to North Korea is a step in the wrong
direction. Russia should be encouraged to minimize such military deals and instead maximize
transactions in non-military areas that will contribute to the stabilization and internationalization
of the North Korean economy. Should the arms sales go through, the good will they will no
doubt engender in Pyongyang should be used to further international efforts to engage North
Korea.
To promote the valuable aspects of Russia’s connections with North Korea (and mini-
mize the less favorable ones) a number of options can fruitfully be explored. First and foremost,
the Russian wish to play a role in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO)71 should be granted. While Russia cannot afford to provide the level of funding that
would normally be required to acquire the status of executive member on the project, the other
executive members (the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union) should help
Moscow find another way to contribute. For instance, Russia could be entrusted with upgrading
the North Korean power grid—a safety necessity once the light-water reactors go online—and
could also integrate the North Korean grid with Russia’s. Improving the power grid could help
the DPRK even before the light-water reactors go online, since Russia has excess power capacity
in the summer, when North Korea has power shortages, and a power deficit in the winter, when
North Korean hydroelectric power production is at its height. In addition, Russia’s participation
could increase its understanding of the project, and become as well a new avenue for the United
States to use in addressing a difficult issue: making Russia understand why, on the one hand,
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selling power reactors to Iran is a security problem but exporting them to North Korea instead
solves security problems.
Finally, there is the small chance that the Russians might prove useful in calming the
North Koreans as 2003 approaches and the light-water reactors are not yet complete, or in per-
suading the North Koreans not to react too strongly to the current anti-Pyongyang rhetoric ema-
nating from Washington. The Russians believe they are better able to understand North Korean
motives, given their long history of interactions with the nation and their understanding of the
North Korean political system. After a tense decade the recent improvement in their mutual rela-
tions gives hope that Moscow may have some new ideas on how to cooperate with the Pyong-
yang regime—ideas beneficial to the international community.
While Moscow does not share all of Washington’s concerns regarding North Korea, in-
creased Russian participation in North Korean negotiations is likely to do American mediators
more good than harm. Most Asian nations will be more confident if new multilateral solutions
can be found to long-standing security problems, instead of continuing the present pattern of ad
hoc, bilateral solutions. On 26 July Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov suggested that existing
talks—between the two Koreas, between North Korea, the United States, and Japan, and be-
tween North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and Japan—be supplemented by discussions
involving six countries: South Korea, North Korea, Russia, the United States, China, and
Japan.72
As for regional ties, North Korea and Russian regional actors began to cooperate about a
decade ago, but that local economic cooperation has remained at a low level. North Korea has
had the most contact with Primorye, the region with which it shares a border, particularly in the
fishing and sea transport industries. At present the question of using fuel oil at North Korea’s
Radzhin oil terminal to increase electricity production in Primorye is under consideration. The
Primorsk power company Dalenergo has held talks with its North Korean counterparts several
times since 1994 regarding the possible mutual sale of electricity, but has been unable to move
the issue forward without central support. The Traversing Korea Railways project—to build a
railroad from the Russian border to South Korea, which would reduce freight times to Europe
from the present 40-45 days via the Suez Canal, to about 14 days—may not be a boon to the
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Russian Far East. According to Khabarovsk Governor Ishayev, the railroad would provide a link
from South Korea’s huge port at Pusan, through China and Russia, to Europe, drawing away
traffic from ports in the Russian Far East. Ishayev predicts the “death” of Primorye’s and Kha-
barovsk’s ports, were this to happen.73 Moscow is still pushing the project, since it would im-
prove Russian relations with both Koreas. The Russian Far East also hosts North Korean guest
workers, who typically work in construction or forestry. However, the overall level of economic
ties between the two nations is small. In the first quarter of 2000, Primorye’s trade turnover with
North Korea was $280,650; as of that time North Korea had invested in eight enterprises in Pri-
morye.74 The amount of money guest workers send home appears to be significant for the wel-
fare of their families in North Korea. This regional economic cooperation should be supported
and expanded, both for the economic benefits and for the opportunity it provides to interact with
the North Korean population.
Russia’s Relations with the United States
The United States has been disappointed in the results of policies designed to aid Russian
economic and political development. Whether failures were due to insufficient funding, Russian
corruption, or other reasons, a decision by the United States to withdraw from economic and
political aid projects could push Russia into actions counterproductive to U.S. interests. Encour-
aging our friends in Asia to engage Russia positively and become involved in its economy would
help stabilize the region while lessening the need for a strong U.S. presence there. The United
States should use its influence to promote the engagement of Japan and South Korea in particu-
lar, and support an increase in Russian ties to other states in the region as well.
If the United States and its friends disengage, Russia will be forced to find allies else-
where. Already, Putin has had meetings with Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qadhafi, and Fidel
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Castro. Even if one believes that Russia’s embrace of rogue regimes is merely a temporary tactic
to engender more attention from the West, one should be wary of pushing too hard and boxing
Russia in: there is a real danger that a Russia in desperate financial straits might begin to make
questionable military sales to such countries.
Although the United States is trying to decrease its direct engagement in Russia in gen-
eral, regarding the Russian Far East in particular the level of interaction is already quite low, and
certainly shows no sign of increasing. Yet even without large amounts of government funding
there are many things that the United States can do to help stabilize the Russian Far East: pro-
moting Russian security at a strategic level, conversion assistance, encouraging U.S. investment
in Russia, and sponsoring nonproliferation assistance programs.
There have been several very successful assistance programs in the nuclear field, but
plans for future projects have run into some problems. Particularly regarding possible help with
submarine dismantlement in Kamchatka, American actions have created an aura of mistrust
among the local population. During negotiations on this issue the United States has not made
sufficient efforts to inform the public or Kamchatka government. While U.S. government offi-
cials cannot divulge any details of ongoing negotiations, they could issue a press bulletin on
progress of the talks, indicating that no agreement has yet been made, that they will issue further
statements when one is concluded, and that U.S. funding will only be forthcoming for projects
that meet all Russian environmental requirements. A bulletin may not quell all rumors but should
improve the prospect for future public acceptance of any deal that might be forthcoming. The
problems with U.S. nonproliferation assistance programs have rarely concerned the level of
funding so much as a failure to understand Russian incentives and local politics.
As for economic assistance, Western plans to date have been disappointing. Loan pro-
grams, such as those by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), have
had some success, but mostly on a small scale. These have had no noticeable impact on military
industry. Arrangements to send short-term advisors to Russian companies have had even poorer
results. Instead, the West should consider instituting a program to provide additional insurance to
foreigners investing in particular Russian industries, in order to reduce the risk of investment and
induce Western capital to fund the conversion of Russian military industries.
There is at present no plan to assist with military conversion, although U.S. projects to
eliminate SSBNs have de facto created some opportunities for conversion in the local military-
206
75 For arguments in favor of the United States pursuing the Russian missile defense proposals,
see Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, “Russia Can Be Our Ally on Missile Defense,” New York
Times, 27 February 2001, p. 23, http://www.nytimes.com, accessed 27 February 2001.
industrial complex. These actions have not been enough, however, to eliminate the risks of theft
or sales of strategic equipment or materials abroad. If a government-funded conversion program
is unpalatable, then at the very least the United States and other foreign governments should look
for ways to promote private investment that results in conversion.
Direct U.S. contacts with the Russian military have been at a very superficial level, and
while helpful, have gone only a short way in increasing mutual confidence. Much much more
needs to be done. Foreign states cannot and should not assist the Russian military in improving
its readiness. On the contrary, through adroit diplomacy they may even influence further closing
of Russian bases. By helping Russia to find a role to play in Asia and by paying attention to its
security concerns in the region, other nations can influence Russian decisions over the level of
military preparedness deemed necessary in the region. It will be very difficult to increase Rus-
sia’s sense of security, however, if the United States develops a missile shield without Russian
acquiescence. Washington should make every possible attempt to consider and deal with Russian
and Chinese security concerns when going forward with missile defense plans, in particular mak-
ing a full effort to review Russian missile defense suggestions even if those suggestions seem
less than concrete.75
Concluding Remarks
Russia’s impact on East Asia is likely to increase. By fostering improved Russian ties
with Japan and the Koreas, as well as the West, the United States and its allies could help Russia
to play a positive role. The West also has an opportunity to steer the Sino-Russian relationship in
a non-military direction. If left alone, without political and economic engagement, the Russian
state could well collapse, resulting in the destabilization of the region.
Although Russia has played little part in Asia during the past decade, current economic
trends suggest that its footprint in Asia is likely to change. Increasing reliance on raw materials
means the domestic economy is shifting to the east. Rising transport costs increasingly cut off
the Russian Far East from the rest of the national economy, so that it will not survive without in-
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creasing trade with Asia. The infrastructure in the Russian Far East, in particular, is nearing
collapse. East Asia is unlikely to be able to stabilize Russia if the nations in the area are left to
develop their relationships on a bilateral basis. Few Japanese businesses will go into Russia
without government support, and the government will not offer that support until the long
delayed peace treaty between Russia and Japan is concluded. The United States can play a role
in assisting in treaty negotiations. South Korean investment in Russia could increase if Moscow
participates more fully in multilateral negotiations regarding North Korea. Involving Russia in
some North Korean issues, particularly KEDO, has other potential benefits: helping Russia solve
its energy problem in the Primorye region, assuaging geopolitical concerns, and perhaps even
providing new ideas on how to deal with North Korea.
There is little disadvantage to increasing multilateral activities in the region. On the other
hand there is a great danger in leaving Russia out in the cold. It remains a large nation with many
weapons, including nuclear weapons and materials. While past policies may not all have proven
successful, current Western governments should look for new policies of engagement, not isola-
tion. There are many unexploited opportunities for involving other East Asian nations in solving
the Russia problem. Avoiding chaos in the largest nation in Asia should be a top priority of the
next decade.
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